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Foreword
By
Julie JCH Ryan, D.SC.
CEO, Wyndrose Technical Group

It cannot be denied: the inventions and uses of technologies over
the long eons of human existence have both improved and
disrupted our existence. Cooking food improved the efficiency of
caloric intake, freeing up time and energy for other pursuits
(Wrangham, 2009). Mastering symbolic representation by painting
on the walls of caves enabled the capture and transfer of intellectual
capital (Mthen, 2006). Over the centuries, curious inventors have
improved, replaced, and combined technologies in ways that have
radically altered the way we interact with and live in the world.
With each step forward, it may seem like only small bits of progress
are being made. It is only when one sits back and considers where
we are, and what technologies are rapidly being integrated into
our living experience, that the magnitude of disruption becomes
apparent.
With the publication of this book, Disruptive Technologies With
Applications In Airline, Marine, Defense Industries, the writing team
assembled by Professor Randall K. Nichols takes a hard look at
the autonomous technologies that are being incorporated into the
dimensions of air, land, and sea, the potential disruptive effects
of those technologies, and the implications to societal norms and
rules. While this book is primarily intended to be a textbook, it
should be of interest to anyone who needs to understand the
changes that are being unleashed by the revolutions in size,
capability, and diversity of autonomous vehicles. The authors come
from an extremely diverse background, ranging from law to science,
Foreword | 11

and bring a wealth of experience, knowledge, and opinion. Why are
these important? Knowledge is the fundamental understanding of
something, experience is a sophisticated appreciation of real world
impacts, and opinion is the application of experience to knowledge
with a view to the future.
Foretelling the future — what will happen — is an interesting
problem: the only thing the forecaster can possibly know is that
they will be wrong about the forecast. The question is how wrong.
Forecasts are important and useful even though they will get
aspects wrong. Good and lucky forecasts get only minor details
wrong while other forecasts can be subverted through sloppy
analysis or simply bad luck. But every forecast brings useful
information to the table. Thinking about what could potentially
happen in the future informs our ability to make choices. These
choices could include policies to make a potential future more likely,
or they could include policies to keep a potential future from
happening.

Understanding

and

thinking

about

disruptive

technologies and what futures they can possibly bring about is
important for students, educators, and leaders in every field. This
book provides an underpinning for that type of analysis by bringing
together the diversity of topics in one sweeping consideration of
technological development.
The future is upon us. We simply need to understand the
implications.
Julie JCH Ryan, D.SC.
CEO, Wyndrose Technical Group
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Preface
Disruptive Technologies With Applications in Airline, Marine,
Defense Industries is our fifth textbook in a series covering the
world of Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations On Air, Sea,
Land; Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and
Operations; Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain:
Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd edition; and Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the Cyber Domain Protecting USA’s
Advanced Air Assets, 1st edition; have seen considerable global
recognition in the field. (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) (Nichols R. , et al.,
2020) (Nichols R. , et al., 2019) (Nichols R. K., 2018)
The authors have expanded their purview beyond UAS / CUAS
/ UUV systems we have written extensively about in our previous
four books. Our new title shows our concern for the emergence of
Disruptive Technologies and how they apply to the Airline, Marine
and Defense industries.
There is a difference between emerging technology trends and
disruptive ones. Emerging technologies are technologies whose
development, practical applications, or both are still largely
unrealized,

such

that

they

are

figuratively

emerging

into

prominence from a background of nonexistence or obscurity. (Wiki,
2021) Some sources say that emerging technologies are taking over
the world by a storm and if misused, it could turn out to be our
worst enemy. (Rose, 2019) Toward Data Science magazine lists
Drone Swarms as number one in their list. The topic covered in
detail in (Nichols R. , et al., 2020). Smart home devices that spy, ex.
IoT or AI / IoT is number two, followed by facial recognition, spy
dust and autonomous robots. (Rose, 2019)
A Disruptive technology is one that displaces an established
14 | Preface

technology and shakes up the industry or a ground-breaking
product that creates a completely new industry. (Rouse, 2021)
That is what our book is about. We think we have found
technology trends that will replace the status quo or disrupt the
conventional technology paradigms.
We have written some explosive chapters in Book 5. Dr. Hans
Mumm has written about the advances in Automation & Human
Machine Interface. Wayne Lonstein, JD has given the reader a solid
look at Social Media as a Battleground in Information Warfare (IW).
CEO Bart Shields has delivered a viable, less risky, more robust
cyber-security alterative / replacement for the popular Blockchain
Algorithm and a clean solution for Ransomware. Professor Randall
Nichols has written about the advanced sensor technologies that
are used by UUVs for munitions characterization, assessment, and
classification. He reports on their counter hostile use of UUVs
against US capital assets in the South China Seas. In a second
chapter, Professor Nichols has challenged the status quo and
debunked the climate change fraud with verifiable facts. In his third
chapter, he explodes our minds with nightmare technologies that if
they come to fruition may do more harm than good. Some of them
might reach Black Swan event status. [1]
Dr. Mark Jackson has written authoritatively about Propulsion
and Fuels: Disruptive Technologies for Submersible Craft Including
UUVs. CEO Randall Mai has penned a chapter to challenge the
ammunition industry by grassroots use of recycled metals and an
alternative propellant – air. Captain John – Paul Hood writes about
the changing landscape of UAS regulations and privacy. 2021 will
prove to be challenging for owners and manufacturers of UAS. CEO
& Dr. Suzanne Sincavage and Professor Candice Carter have teamed
up to scare the pants off of us – especially during the COVID-19
pandemic – by detailing Bioterrorism Risks, Biodefense, Biological
Threat Agents, and the need for advanced sensors to detect these
attacks.
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Over two years of solid research by a team of nine SMEs is
incorporated into our book. We trust you will enjoy reading it as
much as we have in its writing.
Best
Randall K Nichols, DTM
Professor of Practice
Director, Unmanned Aircraft Systems –
Cybersecurity Certificate Program
Managing Editor / Co-Author
Kansas State University Polytechnic Campus &
Professor Emeritus – Cybersecurity, Utica College
LinkedIn Profile:
www.linkedin.com/in/randall-nichols-2222a691
Illi nunquam cedunt.
“We Never Yield”
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[1] A Black Swan is an unpredictable event that is beyond what
is normally expected of a situation and has potentially severe
consequences. Black swan events are characterized by their
extreme rarity, severe impact, and the widespread insistence they
were obvious in hindsight. (Scott, 2021)
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Mai, Research Technologist for KSU, a Dragon convert, with years of
experience in UAS filed operations; Dr Mark Jackson, SME in UUV,
naval architecture, and nanotechnologies, Sgt Jeremy Shay, Dragon
student, COVID-19 expert, RET USAF, Fabrication Production
Manager, Spirit AeroSystems; Joel Coulter, President, Mobile
Sciences Consortium, LLC; and Bart Shields, Inventor and CTO of
Olympus Sky, Inc. Special shoutout to NSWC PCD and Robert
Leasko, PI for the NSWC PVD 2011 Demonstration and Report on
UUVs and MCM Sensors.
Last, Professor Randall K. Nichols is managing editor / author
/ co-author of ten prior books and developer of six Masters and
Certificate programs in Cybersecurity at Utica College and Kansas
State University. He has five decades of Cybersecurity experience.
Finally, Montine Nichols deserves a commendation for her help
on the final drafts and copy edit work for our book (and living
with a real Dragon). Several KSUP UAS pilot – students helped with
the “student view,” and made valid suggestions for improvement,
Vincent Salerno, Senior Airman in Kansas Air National Guard, John
Boesen, (our handwriting expert); Diana K. Nichols, UAS Pilot; Josh
Jacobs, Jorge Silva, Sr. UAS Safety Engineer, and Jordan McDonald.
Special thanks go Kira C. Miller who professionally developed (more
like “nailed”) our cover art.[1]
The team especially thanks Assistant Professors Ryan W. Otto, and
Emily Finch Scholarly Communication Librarians, for their expert
assistance with the NPP final efforts.
Randall K Nichols
Professor of Practice
Director, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) – Cybersecurity
Graduate Certificate Program
Managing Editor / Co-Author
Kansas State University Polytechnic Campus &
Professor Emeritus – Cybersecurity, Utica College
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[1] Kira on October 27, 2020 will be Kira Nichols, marrying my
youngest son.
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List of Contributors
Professor Randall K. Nichols (Managing Editor* / Author)

Randall K. Nichols is Professor of Practice in Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) – Cybersecurity at Kansas State University
Polytechnic (KSUP) in Salina, Kansas. Nichols serves as Director,
graduate UAS- Cybersecurity Certificate program at KSUP. Nichols
is internationally respected, with 50 years of experience in
leadership roles in cryptography, counterintelligence, INFOSEC,
and sensitive computer applications. Throughout his career, Nichols
has published ten best-selling textbooks. Nichols has provided
counsel to the United States government and is certified as a federal
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subject matter expert (SME) in both cryptography and computer
forensics. His most recent work involves creating master and
certificate graduate – level programs for KSU and Utica College. To
wit:
Author/ Developer: MPT/ MS / Certificate in Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS) -Cybersecurity
• Author/ Developer: BS Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
-Cybersecurity
• Retired Chair and Program Developer: MS – Cybersecurity
–Intelligence and Forensics
• Retired Chair and Program Director: BS – Cybersecurity and
Information Assurance
• Co-Author / Developer: MPS – Risk Assessment and
Cybersecurity Policy
• Author / Developer: MS Cyber Surveillance and Warfare

Previously, Nichols was COO of INFOSEC Technologies, LLC, a
consulting

firm

specializing

in

Counterterrorism,

Counterespionage, and Information Security Countermeasures to
support its 1700 commercial, educational and U.S. government
clients.
Nichols served as CEO of COMSEC Solutions, a Cryptographic
/ Anti-virus / Biometrics Countermeasures Company, which was
acquired by a public company in 2000. He served as Vice President
of Cryptography and Director of Research of the acquiring firm.
Nichols served as Technology Director of Cryptography and
Biometrics for the International Computer Security Association
(ICSA), President, and Vice President of the American Cryptogram
Association (ACA).
Nichols holds a 3rd Dan Black Belt (R) in Chung Do Kwan Tae
Kwon Do and permanent rank of 2nd Dan Black Belt (D). He refereed
the National Tae Kwon Do Championships in 1994 in San Antonio ,
TX.
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This is Professor Nichols eleventh published book. Disruptive
Technologieswith Applications in Airline, Marine, Defense is
Nichols’ 5th textbook as managing editor / contributor in the
series on UAS /CUAS / UUV / special technologies all published
by New Prairie Press. Others include:
Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations on Air, Sea, Land
New Prairie Press (published on October 2, 2020)
Available as free eBook at: https://www.newprairiepress.org/
ebooks/35/
Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations
New Prairie Press (published on February 1, 2020)
Available as free eBook at: https://www.newprairiepress.org/
ebooks/31/
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: Protecting
USA’s Advanced Air Assets,
New Prairie Press (NPP 2nd Edition published on July 26, 2019)
Available as free eBook at: https://www.newprairiepress.org/
ebooks/27
Areas of Expertise / Research Interests

• Counterterrorism / Counter- Intelligence /Counterespionage
/ Computer Security
• Countermeasures Asymmetric Warfare and Attack / Defense
Scenarios against National Critical Infrastructure
• Computer Forensics and Cryptography SME & Federal Expert
Witness (Federal Criminal Cases: Treason / Espionage)
• Risk Assessment / Threat Analysis / Vulnerabilities Analysis /
Countermeasures
• Cybersecurity / Surveillance Technologies: Aerial, Infrared,
Visual, Ultraviolet, Radio, Radar & Sonar
• SCADA – Advanced Cyber-weapons Creation / Deployment /
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Deployment / Defense
• UAS- Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into National
Airspace System
• Designing Acoustic Countermeasures against hostile -actor
UAS SWARMS & developing dual purpose IFF sound libraries.
Contact

Prof.

Randall

K

Nichols

at

717-329-9836

or

profrknichols@ksu.edu.
*Direct all inquiries about this book to Prof. Randall K. Nichols at
profrknichols@ksu.edu
Dr. Hans C. Mumm (Co-Author)

Dr. Hans C. Mumm holds a Doctor of Management with a
concentration in Homeland Security from Colorado Technical
University (CTU) and an MS in Strategic Intelligence from American
Military University (AMU). He gained notoriety during Operation
Iraqi Freedom as the officer in charge of the “Iraqi Regime Playing
Cards; CENTCOM’S Top 55 Most Wanted List” which was touted by
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as one the most successful
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Information Operations (IO) in the history of Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). Dr. Mumm is the former Division Chief for Cyber
Security at the Office of The Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) programming and executing a budget of over $140M. Dr.
Mumm has earned twenty-three personal military ribbons/medals
including six military unit medals/citations, and two Directors
Awards, from the DIA. In 2016 he was awarded the People of
Distinction Humanitarian Award as well as being granted a US
Patent and Trademark for How to Harmonize the Speed of
Innovation and Change with the Human Spirit’s Need for
Leadership. In 2005, Dr. Mumm was recognized as one of the “Ten
Outstanding Young Americans,” and in 2003 he was awarded the
National Defense PAC “American Patriot Ingenuity Award” for his
service during “Operation Iraqi Freedom.”
He co-authored an international best-selling book titled
“Lightning Growth” which is a follow up to his best-selling book
in 2015 titled “Applying Complexity Leadership Theory to Drone
Airspace Integration.”
He is a published researcher in both the scientific and social
science arenas and has won grants and contracts to further test
and evaluate his original research. He has notable experience in
research and systems engineering which includes contracts for UAV
research and the creation of an advanced multiple fuel system
which operated the world’s first and only helicopter that can fly
on five separate fuels without engine modifications. His research
extends into emerging and disruptive technology for offensive and
defensive missions supporting US and coalition operations. His UAV
and robotics expertise has focused on determining the specific
uses, exceptions, and allowances for robotics operations; including
studying the unintended consequences, future use, and misuse of
such technologies. Dr. Mumm’s presentations and publications
support his research into autonomous systems in the virtual and
physical worlds. Additionally, he serves as an adjunct professor at
California University of Pennsylvania (CALU) instructing Homeland
Security courses in the Criminal Justice Department.
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Contact

Information:

Dr.

Hans

C.

Mumm,

703-303-1752,

hans@hansmumm.com. www.HansMumm.com
Wayne D. Lonstein, Esq. CISSP (Co-Author)

Wayne Lonstein holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political
Science from Wilkes University, a Bachelor of Science Degree in
Cyber Forensics and Information Security from Syracuse University
– Utica Collage, A Master of Science Degree in Homeland Security
with a concentration in Information Security from The Pennsylvania
State University and a Juris Doctor Degree from Pace University
School of Law. Additionally, he holds a CISSP Certification from The
Pennsylvania State University. He is a member of the state bars of
New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania as well as
being admitted to over 30 United States District Court Bars, The
Court of Veterans Appeals, United States Tax Court and the bar of
the United States Court of Appeals of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Circuits.
In addition, Mr. Lonstein has practiced law nationally since 1987
in the area of technology, intellectual property, sports, and
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entertainment and has litigated over 2000 cases. He is also a
member of the New York State Magistrates Association and has
served as a Magistrate Judge in the Town of Wawarsing, New York
since 1989.
He a member of Signal law PC, the Co- Founder and CEO VFT
Solutions is a member of the Forbes Technology Council and has
authored

numerous

articles

including:

“Why

Industry

and

Government Leaders Need to Realize Vulnerabilities of the Cloud”
Published on June 16, 2017 on LinkedIn; ‘Identifying The Lone
Wolf Using Technology,” on LinkedIn, Published on July 3, 2015;
“Are Social Media Companies Using ToS And Safe Harbor To Profit
From Infringement, Crime And Terror?,” Forbes.com, April 28, 2017;
“Weaponizing Social Media: New Technology Brings New Threat,”
Forbes.com, July 7, 2017; ‘Pay No Attention To That Man Behind
The Curtain’: Technology vs. Transparency,” Forbes.com, October 17,
2017; and “Drone Technology: The Good, The Bad And The Horrible,”
Forbes.com, January 10, 2018.
Dr. Julie J.C.H. Ryan, D.Sc. (Co-Author Books 1-4 in Series)/
Foreword Disruptive Technologies Book 5)
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Julie J.C.H. Ryan, D.Sc., is the CEO of Wyndrose Technical Group,
having retired from academia in 2017. Her last position in academia
was Professor of Cybersecurity and Information Assurance from the
U.S. National Defense University. Prior to that, she was tenured
faculty at the George Washington University and a visiting scholar
at the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST).
Dr. Ryan came to academia from a career in industry that began
when she completed military service. Upon graduating from the
U.S. Air Force Academy, Dr. Ryan served as a Signals Intelligence
Officer in the Air Force, and then as a Military Intelligence Officer
with the Defense Intelligence Agency. Upon leaving government
service, she worked in a variety of positions, including systems
engineer, consultant, and senior staff scientist with companies
including Sterling Software, Booz Allen & Hamilton, Welkin
Associates, and TRW/ESL supporting a variety of projects and
clients.
She is the author /co-author of several books, including
Defending Your Digital Assets Against Hackers, Crackers, Spies, and
Thieves (McGraw Hill 2000), and a Fellow of the American Academy
of Forensic Sciences (AAFS). At Wyndrose Technical Group, she
focuses on futures forecasting and strategic planning with an eye on
technology surprise and disruption.
Professor Candice M. Carter (Co-Author)

30 | List of Contributors

Ms. Candice Carter is a cybersecurity expert with over 15 years
of hands-on experience in the areas of counterterrorism,
counterintelligence,
conducts
Terroristic

and

criminal

Classified/Unclassified
Cyber

Capabilities

cyber

investigations.

briefings
using

in

Social

the

areas

Media

She
of
and

Counterterrorism for the Intelligence Community (IC). Ms. Carter
conducts research and constructs Asymmetric Warfare and Attack
/ Defense Scenarios against National Critical Infrastructure. She
is the Team Lead and for NASA Aeronautics Research Institute for
Transformative Vertical Flight (TVF) Commercial Intra-City OnDemand VTOL group. Ms. Carter is an invited speaker for key
organizations including BSides London and (ISC)2 Security
Congress. She is an Assistant Professor/Chair MSc Cybersecurity
program at the Wilmington University. Ms. Carter holds a MSc
Cybersecurity Forensics and Intelligence from Utica College, Utica ,
NY and a PMT Cybersecurity UAS from Kansas State University.
Aris Theocharis (Co-Editor)
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Aris has 30+ years of IT experience and earned a BS in
Cybersecurity from Utica College, Utica, NY while working full
time. He has provided editing skills for Professor Nichols for 10
years now. His approach is all encompassing, as opposed to strict
grammar rules. Reading ease, topic flow, clarity, and being succinct
are the focus.
Kurt Barnhart, Ph.D. (Associate Dean & Foreword to 1st Edition)

Dr. Barnhart is Professor and currently the Associate Dean of
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Research at Kansas State University Salina. In addition, he
established and serves as the executive director of the Applied
Aviation Research Center. He oversees the Unmanned Aerial
Systems program office. Dr. Barnhart previously served as the Head
of the Aviation Department at Kansas State University.
Dr. Barnhart is a member of the graduate faculty at K-State. He
is eminently qualified with 1) a commercial pilot certificate with
instrument, multi-engine, seaplane, and glider ratings; 2) a certified
flight instructor with instrument and multi-engine ratings; 3) an
airframe and power plant certificate with inspection authorization.
Dr Barnhart’s educational pedigree is outstanding:

an A.S. in

Aviation Maintenance Technology from Vincennes University, a B.S.
in aviation administration from Purdue University, an MBAA from
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, and a Ph.D. in educational
administration from Indiana State University.
Dr. Barnhart’s Research agenda is focused on aviation psychology
and Human Factors as well as the integration of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems into the National Airspace System. His industry experience
includes work as a R&D inspector with Rolls Royce Engine Company
where he worked on the RQ-4 Unmanned Reconnaissance Aircraft
development program, as well as serving as an aircraft systems
instructor for American Trans-Air airlines. Formerly, Dr. Barnhart
was an Associate Professor and Acting Department Chair of the
Aerospace Technology at Indiana State University where he was
responsible for teaching flight and upper division administrative
classes. Courses taught include Aviation Risk Analysis, Citation II
Ground

School,

King

Air

200

Flight,

Air

Navigation,

Air

Transportation, Instrument Ground School, and many others.
CPT John-Paul Hood USA (Co-Author)
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CPT John-Paul Hood is a researcher focused on the development
of future counter unmanned aircraft technologies, theories and best
practices for both government and civilian applications. CPT Hood
has commanded in the US Army Field Artillery with a background
specializing in the coordination and delivery of conventional /
smart munitions as well as achieving desired battlefield effects
through the integration of lethal and non-lethal assets. CPT Hood
holds a BS in Geospatial Information Systems from the United States
Military Academy, West Point NY, and a Professional Masters in
Technology UAS from Kansas State University.

Dr. Alysia Starkey (CEO & Dean Kansas State University
Polytechnic; 2nd Ed. Foreword)
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Dr. Starkey is a Professor and currently serves as the CEO and
Dean for the Kansas State University Polytechnic Campus. As Dean,
she oversees the College of Technology and Aviation academic
programs and campus research centers. Dr. Starkey holds an A.A.
in Social Work from Colby Community College, a B.S. in Psychology
from Fort Hays State University, a M.L.S. from University of North
Texas, and a Ph.D. in Curriculum and Instruction from Kansas State
University. Joining Kansas State Polytechnic in June 2002 as a
technical services/automation coordinator and assistant professor,
Starkey was promoted to library director and associate professor
in 2007, and to assistant dean of continuous improvement and
distance education in 2010. She was named associate dean of
academics and promoted to full professor in 2014. She gained the
additional duties of interim CEO and Dean in June 2018 and
continues in that capacity today.
Joel D. Anderson Colonel USMC (Ret), OVPR, C-UAS Foreword
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Mr. Anderson has more than 30 years’ experience in military,
industry, and academia. He currently serves as Development
Director for Kansas State University within the Office of Research
Development (ORD). Prior to joining KSU, he served as a Technical
Director, Innovation Evangelist, and Senior Subject Matter Expert
for ManTech International in support of HQMC Intelligence
Department and its Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
(TENCAP) office and Technology and Innovation Directorate; and
as the Director for Mosaic ATM, Inc.’s Autonomous Systems Group.
Between 1984-2010, he served in the United States Marine Corps
where he rose in rank from Private to Colonel. During his career,
he served as an (0231) intelligence analyst while enlisted where he
was meritoriously promoted to Corporal, and as an officer he held
military occupational designations as an (0202) Marine Air Ground
Task Force Intelligence Officer, (0240) Imagery Officer, (0540) Space
Operations Officer, and (8058) Acquisition Professional earning
DAIWIA Level III Certification as Program Manager and member of
the acquisition community while PM-Marine Intelligence Systems
for the Marine Corps Systems Command. He held command
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positions as a Surveillance and Target Acquisition Platoon
Commander, Commander of the 2nd Force Imagery Interpretation
Unit (FIIU) and was Commanding Officer Company E. Marine
Security Guard Battalion (Department of State). He served as the
Marine Corps Senior Departmental Requirements Officer (DRO) and
as the Imagery and Collections Section Head while serving with the
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity; as the Branch Head for HQMC
Intelligence Departments Imagery and Geospatial Plans and Policy
Branch, and concluded his career as a Strategic Intelligence Planner
for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
(OUSD-I) and as the Chief of Staff for Secretary Gates Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Task Force (ISRTF). He has served
at every operational level of the Marine Corps from Battalion,
Regiment, Division, Wing, MEU and MEF; within the Marine Corps
supporting establishment, HQMC and on the OUSD-I staff. Mr.
Anderson has spent a career supporting efforts to address the
complexities of the intelligence community and interagency
information management, decision making, talent acquisition,
educational and operational environments.
His personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal;
Bronze Star; Meritorious Service Medal with four gold stars in lieu of
5th award; Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal; Navy and
Marine Corps Achievement Medal; Joint Meritorious Unit Citation;
Meritorious Unit Citation; Navy Unit Citation; Marine Corps
Expeditionary Medal; National Defense Medal with one device in
lieu of second award; Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal;
Southwest Asia Service Medal with three stars in lieu of additional
awards; Global War on Terrorism Service Medal; Sea Service
Deployment Ribbon with three stars in lieu of additional awards;
Overseas Deployment Ribbon with one device; Marine Security
Guard Ribbon; Kuwaiti Liberation Medal (Saudi Arabia); Kuwaiti
Liberation Medal (Kuwait).
Jeremy S. Shay, PMP (Co-Author) USAF SMSGT (Ret)
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Jeremy is an expert in aerospace maintenance, manufacturing,
modification, and maintainability.

He specializes in advanced

composite structural maintenance and advanced coatings. He
recently

completed

the

requirements

to

earn

Cybersecurity UAS from Kansas State University.

his

PMT

His other

academic holdings are a Graduate Certificate in Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Information Assurance and a Bachelor of Science Degree in
Technology Management with a focus on Engineering Technology
which is ABET accredited from Kansas State University, an Associate
of Science in Aviation Maintenance and Professional Managers’
Certification from the Community College of the Air Force, and
Project

Manager

Professional

certification

from

Project

Management Institute.
Jeremy currently serves as a Senior Principle Manufacturing
Engineer at Northrop Grumman. He recently retired from the
United States Air Force as a Senior Master Sergeant with 26 years
of service. During this time, he served as a Structural Maintenance
and Low Observables mechanic on F-111, F-15, F-16, and B-2 aircraft.
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Dr. Mark J. Jackson (Co-Author)

Doctor Mark James Jackson is the McCune and Middlekauff
Endowed Professor and University Faculty Fellow at Kansas State
University. Born in Widnes, Lancashire, England, in 1967, Doctor
Jackson began his engineering career in 1983 when he studied
O.N.C. part I examinations and first-year apprenticeship-training
course in mechanical engineering. After gaining an Ordinary
National Diploma in Engineering with distinctions and I.C.I. prize for
achievement, he studied a degree in mechanical and manufacturing
engineering at Liverpool Polytechnic and spent periods in industry
working for I.C.I. Pharmaceuticals, Unilever Industries, Anglo
Blackwells, Unicorn International and Saint-Gobain Corporation.
After graduating with the Master of Engineering (M. Eng.) degree
with Distinction under the supervision of Professor Jack Schofield,
M.B.E., Doctor Jackson subsequently conducted research for the
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph. D.) degree at Liverpool in the field of
materials engineering focusing primarily on microstructureproperty relationships in vitreous-bonded abrasive materials under
the supervision of Professors Benjamin Mills and H. Peter Jost,
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C.B.E., Hon. F.R.Eng.. He was subsequently employed by Unicorn
Abrasives’ Central Research & Development Laboratory (SaintGobain Abrasives’ Group) as materials technologist, then technical
manager, responsible for product and new business development
in Europe, and university liaison projects concerned with abrasive
process development. Doctor Jackson then became research fellow
at the Cavendish Laboratory, University of Cambridge, working with
Professor John Field, O.B.E., F.R.S., and Professor David Tabor, F.R.S.,
on condensed matter physics and tribology before becoming a
lecturer in engineering at the University of Liverpool in 1998. At
Liverpool, he attracted a number of research grants concerned with
developing innovative manufacturing processes for which he was
jointly awarded an Innovative Manufacturing Technology Centre
from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council in
November 2001.

In 2002, he became associate professor of

mechanical engineering and faculty associate in the Centre for
Manufacturing Research, Centre for Electric Power, and Centre for
Water Resources and Utilization at Tennessee Technological
University (an associated university of Oak Ridge National
Laboratory), and a faculty associate at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory. Dr. Jackson was the academic adviser to the Formula
SAE Team at Tennessee Technological University. At Tennessee
Technological

University,

Dr.

Jackson

established

the

NSF

Geometric Design and Manufacturing Integration Laboratory. Dr.
Jackson collaborated with Nobel Laureate Professor Sir Harold
Kroto, F.R.S., editing a book on ‘Surface Engineering of Surgical
Tools and Medical Devices’ and a special issue of the International
Journal of Nanomanufacturing on ‘Nanofabrication of Novel Carbon
Nanostructures and Nanocomposite Films’. Dr. Jackson was
appointed member of the United Nations Education, Scientific and
Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) International Commission for the
Development of the ‘Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems’ Theme
on ‘Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies’,

(http://m-press.ru/

English/nano/index.html), and still serves in this capacity. The first
edition of the encyclopedia was published 2009 and second edition
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published 2018. In March 2017, the degree of Doctor of Science (D.
Sc.) in mechanical engineering was conferred upon Dr. Jackson in
absentia by congregation for sustained contributions made in the
area of mechanical engineering and advanced manufacturing over a
period of twenty years.
Research Technologist – Randall W. Mai (Co-Author)

Randall grew-up on the family farm in rural Kansas near Tribune.
He spent a large sum of his summers helping on the family farm that
was established by his great-grandfather in 1929. Before graduating
high school Randall was nominated to the United States Naval,
Military, and Merchant Marine Academies by Congressman Keith
G. Sibelius and Senator Bob Dole. Randall earned an A.S. degree
in Mechanical Engineering Technology and a B.S. in Biology /
Chemistry minor. Graduating Magna cum Laud. Randall has
worked as an engineer in agriculture equipment mfg., an Analytical
Chemist / Validation Analysis of computer / software validation
for Abbott Labs and currently works as a Research Technologist
for Kansas State University. He is now establishing himself in the
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Cybersecurity field as he stands on his knowledge of Computer /
Software Validation experience gained within the Pharmaceutical
field. He was responsible for leading the 21CFRpart11 program at the
Abbott Labs facility in McPherson, Ks. and was also responsible for
the validation of the Laboratory LIMS and Millenium32 software.
The validation encompassed network security and disaster
recovery.
Randall will complete a Master program at Kansas State
University in May 2020 in Professional Masters of Technology with
concentration in UAS and Cybersecurity.
Kurt J. Carraway, Col, USAF (Ret) [Foreword to Book 4]

After serving 25 years with the United States Air Force, retired
Colonel Kurt J. Carraway is the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Department Head and Executive Director of the Applied Aviation
Research Center (AARC) at Kansas State University’s Polytechnic
Campus. As Department Head, Carraway leads UAS faculty in the
university’s UAS program, which includes a Bachelor of Science in
Aviation Technology program, a UAS Minor and a UAS Certificate
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program. He also serves as a member of the graduate faculty on
the campus. As Executive Director, Carraway provides strategic
leadership in advancing Kansas State University’s UAS program
goals. He directs the execution of research activities involving UAS
through the AARC. Carraway also directs flight operations
development and maturation of the UAS training program through
direct supervision of the Flight Operations staff. He manages highly
skilled UAS professionals that perform hundreds of UAS flights per
year in civil airspace. He sets policies and procedures for unmanned
flight operations. He serves as Principal Investigator (PI) on UAS
activities through the AARC and is the University PI representative
to ASSURE, the FAA’s UAS Center of Excellence.
Before arriving at Kansas State Polytechnic, Carraway was
stationed at Camp Smith in Oahu, Hawaii where he served first
as Joint Operations Director and then Division Chief of Current
Operations, both for the U.S. Pacific Command. Carraway worked
with the Global Hawk UAS, as an evaluator and instructor pilot, and
later became commander of the Global Hawk squadron. Carraway
established standard operating procedures and composed technical
manuals for the military’s use of the Global Hawk.
A native of St. Louis, Missouri, Carraway received a Bachelor of
Science in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Missouri
Science and Technology in Rolla, prior to entering the Air Force.
During his service, Carraway also completed a Master of Science in
Systems Engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology on the
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, and a Master of
Arts in Management from Webster University in St. Louis, Missouri.
Bart Shields (Co-Author)
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Bart Shields, BS in Computer Science-Scientific Option, MS in
Computer Science-Thesis Option, Chief Technology Officer,
Inventor, Co-founder
Bart Shields is serial entrepreneur, long-time innovator, deeply
technical product architect, with over 25+ years of technical and
engineering management. He has designed systems from concept
to deployment for a wide variety of verticals, but has focused mainly
on data communication, with multiple wireless communication
products to his credit ranging from commercial wireless broadband
routers to tactical radios for the U.S. government.
Bart is a highly innovative, technology expert, having created
designed multiple MAC layer protocols, including the design and
implementation of a Wi-Max like protocol (WCOPP) in the late 90’s
and more recently, a Sensor Node MESH network MAC based upon
Distributed Queuing. Bart has five patents to his credit, two for
Wireless MACs based on Distributed Queuing and three for his
recent cybersecurity protocol and cryptographic key management
system, Autonomous Key Management (AKM).
Bart has built multiple engineering teams and entire departments
from scratch, and overseen all aspects of engineering, including
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fabless

ASIC

design,

communication

systems

algorithm

development, and RF transceiver design and development.
Bart is an expert in embedded development and has spent his
entire career in the design and development of embedded systems,
including both mission and safety critical systems. Bart has focused
the past six years entirely on cybersecurity and solving many of
issues plaguing security today, with simple and elegant solutions
built around his highly innovative technology, AKM.
Dr. Suzanne Sincavage (Co-Author)

Executive Summary
On May 3rd , 2020 Dr Suzanne Sincavage was named Executive
Director for the Institute for Biodefense Research (IBR). IBR is a
nonprofit devoted to advancing the science of microbial forensics.
Dr Sincavage, a PhD in public health epidemiology, with a focus
on biological terrorism preparedness and response, has led her own
consultancy, IDIQ Inc. since 2008, focusing on CBRNE Subject
Matter

Expertise

in

facilitating

and

integrating

innovative

technologies that counter biological terrorism.
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Dr Sincavage received her PhD in Public Health, Epidemiology
with specialization in Biological Terrorism from Union Institute &
University. Dr. Sincavage’s career encompasses 16 years of
experience in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry
serving as a field scientist supporting R & D, medical and regulatory
affairs, and commercial operations covering therapeutic areas of
infectious disease, virology, oncology, hematology, urology, and
immunology.
Dr Sincavage is SME for the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) and DHS.
She

has

held

senior

management

positions

in

Watson

Pharmaceuticals, Department of Medical & Regulatory Affairs;
Wyeth-Ayerst

Laboratories,

G.D.

Searle;

Hoffman-La

Roche

Laboratories; Sacred Heart Medical Center and for fun the La Jolla
Symphony & Chorus.
Dr Sincavage holds certifications:
SAM (CCR); SBA 8 (m)
DD 2345 Military Critical Technical Data Agreement
DTIC
DTIC STINFO Manager
Counterterrorism
InfraGuard – Infrastructure Liaison Officer
ONR – Counterterrorism
Committees:
NDIA Legislative Committee
NDIA National Small Business Conference
NRO ASP Industry Working Group
INSA Acquisition Management Council
USGIF Small Business Working Group
WOSB 8(m) Working Group, SPAWAR HQ, San Diego

46 | List of Contributors

Abbreviations and Acronyms
ABBREVIATIONS: ACRONYMS [REV 91A] 01232021 C1 – C10
The following terms are common to the UAS / UUV industries,
defense / airline / marine industries / general literature,
conferences on UAS/UAV/Drone/UUV systems and / or specific to
Professor Nichols’ five (5) textbooks in the series on UAS / drones /
UAV / UUVs.
A-STAR

Heuristic search algorithm discussed in chapter 9.

A2 / AD

Anti-access / Area Denial

A /Aref

Amplitudes of source and reference points, see

Eq-20-6,7.
AA

Anti-aircraft / Adaptive Antennas

AAA

Anti-aircraft artillery

AAIB
AAM

Air Accidents Investigation Board
Air-to-air missile

AAV

Autonomous air vehicle

ABI

Aviation Block Infrastructure

ABMS

Advanced battle management system

ABS

American Bureau of Shipping

A/C
ACAS

Aircraft
Airborne collision avoidance system / Assistant Chief

of the Air Staff
ACL

Agent communication language / Autonomous control

levels
ACOUSTIC

Detects drones by recognizing unique sounds

produced by their motors.
ACRP
ACS

Airport Cooperative Research Project
Airbome (defense) control station (system)

ACTD

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

AD

Air Defense / Ansar Dine terrorist group.

A/D

Attack / Defense Scenario Analysis
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ADAC
ADAPs
ADC

Automated Dynamic Airspace Controller
Adaptive compute acceleration platforms
Air data computer

ADCP

Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler

ADF

Automatic direction finder/finding.

ADMS

Air defense missile (radar) system

ADS

Air Defense System (USA)

ADS-B

Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast

systems
ADT

Air Data Terminal

AE

Artificial Employee

AESA
AEW

Active electronically scanned array
Airbome early warning

AF

Adaptive Filtering

AFCS

Automatic flight control system

AFRICOM

US Africa Command

AGL
AGM
AGARD

Above ground level
Air- to- surface missile
Advisory

Group

for

Aerospace

Research

and

Development (NATO)
AGM-65

Maverick (USA) is an air-to-surface missile (AGM)

designed for close air support. It is the most widely produced
precision-guided missile in the Western world, and is effective
against a wide range of tactical targets, including armor, air
defenses, ships, ground transportation and fuel storage facilities.
AGV

Autonomous Guard Vehicle

AHA

Autopilot Hardware Attack

AHD

Analog high definition

AHRS

Attitude and heading reference system

AI

Artificial intelligence: “1. a branch of computer science

dealing with the
simulation of intelligent behavior in computers and 2: the
capability of a machine
to imitate intelligent human behavior.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020)
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AIAA
AIC
AIP
AIS

American Institute of Aeronautics and Aerospace
Aeronautical Information Circular
Aeronautical Information Publication
Automated Identification System for Collision

Avoidance
AJ

Anti-Jam

AKM

Autonomous Key Management

ALB

Air Land Battle

ALERT

Advanced

Low-observable

Embedded

Reconnaissance Targeting system.
AM

Amplitude Modulation / al-Mourabitoun terrorist

group
AMB
AMRAAM

Agile Multi-Beam
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile

ANSP

Air Navigation Service Provider

ANO

Air Navigation Order (UK)

AO

Area of Operations

AoA

Angle of Attack

APEC

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

APG

Asia-Pacific Gateway

APKWS

Advanced precision kill weapon system

AQ

Al-Qaida Terrorist Group – “the Base”

AOA

Aircraft operating authority

AQIM

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Ar
AR
AR drone

Receive antenna effective area, m2
Aspect ratio
AR stands for “Augmented Reality” in AR drone. AR

Drone can perform tasks like object recognition and following,
gesture following.
ARM

Anti-Radiation Munitions

ARS

Airborne Remote Sensing

ART

Autonomous Rail Transport

ARW

Anti-radiation weapons

AS

Airborne Sensing Systems

ASB

Advisory Service Bulletin / Air Sea Battle
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ASBM
ASCM

Anti-ship ballistic missile
Anti-ship cruise missile

ASEA

Active electronically scanned arrays

ASEAN

Association of Southeastern Asian Nations

ASC

ALEXA /SIRI /CORTANA

ASICs

Application specific integrated Circuits & circuit

boards
ASL

Airborne Systems Laboratory

ASMS

Automated Separation Management System

ASR

Chinese Air Silk Road

ASOS

Automated surface weather observation system

ASTM

American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM)

ASTER

Agency for Science, Technology and Research

ASuW

Anti-surface unit warfare

ASW

Anti-submarine warfare

AT

Aerial target

ATC

Air Traffic Control

ATHENA

Lockheed Martin Advanced Test High Energy Asset

ATM

Air Traffic Management

ATN

Aids to Navigation (aka ATON)

ATR

Automatic Target Recognition

ATS

Air Traffic Service

AUDS

Anti-UAV Defense System

AUV

Autonomous Underwater Vehicle

Avionics

Aviation electronics in manned or unmanned

aircraft
AUVSI

Association

for

Unmanned

Vehicle

Systems

International
AV

Air Vehicle

AWB

Application White Boxing

AWOS

Automated weather observation system

AWSAS

All Weather Sense and Avoid System

B

IF equivalent bandwidth, Hz

Backhauling

Intermediate links between core network or

internet backbone and small subnets at the edge of the network
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BA

Bacterial agent

BAMS

Broad Area maritime surveillance

BATS

Bermuda Atlantic Time-series Study

Bandwidth

Defined as the Range within a band of wavelengths,

frequencies, or energy.
Think of it as a range of radio frequencies occupied by a
modulated carrier wave, assigned to a service over which a device
can operate. Bandwidth is also a capacity for data transfer of
electrical communications system.
BDA

Battle Damage assessment

BER

Bit error rate

Black Swan

Black Swan Event- A black swan is an unpredictable

event that is beyond what is.
normally expected of a situation and has potentially severe
consequences. Black
swan events are characterized by their extreme rarity, severe
impact, and the
widespread insistence they were obvious in hindsight.
(Black Swan Definition, 2020)
BLOS

Beyond line-of-sight

BMI

Buried Mine Identification

BNF

Bind and Fly – with custom transmitter.

BOSS

Buried Object Scanning Sonar

BPAUV

Battlespace preparation autonomous underwater

vehicle
BRI

Chinese Belt and Road Initiative

BR&T

Boeing Research and Technology

BT

Biological toxins

BTA

Biological Threat Agent

BSR

Bilinear Signal Representation

BSs

Base Stations

BVR

Beyond visual range

BW

Biological weapons

c

Speed of light ~ (3 x 108 m/s) [186,000 miles per

Abbreviations and Acronyms | 51

sec] in vacuum named after Celeritas

the Latin word for speed or

velocity.
c

speed of sound (344 m/s) in air

C

Combined methods of CR

C2 / C2W

Command and control / Command and Control

Warfare
C3I

Command,

control,

communications,

and

Command,

control,

communications,

and

Command,

control,

communications

and

Intelligence
C4
computers
C4I

computers, intelligence
C4ISR

Command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance
C4ISTAR

Command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition and reconnaissance
CA

Collision Avoidance / Clear Acquisition (GPS) /

Cyber Assault (aka CyA)
C/A
CAA

Civilian acquisition code for GPS
Control Acquisition cyber attack

CAS

Close Air Support / Common situational awareness

CASA

Civil Aviation Safety Authority

CASIC

China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation

C of A

Certificate of Airworthiness

CAP

Civil Air Publication

CAT

Collision Avoidance Threshold /Connectivity &

automation in transport
CC / CyC

Cyber Crime

CCCI/II

Classical Cryptography Course Volume I/II (Nichols

R. K., Classical Cryptography Course Volume I / II, 1996)
CCE
CCI

Cyber Counter Espionage
Command

Counterintelligence
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control

interface

/

Cyber

CCMCPS

Cooperative Cognitive Maritime Cyber Physical

System
CCS

Cyber Counter Sabotage

CCT

Cyber Counter Terrorism

CC-UAS

Counter-Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems

CD

Conflict Detection

CDL

Common datalink

CDMA

code division multiple access

CDN

Content Distribution Network

CDR

Collision

detection

and

resolution

systems

(automated SAA in UAS)
CEA

Cyber electromagnetic activities (Cyber, EW,

Spectrum warfare)
CEO

Chief Executive Officer

CETC

Chinese Electronics Technology Group

CF

Computer Forensics

CFTA

Continental Free Trade Area

CFT

Certificate of flight trials / Cross-functional teams

CHIMERA

Counter-electronic HPM Extended range base air

defense
CI / CyI

Cyber Infiltration

CIA

Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability / Central

Intelligence Agency
CIAD

Cyber- Multi-layered Integrated Air Defense

Systems
CIED

Computer improvised explosive device.

CIN

Common Information Network

CIR

Color Infrared – artificial standard where NIR bands

shifted so that humans can see the infrared reflectance.
CISA

Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

CLE

Airport code for Cleveland

C/N

Carrier to Noise ratio in HAPS, => C/ N0

C/NA

Communication / Navigation Aid

CM / CyM
CN3

Countermeasure / Cyber Manipulation
Communications / navigation network node
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CNI
CNKI

Critical National Infrastructure
China-North

Korea-Iran

technical

weapons

cooperation agreements
CNO

Chief Naval Operations

CNPC

Control and non-payload links

CO2
COA

Carbon dioxide emissions
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization

COB

Chief of the Boat

COMINT

Communications intelligence

COMJAM

Communications Jamming

COMSEC

Communications Security

CONOP(S)

Concepts of Operations

CONUS

Continental United States

COOP

Cooperative Observer Program

COS

Continued Operational Safety

COTS

Commercial off-the-shelf

CPA

Closest Point of Approach

CPA Spoof

CPA spoof involves faking a possible collision with a

target ship.
CPL
CPNI

Commercial pilot’s license
Center for Protection of National Infrastructure

(UK)
CPRC

Communist Party of the Republic of China

CPS

Cyber-physical systems

CR

Conflict Resolution / Close range / Cyber Raid (aka

CyR)
CRH
CRX
CS

Coaxial rotor helicopter
Received Signal Power, watts
Control station

CSDP

Common Security and Defense Policy missions (EU)

CSR

Compact Surveillance Radar

CSfC

Commercial Solutions for Classified Program

CSIRO

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research

Organization
CT

Counter Terrorism / Counter Terrorism Mission
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CTOL

Conventional take-off and landing

C-UAS

Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (defenses /

countermeasures)
CUAS

CSIRO Unmanned Aircraft Systems

CV

Collision Volume

CW / CyW

Cyber Warfare

D-STAR

Variation of A-STAR algorithm suitable for solving

path planning problems in
unknown environments
D

distance from transmitter in Range equation (Adamy

D. -0., 2015)
DA

Danger area

Danger Close
Definition

www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/

2013/May-June/Myer.html

Nov

14,

2013

– 1) danger

close is

included in the “method-of-engagement” line of a call-for-fire
request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target.
… Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk estimate
distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used to define
danger close for aircraft delivery. Pi = Probability of incapacitation.
2) Definition of “danger close” (US DoD) In close air support,
artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the term
included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fire
which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of
the target.
DARO

Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office

DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DAS

Detection by Acoustical Signature

dB

decibels

DC

Direct Current

DCL

Drone Champions League

DCPA

Distance between vessels approaching CPA.

DDD

Dull, dangerous, and dirty

DDOS

Distributed Denial of Service cyber attack

DE

Directed Energy
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DEF CON

DEF CON is the world’s longest running and largest

underground hacking conference.
DE / EP

Directed energy / Electromagnetic pulse.

DEM

Digital elevation model

DEW

Directed energy weapons.

DF

Direction finding

DFCS

Digital Flight Control System

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DIME

Diplomatic, information, military, and economy

DIRCM

Directed Infrared Countermeasures

DIY

Do-it-yourself (amateur built drones or modified

racing drones)
D j

Jammer location – to-target receiver location

distance, in km, FM 34-40-7
DJ

Data Jamming / Drone Jammer

DJI

Popular and functional Chinese made drone series:

Mavic, Phantom, Ryze, Matrix, Spark, Enterprise, Inspire, Tello
{However, banned by USA Army} (Newman, 2017)
DL

Downlink in HAPS

DLA

Date last accessed (usually a web reference)

DLI

Datalink interface

DME

di-methyl ether

DNA

Deoxyribonucleic acid

DoD

Department of Defense

DOF

Degrees of Freedom

DOS

Denial of Service cyber attack

DOT

Department of Transportation

DPM

Direct power management / Dynamic Power

Management
DPRK
D-R-O-N-E

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
FAA Guidance: Direct, Report, Observe, Notice

&Execute
DROV

Remote operating vehicle

DSA

Detect, sense and avoid / Dynamic Sense-and-Act.

DSR

Chinese Digital Silk Road
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DSS

Decision Support System

DSSS

Direct sequence spread spectrum.

D t

Enemy transmitter location -to- target receiver

location, in km, FM 34-40-7
DT

Directional

transmission

/

Department

of

Transport (UK)
DTDMA

Distributed Time Division Multiple Access (DTDMA)

network radio system
DTED

Digital terrain evaluation data

DTF

Drug Task Force

DTH

Direct-To-Home

DTI

Direct Track & Identify

DTRA

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DUO

Designated UAS operator

DVL

Doppler Velocity Log

EA

Electronic Attack

EARSC

European Association of Remote Sensing Companies

EAS

Equivalent airspeed

EAU

East Africa union comprising of Israel and six East

African states, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and
South Sudan
(Eb / No)

Thermal noise power spectral density ratio

ECCM / EP

Electronic counter-countermeasures / Electronic

Protection
ECM

Electronic countermeasures

ECR

Electronic combat reconnaissance

EDC

Estimated Date of Completion

EDEW

Effects of Directed Energy Weapons

EEDI

Energy efficiency design index

EEZP

Exclusive economic Zone protection

EFF

Electronic Frontier Foundation

EHS

Enhanced surveillance

EIRP

Effective isotopic radiated power

Electrolaser

Electroshock weapon that is also a DEW. Uses

lasers to form electrically conductive laser-induced plasma charge.
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ELINT

Electronic Intelligence

ELT

Emergency locator transmitter

ECM

Electromagnetic compatibility

EM

Electromagnetic

EMC

Electromagnetic compatibility

EME

Electromagnetic environment

EMI

Electromagnetic interference

EMO

Electromagnetic operations

EMP

Electromagnetic pulse

EMR

Electromagnetic Radiation

EMS

Electromagnetic Spectrum

EMSVIS

Electromagnetic Spectrum Visible Light

EMW

Electromagnetic Waves

EO

Electro-optical (sensing) / Earth Observation

EOI

Electro-Optical Imager

EOTS

Electro-optical targeting system

EPIRB

Emergency Positioning -Indicating Radio Beacon

EQUAS

Explainable question answering system.

ERPJ

Effective radiated power of the jammer, in dBm

ERPS

Effective radiated power of the desired signal

transmitter, in dBm
ESC
ESM / ES

Electronic still camera
Electronic support measures / Electronic warfare

support / Earth station &

ESM

Electronic

Signal Monitoring
EU

European Union

EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force’s anti-piracy naval
mission
EUTM

Somalia Military training mission in Somalia

EVTOL

Electric Vertical Take-off and Landing

EW

Electronic warfare, see 9-15 & footnotes.

F

Field theory methods of CR

F

Fundamental frequency is defined as the lowest

frequency of a periodic waveform
f

Frequency, cycles / second RRE)
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Fo

Resonant frequency of string, Hz see Eq. 20-5

F

Frequency in MHz, FM 34-40-7

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FACE

Future Airborne Capability Environment

FAME

Fatty acid methyl esters

FAR

False Alarm Rates

FB

Facebook©

FBL

Fly-by-Light, a type of flight-control system where

input command signals are sent to the actuators through the
medium of optical-fiber.
FBW

Fly-by-wire

FCC

Federal Communications Commission

FCS

Flight control systems / Flight Control Station

FDF

Frequency Domain Filtering

FDM

frequency division multiplexing

FHSS

Frequency hopping spread spectrum.

FIIP

Floating Integrated Information Platforms

FIR

Far Infrared (25-40) to (200-350) um

FIRES

definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) the use of weapon

systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target.
FL

Flight Level

FLIR

Forward-looking infrared

Fly-by-Wire

Predetermine flight mission path based on GPS

coordinates.
Floats

Floating sensors (USN)

FMS

Flexible manufacturing system

Follow-Me

UAS autopilot automatically follows operator.

Fom

HAPS Figure of merit in upload /download link

FoV

Field of view

FFOV

Forward Field of View

FRAGO

Fragmentary Order – to send timely changes of

existing orders to a subordinate.
FPV

First Person View – live streaming video used in

racing drones.
FPGA

Field programmable gate array
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FS

Fixed service

FSS

Fixed satellite service

FW

Fixed wing

FY

Fiscal year

G

Geometric methods of CR

G5S

G5 Sahel (G5S) Joint Force, has membership of five

states: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad
GAO

General Accounting Office USA

gAR

Receiving Antenna Gain as a Factor

GBU

Guided Bomb Unit

GCHQ

Government

Communications

Headquarters

(Britain)
GCS

Ground control station

GDP

Gross Domestic Product (USA)

GDPR

European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection

Regulation
GDT

Ground data terminal

GENie

General Electric Network for Information Exchange

GEO

Geostationary Earth orbit satellite

GEOINT

Geospatial-Intelligence

GeoFence

A geo-fence is

a virtual perimeter for

a

real-

world geographic area
GIGO
GLOW
GLONASS

Garbage in, garbage out
Gross lift-off weight for a missile / rocket
Global Satellite Navigational System

GNL

Galveston National Laboratory

GNSS

Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS

Global Positioning System / Geo Fencing

GPS/INS

Use of GPS satellite signals to correct or calibrate

a solution from an inertial navigation system (INS). The method is
applicable for any GNSS/INS system.
GPSSPOOF

Hack of GPS system affecting UAS commands.

GPWS

Ground proximity warning system

GR

The receiving antenna gain in the direction of the

desired signal transmitter, dBi.
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G RJ

Receiving antenna gain in the direction of the

jammer, in dBi.
GS

Ground segment of HAPs

GSAA

Government Services Administration – audit division

GSE

Ground support equipment

GSHM

Ground Station Handover Method

GSM

Global System for Mobile Communications

GT

Game Theory methods of CR

G/T

ratio of the receive antenna gain to system noise

temperature.
(G /Ts) dB

Represents the figure of merit of the HAPS receiver,

in dB.
GT
GTA

Gain of the transmit antenna, dB.
Ground -to -Air Defense

Hard damage DEW complete vaporization of a target
Harmonic

Frequency, which is an integer multiple of the

fundamental frequency.
H

Elevation of the jammer location above sea level,

feet, FM 34-40-7
HAE

High altitude endurance

HALE

High altitude – long endurance

HAPS

High Altitude Platforms (generally for wireless

communications enhancements)
HAPS UAVs

UAVs dedicated to HAPS service (example to

communicate via CNPC links)
HCE

Highly contested environment

HEAT

High-explosive anti-tank warhead

HELWS

High energy laser weapon system

HITL

Human in-the-loop

HMI

Human machine interface

HO

Home Office (UK)

HPA

High power amplifier

HPL

High powered laser weapon

HPM

High powered microwave defense

HSM

Hardware Security Module
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Ht

Elevation of enemy transmitter location above

sea level, in feet, FM 34-40-7
HUD
Human

Heads-up display
“a bipedal primate mammal (Homo sapiens), a

person” (Merriam-Webster, 2020); Humanity

“the quality or

state of being human.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020)
Humanoids

“a humanoid being: a nonhuman creature or being

with characteristics (such as the ability to walk upright) resembling
those of a human.”
HUMINT

Human intelligence (spy’s)

HVT

High value target (generally, for assassination)

I

Sound intensity, W x m-2 [Source strength S / 4πr2]

(Uni-Wuppertal, 2019)
IA

Information Assurance / Intentional cyber warfare

attack
I-actors

Intentional Cyber Actors

IACS

Industrial automation and control systems

IADS

Multi-layered integrated air defense systems

IAI

Israeli Aerospace Industries

IAS

Indicated airspeed

IBM

International Business Machines

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

I.C.B.C

International Center for Boundary Cooperation

(China)
ICBM

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

ICGs

Information centers of gravity

ICS

Internet Connection Sharing / Industrial control

systems
ICT
ID

Information & Communications Technology
Information

Dominance

/

Inspection

and

Identification /Identification
IEC 62443

International standard for industrial automation

and control systems
IEDs

Improvised Explosive Devices

IEEE

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
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IETM

Interactive Electronic Maintenance Manuals

IEWS

Intelligence, electronic warfare, and sensors

IFF

Identification, friend, or foe

IFR

Instrument flight rules

I&I

Interchangeability and Interoperability

IIT

Intentional Insider Threats

Imaging Sensors ARS sensors that build images
IL

Intensity level of sound measured, dB, Eq. 20-2

IMINT

Imagery intelligence

IMM/IM&M

Interacting-multiple-models tracker / Integrity

Management & Monitoring
IMO

International Maritime Organization

IMU

Inertial Measurement Unit

INS

Inertial navigation system

INFOSEC

Information Security

IO

Information Operations, see Figure 9-11 & footnotes.

IOB

Internet of bodies

IOC

Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission

IOR

India Ocean Region

IoT

Internet of things

IIoT

Industrial Internet of things

IPL

Insitu Pacific Limited

IR

Infrared Sensors

IRST

Infrared search and tracking

IS

Information Superiority

ISCS

Integrated shipboard control systems

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)

ISR

Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance UAS

Platform
ISTAR

Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and

reconnaissance
IT/OT
ITU

Information Technology/ Operational Technology
International

Telecommunications

Union

–

Standards Organization
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ITU-R

International Telecommunications Union – Radio

Sector
IW

Information Warfare

JADC2 Joint all-domain command & control
JADO

Joint all-domain operations (Thatcher, 2020)

JAGM

Joint-Air-to-Ground Missile

JAUS

Joint architecture for UAS

JDAM

Joint direct attack munitions

JFO

Joint fires observer

JP

Joint Publication – followed by military identifier.

JDAM

Joint Direct Attack Munition

JNIM

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin

JOAC

Joint Operational Access Concept

JOPES

Joint Operation and Planning System / Execution

System
JP
J / S

Joint Publication
= the ratio of the jammer power to the desired

signal power at the input to the receiver being jammed in dB
JST

Japan Time zone

JTAC

Joint Terminal Attack Controller.

JTIDS

Joint Tactical Information Distribution System

(JTIDS) is an L band DTDMA.
K

Boltzmann’s constant (Noise component, RRE) (1.38

x 10 -23 J/K), Kelvin
K

2 for jamming frequency modulated receivers

(jamming tuner accuracy), FM 34-40-7
KAMIKAZI Means “Divine Wind,” Tactic best known for Japanese
suicide A/C attacks on Allied Capital Vessels in WWII. UAS TEAMS
or SWARMS could be directed in the same way.
KE

Kinetic energy

KEW

Kinetic energy weapons

KM

Katiba Macina Groups

KMS

Key Management System

KSU

Kansas State University

L

λ / 2 in Eq. 20-5
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LAANC

Low

Altitude

Authorization

and

Notification

Capability
LASER
of optical

“A laser is a device that emits light through a process
amplification based

on

the stimulated

emission of electromagnetic radiation. The term “laser” originated
as an acronym for “light amplification by stimulated emission of
radiation”. A laser differs from other sources of light in that it emits
light coherently, spatially and temporally. Spatial coherence allows
a laser to be focused to a tight spot, enabling applications such
as laser cutting and lithography. Spatial coherence also allows a
laser beam to stay narrow over great distances (collimation),
enabling applications such as laser pointers. Lasers can also have
high temporal coherence, which allows them to emit light with a
very narrow spectrum, i.e., they can emit a single color of light.
Temporal coherence can be used to produce pulses of light as short
as a femtosecond. Used: for military and law enforcement devices
for marking targets and measuring range and speed.” (Wiki-L, 2018)
Laser JDAM Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition – dumb bombs,
all weather precision –guided munitions. Guided by an integrated
inertial guidance system.
Laser rangefinder Scope to assist targeting of munitions.
Countermeasure: laser-absorbing paint
LGWs
Latency

Laser-guided weapons
Processing difference between time interval signal

is transmitted and signal is received
LCAC

Landing Craft Air Cushion Facility

LCDR

Lieutenant Commander

L/D

Lift to drag ratio.

LDCM

Low Duty cycle methods

LEO

Low Earth Orbit Satellite / Law Enforcement Officer

LGB

Laser-guided bomb, a guided bomb that uses semi-

active laser guidance to strike a designated target with greater
accuracy than an unguided one.
LGTF

Liptako-Gourma task force (LGTF) established by

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to secure their shared border region.
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LIDAR

Light (Imaging) Detection and Ranging

LFS

Free- Space Loss as a Factor

LIPC

laser-induced plasma channel

LJ
LMADIS

Propagation loss from jammer to receiver, in dBi
Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (family

of C-UAS systems)
LMM

Lightweight Multi-role Missile (by Thales)

LNG

Liquid natural gas

LORAN-C

Long Range Navigation, Revision C

LOS

Line-of-sight / Loss of Signal / Loss of Separation

LOSAS

Low-cost Scout UAV Acoustic System

LPA

Log periodic array

LPI

Low Probability of Intercept

LR

Long range

LRA

Long range artillery

LRAD

Long Range Acoustical Device (Weapon) (Yunmonk

Son, 2015)
LRCS

Low radar cross section

LRE

Launch and recovery element.

LRF

Laser rangefinder

LS

Losses existing in the system (lumped

together), dB (RRE)
LS

The propagation loss from the desired signal

transmitter, in dBm
LSDB

Laser Small Diameter Bomb

LSG

Real-time Tracking Laser Scalar Gradiometer

LST

Laser spot trackers

LTA

Lighter than Air (airship) /Low noise amplifier

LTE /LTE+

Long Term Evolution – refers to mobile

telecommunications coverage.
LUSV

Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles

LWIR

Long wave Infrared (sensor or camera)

M

Mass in Eq. 20-5

MA

Multi-agent methods of CR

MAC

Unique Media access control address assigned to a
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network interface controller

(NIC) for use as a network

address in communication with a network segment.
MAD

Magnetic anomaly detection

MADIS

Marine Air Defense Integrated System

MAE

Medium-altitude endurance

MAGTF

Marine air-ground task force

MALDRONE Malware injected into critical SAA for UAS.
MALE

Medium-altitude, long endurance UAS

MALE-T

Medium altitude long endurance – tactical UAS

MAME

Medium altitude, medium endurance

MARIN

Maritime Research Institute Netherlands

MARPOL

Marine pollution (prevention of)

MAS

Mayflower autonomous system

MASINT

Measurement and Signal Intelligence

MATS

Mobile Aircraft Tracking System

M-AUDS

Mobile Anti-UAV Defense System

MAV

Micro-air vehicle

Maverick

AGM -65 (USA) Missile

MBES

Multi-beam Echo Sounder

MCE

Mission control element

MCM

Mine countermeasures

MCU

Master Control Unit

MCVs

Mesoscale convective vortices

MDR

Missed Detection Rates

Mesonet

network of automated weather and environmental

monitoring stations designed to
observe mesoscale meteorological phenomena.
MEB

Marine expeditionary brigade (14,500 marines and

sailors).
MEMS

Micro-electromechanical systems

MEO

Medium Earth Orbit satellite

MFD

Multifunctional display

MGTOW

Maximum gross take-off weight

MHT

Multiple-hypotheses-testing

MIM

Man in the Middle cyber attack
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MINUSMA

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in

Mali
MIR

Mid Infrared 5 to (25-40) um

MIT

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ML

Machine learning techniques

MLRS

Multi launch rocket systems.

MLU

Mid-life upgrade

MMI

Man-machine interface

MORS

Military Operations Research Society

Modulation

Signal Modulation is the process of varying one or

more properties of a periodic waveform, called the carrier signal,
with a modulating signal that typically contains information to be
transmitted
MPA

Maritime patrol aircraft

MPI

Message-passing interface

MPC

Model-based predictive control

MPO

Mission payload operator

MR

Medium range / Maritime Reconnaissance

MRE

Medium-range endurance

MS

Mobile service

MSL / AGL

MSL altitudes are measured from a standard datum,

which is roughly equal to the average altitude of the ocean. So, an
aircraft traveling 5,000 feet directly above a mountain that’s 3,000
feet tall would have an altitude of 5,000 feet Above Ground Level
(AGL) and 8,000 feet MSL.
MSR
MSSM

Maritime Silk Road (China)
Multi-step optimization method to achieve re-

planning for stealth UAV penetration of ADS.
MTCR

missile Technology Control Regime

MTI

Moving target indication*

MTOM

Maximum take-off mass

MTOW

Maximum takeoff weight of an aircraft at which the

pilot can attempt to take off, due to structural or other limits.
MTS

Multi

Spectral

Transportation Systems / Sector
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Targeting

System

/Maritime

MTTR

Multitarget tracking radar/Mean time to repair.

MUAV

Mini-UAV or maritime UAV

MUJAO

Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

MUM

Manned-unmanned teaming.

MUSV

Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles

MW

Microwave

MWIR

Midwave Infrared

MW

microwave towers

N

Available Noise power, watts for HAPS

N

Terrain and ground conductivity factor, FM 34-40-7

5 = very rough terrain with poor ground conductivity
4 = moderately rough terrain with fair to good ground
conductivity
3 = Farmland terrain with good ground conductivity
2 = Level terrain with good ground conductivity[1]
The elevation of the jammer location and the enemy transmitter
location does not include the height of the antenna above the
ground or the length of the antenna. It is the location deviation
above sea level.
NAC

Network Access Control

NACA

National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics

NAS

National Airspace (USA)

NASAMS II National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System
NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAV

Nano-air vehicle / NAV data message for GPS

systems
NAVSEAS

Naval Sea Systems Command

NBC

Nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare

NCO

Network-centric operations

NCW

Network Centric Warfare

NDRC

National Development and Reform Commission

(China)
NEC
NEMESIS

Network enabled capability
Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature

against integrated Sensors (USN)
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NGA

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

NIEM

National Information Exchange Model

NIR

near Infrared

NLOS

Non-line-of-sight

NM
NMAC

Nautical Miles
A NMAC is defined as an incident associated with the

operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of collision occurs as
a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a
report is received from a pilot or a flight crewmember stating that a
collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft.
NMLA

the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad

(Tuareg Rebellion)
NO
NOAA

Numerical Optimization methods of CR
National

Oceanographic

and

Atmospheric

Administration
NOLO

No onboard live operator (USN)

NOTAM

Notice to airmen

NOx

Nitrogen emissions

NPD

Near Peer Doctrine

NPS

National Park Service

NSA

National Security Agency (US)

NSRL

New Silk Road Sea / Land routes (Chinese)

NSWC

Naval Surface Warfare Center

NSWC PCD

Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division

NTIA

National Telecommunications and Information

Administration
NTM/NTOM Notice to mariners
NTSB
NTT
NULLO
NUSSRC

National Transportation Safety Board
Non-Threat Traffic
Not using live operator (USAF)
National Unmanned Systems Shared Resource

Center
O

Other methods of CR

OEM

Original Equipment Manufacture
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OIO

Offensive Information Operations

OLOS

Out-of-the-line-of-sight

OODA

Decision Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

OoT
ONR

Ocean of Things (USN) (DARPA)
Office of Naval Research

OPA

Optionally piloted aircraft

OPAV

Optionally piloted air vehicle (aka OPV)

OPSEC

Operations Security

OSI

Open systems interconnection

OSS

Office of Strategic Services (now CIA)

OT

Operational technology

OTH

Over- the- horizon

OVPR

Office of the Vice President of Research , KSU

P

Isotropic source of an electromagnetic pulse of peak

power, Mw
PACE

Primary; Alternative; Contingency; Emergency

PANCAS

Passive Acoustic Non-Cooperative Collision Alert

System
PAR

Photosynthetically Active Radiation Sensor

PB

Particle Beams, Particle beams are large numbers of

atomic or sub-atomic.
particles moving at relativistic velocities.
PBL

Planetary boundary layer

PCAS

Persistent close air support

PCS

Personal Communication Services

PDV

Parameter Data Vector

PEIRP

Transmitter’s effective isotropic radiated power,

watts
PFMS

Predictive Flight Management System

PEMSIA

Partnership in Environmental Management of the

Seas of East Asia
PGB

Precision guided bomb

PGM

Precision guided missile

PHOTINT

Photographic intelligence (usually sky – ground)

PHX

Airport code for Phoenix
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PI

Probability of Incapacitation

PID

Proportional-Integral- Derivative

PII

Personal Identifiable Information

PIM

Position

of

intended

movements/Previously

intended movements
PIT

Proximity Intruder Traffic

P j

Minimum amount of jammer power output

required, in watts, FM 34-40-7
PKI

Public Key Infrastructure

PL

Power level, dB, Eq. 20-1

PLA

Chinese People’s Liberation Army

PLAN

Peoples Liberation Army Navy (China)

PLC

Programmable Logic Controllers

PLOCAN

Research facility Oceanic Platform of the Canary

Islands
PMA
PMIAA

Post Mission Analysis
Permissions

Management:

Identification,

Authentication and Authorization
PNF

Plug and Fly with custom transmitter, receiver,

battery, and charger.
PNT

Reliable communications; positioning, navigation,

and timing
PO

Psychological Operations / Performance Objectives

POS

Position and Orientation System

POV

Point of View

PPP

Precise Point Positioning

PPS

Precise positioning service (GPS)

PRC

Peoples Republic of China (China)

Primum Non Nocere – First Do No Harm (Latin)
PSD
PREACT

Power Spectral Density
Partnership

for

Regional

Counterterrorism (PREACT)
PRF

Pulse repetition frequency codes

PRM

Precision Runway Monitor

PS

Pressure sensor
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East

Africa

PSH

Plan-symmetric helicopter

PSR

Primary Surveillance Radar

P t

Power output of the enemy drone, in watts, FM

34-40-7
PW/PSYWAR Psychological Warfare
PWO

Principal Warfare officer

P(Y)

Precise Signal (GPS)for military positioning

QOS

Quality of Service in HAPs

QR

QR code is a type of matrix barcode which is

machine or phone readable.
QUAS

QUT UAS

QUT

Queensland University of Technology

R

1 /Tb is the bit rate (b/s) in link equation

R&D

Research & Development

R4

Energy density received at detected target

range, R, nm.
RA

Resolution Advisory

RAC

Range air controller

RACC

Social media RACC Threat Matrix: Removal,

Authenticity; Censorship, Collusion
RADAR

Radio Detection and Ranging

RADINT

Radar intelligence

RAM

Radar absorbing materials.

RAS

Radar absorbing structure.

RAST

Recovery, assist, and traverse.

RB

Rule-based methods (Conflict Resolution)

RBW

Red- breasted Woodpecker

RCE

Remote Code Execution

RCO

Remote-control operator

RCS

Radar cross-section

RCTA

Surf Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics

RDT& E

Research, Development, Test & Evaluation

RED

Risk Estimate Distance

Remote ID

Remote ID has two meanings in this textbook. It is

used as an information /
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technology device to identify people from a UAV. This term is used
in the UAS.
industry and the FAA as a mechanism for identifying an aircraft
type and the
registrant from the ground, essentially a digital license plate and
registration.
RES

Radio electronic systems

RF

Radio Frequency

RGB

Red Green Blue for VIS camera

RGT

Remote ground terminal

RIAS

Research

Institute

for

Autonomous

Systems

-University of North Dakota
Rician PDF
RIMPAC

Rician probability density function
Rim of the Pacific Exercise – Maritime

RL

Ramp launched

RMS

Reconnaissance management system /Root-mean-

square
RN

Ryan-Nichols Qualitative Risk Assessment Equations

17-2, 17-3
RNRA

Ryan – Nichols Attack / Defense Scenario Risk

Assessment for Cyber cases
ROA
ROC

Remotely operated aircraft
Republic of China (Taiwan) / Regional Operations

Center (USA)
ROV/ROUV

Remote operating vehicle / Remotely operated

underwater vehicle
RPA

Remotely piloted aircraft

RPH

Remotely piloted helicopter

RPV

Remotely piloted vehicle

RR

Radio regulations

RRE

Radar Range Equation

RSA

RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adelman) -authors of early

public –key cryptographic system
RSTA

Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition

RTA

Dubai Roads and Transport Authority
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RTF

Off- the- shelf, Ready -to -Fly

RTG

Real time Gradiometer

RTK

Real Time Kinematic

RTS

Remote tracking station/Request to send/Release

to service.
RTU
RUAV

Remote Terminal Unit
Relay UAV

RWR

Radar warning receiver

S

Intensity at surface of sphere

S&T

Science & Technology

SA

Situational Awareness

SAA

Sense and Avoid &

SAA

Sense and Act Systems; replaces See and Avoid

function of a human pilot.
SAASM

Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module

SAE

Society of Automotive Engineers

SAHRV

Semi-autonomous Hydrographic Reconnaissance

vehicle
SAM
SAMPLE

Surface to Air Missile
Survivable autonomous mobile platform, long-

endurance
SAP

Systems Applications and Products also the name of

a company
SAR

Synthetic aperture radar / Search and rescue-

especially using helicopters.
SAS

Safety Assurance System

SATCOM

Satellite communications

SBP

Sub Bottom Profiler

SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems

SCHEMA

Security Incident Identification

SCIF

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

SCS

Shipboard control system (or station) / Stereo

Camera System / South China Sea
SE

Synthetic environment

SEA

Airport code for Seattle
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SEAD

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SECDEF

Secretary of Defense

Shadowing

Airframe shadowing – UAV- Ground signal

degradation during maneuver
SEZ

Special economic zones

SHM

Simple harmonic motion – represented by sign

wave.
SHORAD

Short Range Air Defense systems

SIGINT

Signals Intelligence

Signature

UAS detection by acoustic, optical, thermal and

radio /radar
SINS

Ships inertial navigation systems.

SJM

Salafi-Jihad Movement

SKASaC

Seeking airborne surveillance and control.

SKYNET

Fictional artificial intelligence system that becomes

self-aware
SLAM

Simultaneous localization and mapping

SLAMRAAM Surface launched AMRAAM
SM

Separation Management

SMC

Single moving camera

SME

Subject matter expert

SMR

Single main rotor

S/N

S / N = is one pulse received signal to noise ratio,

dB: Signal to Noise ratio at HAPS receiver
SOA

Static Obstacle – Avoidance system

Soft damage

DEW disruption to a UAS computer

SOLAS

Safety of Life at Sea (International Maritime

Convention) [safety conventions]
SONAR

Sound Navigation and Ranging

Sox

Sulfur emissions

SPL

Sound pressure level, dB = 20 Log p / po [ measured

pressures to reference pressure]
SPS
Spoofing

see Eq. 20-3,4; 6-7

Standard position service (GPS)
A Cyber-weapon attack that generates false signals

to replace valid ones.
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Spot sensors

ARS sensors that measure single locations without

image library
SPURV

Special purpose underwater research vehicle

SQL

SQL Injection – common malevolent code injection

technique
SR

Short range

SRBM

Short range ballistic missile, ex SCUD missile

SRL

Systems readiness level

SSA

Static Sense-and -Act

SSBN

Ballistic missile submarine force

SSP

Smart Skies Project

SSR

Secondary Surveillance Radar

SST

Self – Separation Threshold

ST&T

Submarine Track and Trail

STANAG 4856 Standard interfaces of UAV Control System for
NATO UAV
STCW

Standards of training and certification

STK

Satellite toolkit

STOL

Short take-off and landing

sUAS

Small Unmanned Aircraft System

SubT
SUAVE
SWARM

Subterranean Challenge Urban Circuit
Small UAV engine
High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or

unmanned boats
SWAT

Special Weapons and Tactics (police / paramilitary)

SWAP

Size, weight, and power

SWIR

Shortwave infrared, 1400-3000 nm, 1.4 -3.0 um

wavelength range
SZ

Safety Zone is defined as the horizontal and vertical

separation criteria which form a cylindrical airspace volume around
the UAS. In figure 3-2 that volume is defined by 1000 ft. radius and
200 ft. height. It is assumed that initially the UAS is in the center
with 100 ft above and below the A/C.
T

In Range equation & environment, strength of a
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received signal, function of square or fourth power of distance, d,
from transmitter (Adamy D. -0., 2015)
T

Time, sec (RRE)

T

Tension in Eq.20-5

TA

Traffic Advisory

TAC

Target air controller

TACAN

Tactical air navigation

TAR

Antenna noise temperature, Kelvin

TAS

True airspeed

TBO

Time between overhauls

TC

Type certificate

TCAS

Traffic alert and collision avoidance system

TCPA

Time to reach Closest Point of Approach

Te

Effective input noise temperature, Kelvin,

TEAM (UAS) High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or
unmanned boats; differs from SWARM in that it has a UAS Team
Leader, (TL) where SWARM does not. TL directs the UAS team and
is the primary counter UAS target to disrupt.
TETRA

Terrestrial Trunked Radio for terrestrial terminals /

services
Thermobaric Metal augmented charge
THOR

Tactical high-power operational responder

TIR

Thermal infrared = 8000 – 15000 nm, 8 -15 um

TL

Team Leader

TLS

Transport Layer Security

TO

take-off

Tort

A tort is an act or omission that gives rise to injury

or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for which courts
impose liability.
TP

Trajectory Prediction

TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command networks
TRL

Technology readiness level: Technology readiness

levels are a rating method.
developed by NASA to describe where a technology is in terms of
its
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development. The lowest levels (1 – 3) are technologies that are
being.
researched, the middle levels (4 – 6) are technologies that are
being prototyped.
and tested, and the highest levels (7 – 9) are technologies that are
being.
demonstrated and used. (NASA, 2017)
TS

Measured noise temperature, Kelvin units above

absolute zero.
TSTCP

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. TSCTP

partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
TT & C

Telemetry, tracking and command.

TUAV

Tactical UAV

UA

Unmanned Aircraft (non-cooperative and potential

intruder)
U-Actors

Unintentional Cyber Actors

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UAM

Urban Air Mobility (vehicle)

UAPO

Unmanned Aircraft Program Office

UAS

Unmanned aircraft system

UASCdr

Unmanned aircraft system commander

UASIPP

UAS Integration Pilot Program

UAS-p
UAV

UAS pilot
Unmanned aerial vehicle / Unmanned autonomous

vehicle.
UAV-p

UAV pilot

UBR

Uplink bit rate, Mb/s

UCAR

Unmanned combat armed rotorcraft

UCARS

UAV common automated recovery system

UCAV

Unmanned combat air vehicle

UCWA / UA Unintentional cyber warfare attack
UG

Underwater glider (USN)

UGCS

Unmanned Ground Control Station

UGS

Unmanned ground-based station
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UGT

Unmanned ground transportation

UGV

Unmanned ground vehicle

UHF

Ultra High Frequency, 300 MHz – 3 GHz

UIT

Unintentional Insider Threats

UK

United Kingdom

UL

Upload link

ULC

Uniform Law Commission

ULPCG

University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

UMTS

Universal Mobile Telecommunications System

U.N.

United Nations

UND

University of North Dakota

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization
UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

US

United States

USAMRIID

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious

Diseases
USBL

Responder for Surface Ultra Short Baseline

USCG

United States Coast Guard

USCGA

United States Coast Guard Auxiliary

USD

Unmanned surveillance drone / United States

Dollar
USMC

United States Marine Corp

USS

Undersea Search and Survey

USV

Unmanned surface vehicle [Boat]

UTM

Unmanned Traffic Management / Safe Uniform

Traffic Management
UTV

Unmanned target vehicle

UUV

Unmanned underwater / undersea vehicle.

UV

Unmanned Vehicle

UUNs/DUNSs Urgent / deliberate universal needs statements
UXO

Unexploded Ordinance

V

Visible

VCR

Video Camera Recorder

VFR

Visual flight rules
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VHS

Very High Frequency Radio

VIKI

Virtual Interactive Kinetic Intelligence

VLA

Very light aircraft

VLJ

Very Light Jet

VLAR

Vertical launch and recovery

VLOS

Visual Line of Sight

VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions

VNIR

Visible light and near infrared 400 – 1400 nm, 0.4 –

1.4 um wavelength range
VOA
Voloport

Voice of America
Landing site for Volcopter.

VTC

Vessel traffic control

VTM

Vessel traffic management

VTOL

Vertical take-off and landing

VTUAV

Vertical take-off UAV

WABN

wide available broadband networks

WARM

identify war reserve mode emissions.

WEF

World Economic Forum

WEZ

Weapon Engagement Zone

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction /Weapons of Mass

Disruption
WMDD

Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate

WRC

World Radio Conference Standards Organization

XLUUV

Extra-large unmanned undersea vehicle

XO

Executive Officer of Naval vessel

ZIGBEE or KILLERBEE

Sniffing / penetration tools specific to

UAS.
Greek / Mathematical Symbols
λ

Wavelength in Hz, c / f where c= speed of light 344

m/s and f = frequency, Hz.
Σ

Radar Cross Sectional Area, m2

υ

UAV velocity vector and UAV speed (ms -1)

θ

Horizontal angle in inertial axes (rad)

Ψ

Vertical angle in inertial axes (rad)
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x,y,z

Inertial position coordinates (m)

κ

Curvature (m-1)

τ

Torsion, (m-1)

r(q)

Path, with path variable (q)

h

Path length (m)

e

Basis axes vector set.

P(x, y, z, θ, Ψ) UAV pose where: where x, y, z, is the UAV location or
waypoint and (θ, Ψ) are.
the horizontal and vertical angles , respectively
Ps

Starting pose for UAV moving to

Pf

Finish pose

Џ

Path constraint in (9.4)

a

lateral acceleration proportional to curvature k

∞

vector operator in (9.6)

f(n)

Path cost function in (9.9)

g(n)

cost of path from start node n to the goal.

h(n)

Heuristic function which estimates the distance

from the next node n on the path.
to goal in (9.9)
h(X)

represents actual journey cost from goal X.

g(X,E)

represents the estimate journey cost from state X to

the current position of the
stealth UAV in (9.10)
N

Length of the prediction domain in (9.11) & N steps

in (9.12)
W

length of the control domain in (9.11)

qi

Output prediction error

qj

Is the weighting coefficient of the control variable

in (9.11)
k

Kth node for prediction of cost of predicted flight

path in MPC (9.12)
3-D

three dimensional

Special Definitions
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Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the
resources of two belligerents differ in essence and, in the struggle,
interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic
weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics
of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to
use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality of their
forces and equipment. (Thomas, 2010) Such strategies may not
necessarily be militarized. (Steponova, 2016)
This is in contrast to symmetric warfare, where two powers have
comparable military power and resources and rely on tactics that
are similar overall, differing only in details and execution. (Thomas,
2010)
Sources plus Bibliography below: (Nichols R. K., Unmanned
Aircraft Systems In the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced
Air Assets. 2nd Ed. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press., 2019) and
(Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies
and Operations, 2020) (Nichols & et.al, 2020)
Austin, R, (2010) Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design,
Development and Deployment, West Sussex, UK: Wiley, [Condensed
with additions from eleven-page “Units and Abbreviations Table.”
Pp. ix-xxix] Additional sources generated from / specific to Chapter
development / discussion. A few definitions taken from Wikipedia.
Cyber terminology from: Nichols, R. K. (Sept. 5, 2008) Cyber
Counterintelligence & Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
(SCIF) Needs – Talking Points & (Randall K. Nichols J. J., 2018)
& (Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against Enemy
Counter Measures, 2019) & (Randall K. Nichols D. , Chapter 20
Acoustic CM & IFF Libraries V SWARMS Rev 1 05142019, 2018)
& (Randall K. Nichols and Lekkas, 2002)& (NIST, September 2012)
Alford, L. D., Jr., USAF, Lt. Col. (2000) Cyber Warfare: Protecting
Military Systems Acquisition Review Quarterly, spring 2000, V.7, No.
2, P, 105, (Nielsen, 2012)
Nichols, Randall K.; Mumm, Hans C.; Lonstein, Wayne D.; Ryan,
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Julie J.C.H.; Carter, Candice; and Hood, John-Paul, “Unmanned
Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain” (2019). NPP eBooks. 27.
https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27
Http://Www.Dtic.Mil/Dtic/Tr/Fulltext/U2/A487951.Pdf
Appendix 1: Standard Acoustic Principal Physical Properties
(Entokey, 2019)
and (Gelfand S. A., 2009)
A majority of the technical abbreviations come from (Nichols R. K.,
et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) and
(Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies
and Operations, 2020) (Nichols & et.al, 2020) (Nichols, et al.,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: Protecting
USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019) Nichols, R. K., Ryan,
J., Mumm, H., Lonstein, W., Carter, C., Hood, J., . . . & Jackson, M.
(2020). Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations on Air, Sea, Land.
Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press #35. Nichols, R. K., Sincavage, S.,
Mumm, H., Lonstein, W., Carter, C., Hood, J., . . . & Shields, B. (2021).
Disruptive Technologies With Applications In Airline, Marine, Defense
Industries. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press, #TBA.
Other definitions from the following references:
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1. Propulsion and Fuels:
Disruptive Technologies for
Submersible Craft Including
UUVs [Jackson]
Student Learning Objectives – The student will understand
disruptive technologies associated with submersible craft including
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).
The student will be able to:
• Understand the drivers for change that leads to the adoption
of disruptive technologies.
• Appreciate the need for international regulations to manage
the disruption.
• Explain the current and future disruptive technologies that
drive the need to change fuels for use in new propulsion
systems.
• Understand the role of naval architects in developing
submersible craft including UUVs that adopt disruptive
technologies.

Introduction
Drivers for Change
The major disruptors in terms of propulsor’s and associated fuels
for UUVs (Button, 2009) are driven by three areas: introduction of
carbon taxes, rising cost of fuel and environmental regulations. In
terms of carbon emissions, Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol limits
carbon emissions and is governed by the International Maritime
Propulsion and Fuels: Disruptive
Technologies for Submersible Craft

Organization (IMO) for all seafaring craft (American Bureau of
Shipping, 2019). Failure to reach such an agreement globally means
that individual nations is responsible for its own reductions and
the IMO developed the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) to
support nations who are proactive at reducing carbon emissions. At
best, nations monitor reductions, and the naval architect develops
procedures aimed at reducing the carbon footprint of the craft.
The rising price of oil is a way of reducing carbon emissions from
an economic viewpoint. As it is a finite resource, there will be a
point when the price of oil will force operators of submersibles
including UUVs to use an alternate fuel and its finite volume is seen
as a significant disruptor that will force naval architects to design
craft that will use renewable sources of energy (Department of the
Navy, 2004), (Department of Defense, 2011), (Department of Defense,
2012). Extra-large UUVs (XLUUVs) is set to become the dominant
UUV for the US Navy starting 2023 (US_Congress, 2020). The US
navy defines XLUUVs as greater than 48 inches in diameter and can
only be launched from a pier rather than a manned submarine.
A typical XLUUV is shown in Figure 1.1 and is known at the Boeing
Echo Voyager XLUUV. The Echo Voyager is 51 feet in length and has
a rectangular cross section of 8.5 feet x 8.5 feet, a weight in air of
50 tons, and a range of 6,500 nautical miles. It can accommodate a
modular payload section up to 34 feet in length and provides 2,000
cubic feet of internal payload volume.
Figure 1.1 Boeing Echo Voyager XLUUV. Courtesy of Boeing
(https://www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous-systems/echovoyager/index.page)
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International Regulations
The regulatory authority that serves the international maritime
community is known as the ‘International Maritime Organization’
and is an arm of the United Nations (UN). The UN has a secretariat
of flag states where regulations and conventions are debated and
agreed. The IMO provides rules that follow the regulations and are
adopted across all territorial and international waters. There are
a number of regulations that cover UUVs and are associated with
the prevention of marine pollution (MARPOL), standards of training
and certification (STCW) and safety conventions (SOLAS). MARPOL
applies to the protection of the marine environment from the craft
itself, STCW provides a competency framework for operators of
UUVs and SOLAS applies to structural integrity of UUVs and other
seafaring craft, manned or unmanned (American Bureau of
Shipping, 2019).

Emissions control under MARPOL Annex VI

restricts the emissions of nitrogen (NOX) and sulfur (SOX) pollutants
during the combustion of diesel in prime movers. However,
restrictions in ozone, particulates and greenhouse gases are
included in subsequent amendments of Annex VI.
The standards are arranged in three tiers I, II, and III. Tier I was
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established in 1997 and ratified in 2004, whereas Tiers II and III were
established in 2008 and ratified in 2010. NOX limits apply globally,
whereas SOX limits apply regionally.

Large seafaring vessels

typically produce relative CO2 emissions between 1 – 3, whereas
airplanes emit 398 relative units of CO2, small goods vehicles emit
226 relative units of CO2, large articulated trucks emit 49 relative
units of CO2, while railway wagons emit 6 relative units of CO2.
Therefore, ships and submersibles have a low carbon footprint than
other forms of global transport.
Fuels and Propulsion: Current Disruptive Technologies
Diesel Fuels
Diesel engines have improved significantly since the 1980s with
advances associated with increased bore/stroke ratio, slow- and
medium-speed engines, improved peak pressures and significant
fuel reductions in two-stroke engines. Turbocharging efficiency
and fuel injection technology have contributed to further
reductions in consumption in four-stroke engines. However, since
the mid-1990s, the design of diesel engines changed due to the
reduction of NOX and SOX emissions without changing fuel
efficiency requirements. Marine engine design has changed since
the mid-1990s and include changes such as: low NOX combustions
with adjustable camshafts, variable inlet valve controls, high boost
pressures

and better

combustion

chamber

design,

greater

mechanical strength of engines, two-stage turbocharging, exhaust
gas recirculation, waste gate technology, sequential turbocharging,
variable turbine geometry, humidification of inlet air, use of
selective catalytic reduction systems, exhaust gas scrubbing, and
the emulsification of fuels (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018).
The disruptive technologies used for improving NOX emissions
in diesel engines are focused on reducing peak temperatures and
duration of the combustion cycle and the use of Miller cycle inlet
valve timings and higher-pressure turbochargers. It has been
discovered that using the Miller cycle instead of the Diesel cycle
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during combustion reduces NOX emissions by reducing the cycle
temperature at constant high pressure, hence the use and further
development of high-pressure turbocharging using two-stage
turbochargers.
Biofuels
Collections of cells and proteins and the conditions under which
these natural living systems grow and replicate created the first
biofuels. The first generation of biofuels consisted of biodiesel and
bioethanol. Biodiesel is manufactured from vegetable oils (coconut,
palm, rape seed, soybean, and tallow) and animal fats. They are
classed as fatty acid methyl esters (FAME) and are manufactured
when vegetable oils and animal fats react with alcohol such as
methanol. Bioethanol is manufactured by fermenting renewables
based on sugar or starch. These ingredients are typically cassava,
corn, sorghum, sugar beets, sugar cane and wheat. The variability in
FAME stability in various conditions is due to the type of ingredients
used in their formulation and their ability to absorb water and hold
in suspension, which causes hydrolytic reactions that causes FAME
to revert to fatty acids. If water is dissociated microbiological
growth can clog filters and corrosion of engine parts can occur.
Disruptors that may enhance and increase the use of biofuels
focus on producing synthetic fuels based on branch-chain higher
alcohols, E-coli, microorganisms such as yeast and algae-based
fuels. Other types of fuels that may be used in the future could
be based on di-methyl ether (DME) that can be produced from
biomass, natural coal and gas and oil residues. It is condensed when
pressured above 0.5 MPa, is non-toxic and environmentally benign
and is not dissimilar to liquid natural gas (LNG). It has a high cetane
number and is high in oxygen content when mixed in air achieving
smokeless combustion and very low formation of particulates.
However, it has a lower density than other fuels and lower
combustion enthalpy. It requires lubricity and corrosive inhibiting
additives, but despite the issues of lubricity and corrosion, it has
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high thermal efficiency, low noise, low NOX emissions and is low in
particulates (low soot formation) (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018).
Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) Fuels
The principal constituent of LNG is CH4, which reduces CO2
emissions by 25%. Also, NOX production is 85% less due to
compression ratio and combustion temperature differences. Since
sulfur is absent from the fuel, SOX emissions are non-existent. The
advantages of using LNG are described as low emissions, existing
marine engines burn LNG, LNG is cheaper than most fuels, and
fueling

technology

is

well

established.

The

disadvantages

associated with LNG are associated with methane slip and that
LNG requires a heat source to evaporate it to form a gas used for
combustion.
Gas Turbine Propulsion
Gas turbines are used for direct propulsion or can be used to
generate electricity to electric motors when not used for
propulsion. Figure 1.2 shows a typical cross-section of a gas turbine.
This allows them to be used for hybrid operations coupled to diesel
engines or diesel generators. Gas turbines have the advantage of
low weight compared to standard prime movers and aero-derivative
turbines burn distillate fuels that satisfy current regulations on
emissions and smoke generation. However, distillate fuels are more
expensive than standard marine fuels, and are very powerful when
turbines are heat recovery turbines are coupled to use the exhaust
gases to increase thermal efficiency for electricity generation.
Indeed, gas turbines can be used for propulsion and for providing
electricity to secondary propulsion units. The advantages of using
gas turbines lies in the fact that they are high power density prime
movers and are low weight and small size. NOX emissions are low
and SOX emissions are negligible due to use of high-grade fuels.
However, distillate fuels are expensive, turbines are less efficient as
ambient temperature increases and thermal efficiencies are lower
compared to diesel engines (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018).
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Figure 1.2 Cross section of a typical gas turbine
engine. Courtesy of Tilyudai and reused under license CC BY-NCSA 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/.

Nuclear Propulsion
Energy generation and storage usually relies on breaking
chemical bonds between atoms. Nuclear power relies on converting
large and heavy nuclei into smaller fission products by controlled
chain reactions. A large amount of heat is generated that is
converted to usable power via an appropriate thermodynamic cycle.
Nuclear propulsion is CO2 free and is quite disruptive in terms of
using it as a propulsion source. Molten salt thorium reactors are
considered to be disruptors to using diesel and turbine power units
owing to the abundance of thorium compared to uranium and using
molten salts of fluorides and chlorides to act as coolants operating
at temperatures in the range of 650OC to 700 OC. Such reactors are
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in development and the use on seafaring craft is governed by the
IMO’s Code of Safety for Nuclear Ships, Resolution A.491 (XII), 1981.
However, they have not been used on UUVs and small submersibles
so experience and knowledge of operation from larger submarines
may have to be transferred to the naval architect responsible for
using them in UUVs. The advantages of using them include no
emissions generated, the design of reactors is well established so
could easily be adapted for UUVs, they can be small and modular
in design, the cost of fuel is paid at the beginning of use and is
not subjected to price fluctuations. The disadvantages of this
technology are associated with knowledge of safety and the lack
of systems engineering knowledge in personnel that would prevent
wider adoption, design of UUVs may be constrained because of the
technology, regulatory standards would need to be created for use
in UUVs, support systems and planned response to misuse would
need to be developed and for use a new and controversial
technology, proof of concept and the management of public
perception will need to be managed (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018).
Battery Technology
Battery technology is very well advanced and documented. New
battery chemistries are fundamental and constitute the most
disruptive technology associated with their wider use on UUVs.
Metal-sulfur is typical, but metal-air is becoming more widespread
such as lithium-air being the leading couple due to its ability to
provide the highest amount of energy per density of metal.
However, post lithium-air battery technology is being developed
due to the limited supply of lithium. The use of magnesium-air
batteries is being considered and the technology developed because
magnesium can be harvested from salt water. However, energy
storage is thought to be the key to the future for UUVs, so the
development of supercapacitors to store charge is a key disruptor
for many areas of transport, not least UUVs. The advantages of
batteries on UUVs are focused on non-generation of emissions,
continuous development means that they will get smaller and more
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powerful and that batteries can be used as hybrid power generators
with combinations of other modes of propulsion (MAN Energy
Solutions, 2018). Disadvantages include size and the fact that they
need to be recharged/replaced when the UUV is being used in
service. A submarine battery cell is shown in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3 Submarine battery cell. Courtesy of Jamie
Sanford and used with permission under license CC BY-NC 2.0.
To view a copy of this license, visit
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/.

Fuel Cells
Fuel cells were invented in 1838 but not widely adopted until
recently due to their low mass, the emission of the fuel cell is
water, and because materials technology has advanced so much in
recent years that fuel cells may be widely used. They are electrochemical and require support plant such as pumps and fans and
rely on hydrogen and oxygen combining to release energy. The
reactants consumed by the fuel cell is stored externally rather than
internally (batteries) and can be renewed continuously rather than
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depleted (battery). Therefore, it produces power all the time as long
at the reactants are supplied to it. There are certain drawbacks to
their use such as hydrogen supply issues at sea and they have lower
specific power and density compared to diesel engines. They also
provide direct current output that is not compatible with coupling
to mechanical transmission systems (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018).
However, they can be used for auxiliary power sources, methanol
can be used as a substitute fuel, they are quiet (no moving parts),
and they require clean fuels that do not emit SOX or NOX due to low
temperature operation. Figure 1.4 shows a fuel cell developed by the
Argonne National Laboratory, USA.
Figure 1.4 Fuel cell. Courtesy of Argonne National
Laboratory (license CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). To view a copy of this
license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/
2.0/.

Hydrogen Fuel
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Hydrogen is a potential disruptive fuel for use on UUVs and can
come from sources such as wind, hydro-electric, nuclear or as a
conventional fuel used in fuel cells. The advantages of using liquid
hydrogen are that it does not produce CO2 or SOX emissions, it uses
land-based sources of power for creation, it can be used in fuel cells
and in internal combustion engines and burning it produces a large
amount of fresh water (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018). However, it is
unknown in the marine sector, has some safety issues and a supply
infrastructure would be needed for use in UUVs.
Future Disruptive Technologies for Propulsion and Fuels
Hybrid Propulsion
Hybrid propulsion is an option where different modes of power
can be used to optimize the operation of the UUV. The reasons
for selecting hybrid propulsion systems are focused on reduced
fuel consumption, reduced impact of CO2 and other pollutants,
variable future fuel costs and supply, insurance against increasing
environmental legislation, noise reduction, operating in zero
emission mode, and lower amount of maintenance.
Further disruptive technologies associated with propulsion
include the use of propellers such as fixed pitch, controllable pitch
propellers and ducted propellers. The type of propeller used for
UUVs is determined by operational conditions. Typically, for small
high-speed UUVs both rotational speed and propeller advance can
be high and it can be difficult to control the effects of cavitation.
Therefore, developments in the use of ducted and podded
propellers will need to be made to apply this disruptive technology
to UUVs. Other types of propeller to be considered for use on UUVs
include contra-rotating propellers, and cycloidal propellers. The
naval architect should maximize the diameter of the propeller so
that torque, thrust, and propeller efficiency are maximized. The
propeller can be approximated to a Wageningen B-screw series
using open water design data. This is well characterized in most
texts concerned with naval architecture (Lewis, 1988). Other

Propulsion and Fuels: Disruptive Technologies for Submersible Craft
Including UUVs [Jackson] | 137

disruptive technologies to consider for propulsion is waterjet
propulsion and magneto hydrodynamic propulsion for small UUVs.
Energy Saving Devices
Energy saving devices associated with hydrodynamic flow are
considered in three sections of the hull: before the propeller, at
the propeller and after the propeller. There are some overlapping
areas but mostly operate at the boundary layer and in the wake of
the UUV. Devices placed on the flow of the propeller include wake
equalizing ducts, asymmetric stern, Grothuis spoilers, partial stern
tunnels, Mewis ducts, reaction fins, Zozen nozzles, and integrated
ducted propellers.
Disruptive technologies applied to the propeller area include low
speed propellers, propellers with end plates, Kappel propellers and
propeller boss cap fins. For energy saving behind the propeller, grim
vane wheels, rudder thrusting fins and rubber bulb fins are adopted
depending on the mode of operation (Hughes, 2010).

Hull Design (Appendages and Coatings)
The efficiency of the hull is governed by the form of the hull and
its dimensions (Nicholls, 2020). The hull envelope for submersibles
is described by the Jackson hull-form (Figure 1.5) (Hughes, 2010).
However, the stern of the UUV can be improved by using the Myring
hull-form with its axisymmetric geometry. The Myring hull-form is
a function of five variables: forward length of hull-section (Lfwd),
parallel mid-body length (Lmid), forward curvature index (n), tail
semi-angle (α), and maximum hull-form diameter (D).
The length of the aft hull-section (Laft) is (Eq. 1.1):
(1.1)
Laft = 100 – ( Lfwd + Lmid )
The radius of the forward hull-section, Rfwd, for a given axial
coordinate, x, is defined as a modified semi-ellipsoid (Eq. 1.2):
(1.2)
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Rfwd

= (D /2)

{ [ 1 – ( x- Lfwd / x ) 2 ] n }

The radius of the aft hull-section, Raft, is defined as (Eq. 1.3):
(1.3)
Raft = (D /2) – { [ (3D/2Laft 2 – tan α / Laft) ( x – Lfwd – Laft ) 2 ]
}

FORWARD-BODY
BODY

MIDAFT-BODY

Figure 1.5 Jackson hull-form geometry. [Adapted from Open
Clipart Vectors by pixabay (Public Domain Image)]
The Myring hull-form is similar to the Jackson hull-form.
However, the semi-angle of the aft section provides the naval
architect with the ability to account for stern flows effects due
to the geometry of the hull-section. The use of coatings on the
Myring hull-form has yet to be investigated as a potential disruptive
technology that could changes the characteristics of skin friction
resistance and reduced biofouling.
Hull coatings and roughness is significant when considering the
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motion of UUVs. Hull coatings minimize the skin friction component
of resistance and prevent fouling of the surface. Tin-based coatings
have been used regularly in marine applications to prevent fouling
but are detrimental to the environment. Therefore, disruptive
technologies are focused on providing environmentally-friendly
coatings such as electrochemically active coatings that allow the
injection of boundary interfaces with bubbles so that an air cushion
can be activated under certain conditions to reduce friction and
disrupt the fouling process. Investigations into the texture of
coating/hull surfaces will need to be conducted to emulate the skin
of marine mammals so that friction and fouling is minimized or
eliminated completely.
Superconducting Electric Motors
Electric motors are very efficient, but superconducting electric
motors are highly efficient (~ 99%). This allows them to reduce
operating costs of UUVs and reduce emissions. Superconducting
motors are smaller in size, typically developing power per weight
in the region of 30 kW/kg compared to standard electric motors
~ 5 kW/kg. High temperature superconductors discovered in 1986
are useful for developing this technology, but the discovery of
magnesium diboride as a superconducting material in 2001 means
that its lower critical temperature and sensitivity to magnetic fields
will need to be adapted for use in rotating electrical machinery. The
potential advantages of this disruptive technology include very low
losses in electrical machines such as motors and the size and weight
of the motor compared to traditional electric motors is much lower.
However, the technology is yet to be proven at sea.
Conclusions: Naval Architect’s Role
The role of the naval architect is becoming increasingly complex
and broad especially when one considers the effects of extreme
weather and the minimization of using the earth’s scarce resources
(Lewis, 1988). The future naval architect will need to work with
natural scientists, such as marine biologists, in order to design
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vessels that work with nature to minimize the impact on the natural
world (Hughes, 2010). The role will continue to work with engineers
from

other

disciplines,

project

managers

and

business

administrators and we may see the development of new academic
courses that blend the principles of naval architecture with business
studies that includes the commercial aspects of UUVs such as ‘naval
systems architecture’ or ‘marine systems engineering’ (MAN Energy
Solutions, 2018). The UUV must be considered as a system in order
to design an environmentally beneficial craft. This means that the
design, operation, and maintenance of the UUV is an integrated
system, and that the naval architect needs to fully understand the
operational and engineering principles that form the systems
architecture of UUVs. The potential integration of disruptive
technologies into the design of UUVs provides opportunities to
further advance the field of underwater systems especially in the
current political and economic climate.
Questions
• What are the drivers for change in terms of using new fuels for
propulsion units in UUVs?
• Name and explain the key international regulations that
support the design and operation of submersibles and other
forms of UUVs.
• Describe the disruptive technology driving the development of
diesel engines and explain why the Miller thermodynamic
cycle better than the Diesel cycle in the context of disruptive
technologies applied to diesel engines?
• Discuss and describe the current disruptive technologies that
affect the design, maintenance, and operations of UUVs.
• The choice of fuel is dependent on the type of prime mover
used in a UUV. What are the environmental benefits of using
biofuels, LNG, and hydrogen?
• What is hybrid propulsion? Name its advantages and
disadvantages.
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• Comment on the design a the UUV’s hull section and the naval
architect’s role in designing UUVs subjected to future
disruptive technologies.
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of using
superconducting electric motors in UUVs?
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2. Automation &
Human-Machine Symbiosis
[Mumm]
Student Learning Objectives – The student will gain knowledge of
the concepts and framework as it relates to the symbiosis of humans
and machines and how this once futuristic idea is now a reality.
A Look Back at the Machine and Human Symbiosis Evolution
The idea that humans and machines would someday become
interdependent upon one another was once considered science
fiction and useful material for Hollywood films; however, it was
not a scenario based on reality. This has all changed, and the
interdependence of the human race on machines is becoming an
integration that we can no longer ignore.
The Biology Dictionary lists the definition of symbiosis as “an
evolved interaction or close living relationship between organisms
from different species, usually with benefits to one or both of the
individuals involved”. (Symbiosis Definition, 2020). See Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 Robot and Human Connecting (Middleton, 2018)
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For this discussion, the humans are creating the autonomous
systems (robots) for the benefit of the human race, which is deemed
as an obligation in symbiosis in “which case the relationship
between the two species is so interdependent, that each of the
organisms is unable to survive without the other” (Symbiosis
Definition, 2020). The case for an obligated symbiotic relationship
can be made here as a ‘facultative’ relationship is based in the ability
of the connection to be created by choice, because one entity can
live without the other. In the year 2020 and beyond, it is clear
humans have created a world where machines are essential to
human survival. This survival is seen in many forms from daily
activities, healthcare to national security and warfare as discussed
in November of 2020 by the head of the British Army, General Sir
Nick Carter, as he is forecasting “Thirty thousand “robot soldiers”
could be fighting alongside humans in the near future as the British
Army is forced to modernize” (Duncan, 2020). This would include
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small

drones,

unmanned

ground

vehicles,

and

unmanned

underwater vehicles.
A look at how the human race is becoming more of a cyborg
or a cyber organism is discussed from the lens of this being an
endosymbiosis relationship “occurring when one of the symbiotic
partners lives within the body of the other” (Symbiosis Definition,
2020).
The study of organic life and how it evolves is steeped in history,
scientific theories, and documentation. This is in stark contrast to
the very recent evolution of artificial intelligence and artificial life.
In order to achieve full symbiosis between humans and machines
“may require that truly human-like characteristics be developed
in intelligent machines. Such machines not only should be capable
of human-like thinking, reasoning, and problem solving, but also
should be capable of displaying human-like motivation, emotion,
and personality, among other things.
Little is known about how a system will evolve over time and
how this evolution will act and react in human settings such as the
workplace and our overall society” (Sun, 2020).
The Fifth Industrial Revolution
Changes take time, resources, and evolutionary reasoning
towards the betterment of humanity or a radical shift in our daily
lives introduced in small measures. This pace of change is speeding
up, and the time between shifts is shrinking, yet the effects of
the change are magnified without a clear understanding of the
consequences of actions and the reactions they cause. The fifth
revolution will “take away mundane and repetitive tasks; it opens
the way to curiosity, creativity, empathy, and judgment, ensuring a
balance between people and technology” (Joseph, 2020). The rate
of change will dwarf that of the past as the definition of the new
revolution will herald that in “the Fifth Industrial Revolution,
humans and machines will dance together, metaphorically” (Gauri,
2019). In a September 2020 article of The National, Patrick Noack
states:
The speed of this revolution is unprecedented, and the impact is
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relevant to more and more people in increasingly diverse ways…the
first of the revolutions lasted about 200 years. The second lasted
100, while the third about 50. It is easy to see the pattern
here…during the fourth (revolution) we are hyperconnected
through our smart devices to most of the planet. The fifth
revolution will make that connection closer and seamless and will
feel unmediated. The smart device on which we tap and into which
we speak will disappear. Brain-computer interfaces will replace
them. (Noack, 2020).
The aviation and maritime industries are steep in the history
of humans and machine as the industrialization of our societies
spread across the world. It was first the naval industry and later the
aviation industry that allowed commerce to blossom and affordable
travel to take hold. The change seen in these industries drove
innovation, yet profit was the goal; this hallmark is what defines the
shift as humanity “needs a Fifth Industrial Revolution to flower like
a new Renaissance Age. It will be marked by creativity and common
purpose, as we together work to bend progress and profits toward
purpose and inclusivity” (Gauri, 2019).
Consider the motivations of innovations such as “Mr. Trash
Wheel” as seen in Figure 2-2, as it depicts human-like qualities even
though it is a sustainably powered trash interceptor invented in
Baltimore, Maryland.
“Mr. Trash Wheel helps to connect the dots and helps residents
understand the impact of their actions,” said Rebecca Woods,
executive director of Baltimore’s Environmental Control Board. “Mr.
Trash Wheel provides a point of education for upstream efforts in
helping residents understand what happens to trash that enters
streets and then storm drains. Woods said. “Mr. Trash Wheel (Figure
2.2) is that friendly face that provides my son comfort that trash will
be blocked from entering the harbor. To my son, Mr. Trash Wheel is
a hero” (Kossakovski, 2018).
Figure 2.2 Mr. Trash Wheel (Kossakovski, 2018)

146 | Automation & Human-Machine Symbiosis [Mumm]

The project offered a purpose greater than profit, as the amount
of trash that is in harbors, docks, and even the open ocean is
staggering. “Plastic, tires and other trash routinely flow into the
harbor through the city’s storm sewers”. This innovation allows for
more than just environmental cleanup; and it provides for profits
towards a purpose of inclusivity as Mr. Trash Wheel “has collected
more than 1.5 million pounds of trash since May 2014. It is powered
by the harbor’s current and solar panels” (Kossakovski, 2018).
The fifth industrial revolution is poised to push the fourth
revolution into the history books and take over sooner than one
might think. Our preferred mode of communications moves from
cell phones to brain waves, our data collection from the internet
of things to 3-D sensor collection, allowing artificial intelligence
freedom to roam far past our understanding. We might “checkin at the airport using a mind-reading bracelet or do our mindsupported shopping to guarantee our safety from infectious
viruses… our use of these technologies will lay the foundations for
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yet a new revolution. What might the Sixth Industrial Revolution
hold?” (Noack, 2020)
.
Human and Machine Joined – Cyborg or Evolutionary
Inevitability?
Who would have ever thought that the television program “The
Six Million Dollar Man” would not only become reality, but it would
also be looked at as rudimentary in our evolution of integrating
machines into humankind to improve our quality of life and
ultimately extend our lives? The definition of a cyborg is “a person
whose physiological functioning is aided by or dependent upon a
mechanical or electronic device” ( Cyborg, 2020) or basically a bionic
human or animal. Now the real question becomes, do machines
evolve past humankind, becoming not only more intelligent but also
self-aware and more like humankind?
Will robots continue to learn and study humans and their
evolution for the purpose of evolving past humanity? What is not
apparent is the pace at which authorities, responsibilities, strategic
plans, and policies must change and evolve in order to help
organizations understand their role in shaping a positive, proactive
future.
The threat of unchecked technology, unmanned architecture
development, and the ability to weaponize unmanned systems
continues

to

evolve.

Unmanned

architecture

technology

advancements have offered more sophisticated abilities with costeffective designs that have reduced the entry barrier for consumers,
businesses, enemy states, and terrorist organizations. (Nichols, et
al., 2019).
Elon Musk’s company, Neuralink, is working on creating a brain to
machine interface which will allow for an integrated brain-machine
symbiosis with thousands of channels to take advantage of the
power of artificial intelligence. Musk has described it as a “Fitbit
for your brain” and is envisioning that a robot will do the entire
surgery to fit this coin-sized device into your brain. Musk admits
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that the ethical and safety issues will drive some of the early public’s
adoption.
Figure 2.3 Neuralink Interface Process (Gilbert, 2019)

The device would read your brain through the interface as it is
“connecting electrodes throughout the brain and reading its neuron
signals en masse. (Figure 2.3) Gathering huge amounts of data from
the signals would eventually teach Neuralink’s software how the
brain uses them to communicate with the rest of the body”
(Ioannou, 2020). Musk is quoted as stating, “It’s not just a measure
of computerizing your brain, but a measure of potentially fixing
complex neurological problems. “I think there’s an incredible
amount we can do to solve brain disorders and damage” (Gilbert,
2019).
Reports published in the Journal of NeuroInterventional Surgery
are hailing the first time a Stentrode device has allowed a human to
control a computer by using their mind, without wires or machine
intervention. The device is inserted into the brain via a small keyhole
incision (Lavars, 2020). Figure 2.4 shows the device next to a
matchstick. The patient, Phillip O’Keefe, has had a Stentrode device
implanted and
Figure 2.4 Stentrode device compared to a matchstick (Lavars,
2020)
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the implant records his brain activity and transmits it wirelessly
to a small receiver worn on his chest, and onward to a computer
that translates the signals into onscreen commands… to surf the
internet, write emails, do part-time work in data entry, and check
his online banking. By thinking about moving his left ankle, he is able
to perform a mouse click (Lavars, 2020).
This incredible symbiosis offers us a glimpse into the idea that
“technology will bend back towards the service of humanity, marked
by creativity and a common purpose…empower(ing) us to close the
historic gap and create a new socio-economic era” (Joseph, 2020).
Cyborgs and cyborg soldiers of all forms and fashion are featured
in Hollywood movies and Sci-Fi novels. These cyborg soldiers are
no longer characters in sci-fi thrillers. As depicted in Figure 2.5,
the troops of the future will have computers embedded in their
craniums.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

(DARPA)
Figure 2.5 Mind-Controlled Troops Connected to Weapons
Systems (West, 2018)
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is selecting teams to develop a “neural interface” that would both
allow troops to connect to military systems using their brainwaves
and let those systems transmit back information directly to users’
brains. The Next-Generation Non-Surgical Neurotechnology, or N3,
program aims to combine the speed and processing power of
computers with humans’ ability to adapt to complex situations,
DARPA said. In other words, the technology would let people
control, feel, and interact with a remote machine as though it were
a part of their own body (West, 2018). (See Figure 2.6)
Figure 2.6 Mockup of U.S. SOCOM’s TALOS suit (Rempfer, 2019)
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Figure 2-6 illustrates the future soldier with additional sensors
to allow the soldier to autonomously send and receive information.
The implications of a machine talking directly into a human mind
in the middle of a high stress, highly emotional situation such as
combat is not understood or even discussed within most available
literature. The consequences to the human or to the battlefield are
not known as “these interactions would allow warfighters direct
communication with unmanned and autonomous systems, as well
as with other humans, to optimize command and control systems
and operations” (Rempfer, 2019). All of this is with a questionable
ability to interject ethics and with minor regard as to what long term
effects it will have on the human soldiers.
Traversing the Seas with New Autonomous Technologies
The seas are generally regarded as a very unforgiving place where
a mix of factors from weather to technology combined with the
operator’s experience will determine success or failure in successful
navigation or just surviving this environment. Future Defense USA
in Alexandria, Virginia, is developing an optionally piloted advanced
technology vessel known as the Thunderchild to the defense market
and later to the civilian arena. The boat will be outfitted with
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complimentary autonomous systems based on the customers’
requirements (DiDonato, 2020). (Figure 2.7)
Figure 2.7 The Thunderchild (Kowalski, 2020)

The Thunderchild already holds world records for speed in
navigation, and with the ability to operate in sea state six, which
encompasses wind speeds over 25 knots, and wave heights of over
3 meters, this capability allows the Thunderchild to operate where
most of the worlds Coast Guards and Navies are not able to. This
technology will have the ability to be optionally piloted, allowing
for maximum flexibility for manned operations when required or
unmanned operations to take advantage of the advances in
communications, navigation, and a lower operating cost than
currently available (DiDonato, 2020).
Surface vessels are quickly moving to full autonomy with the help
of some large IT companies. IBM has invested in moving autonomy
forward with its Mayflower Autonomous Ship (MAS). It is currently
sailing and is slated to re-trace the original 1620 Mayflower sea
route to commemorate the 400th anniversary of the Mayflower
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ocean voyage. MAS will use IBM’s advances in AI and edge
computing (Figure 2.8):
to sense, think and make decisions at sea, even with no human
intervention… with no human captain or onboard crew, it will
become one of the first full-sized, fully autonomous vessels to cross
the Atlantic. The mission will further the development of
commercial autonomous ships and help transform the future of
marine research.” (IBM News Room, 2020)
Figure 2.8 MAS (IBM News Room, 2020)

Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) will be used for logistics,
research, and offensive and defensive weapons. The US Navy is
working quickly to increase its offensive undersea drone capabilities
as
“The maritime domain has yet to see the kind of explosive
innovation that UAVs have brought to land warfare… autonomous
systems promise to bring to the undersea domain the kind of new
capabilities and offensive punch, the Navy has yet to fully tap their
potential” (Frandrup, 2019).
The new era of unmanned submarines and the implications of
where the technology will lead humankind is under “The influence
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of massive spending on developing AI for undersea systems
portends the greatest change in military sea power since the
introduction of nuclear-powered vessels”. (Wilson, 2019) See Figure
2.9.
Figure 2.9 Boeing Echo Voyager Extra-Large Unmanned
Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) (Wilson, 2019)

The research missions of UUVs are countless, yet they have their
limitations. Terradepth, a Texas company, is working on solving the
power and longevity issues that plague many research missions.
Terradepth is working on a tag-team design of an unmanned
submersible they named AxV. (Figure 2.10)
Figure 2.10 Diagram illustrating the Terradepth system
(Coxworth, 2020)
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The submerged AxV likewise gathers undersea data, running
purely on battery power. When that battery starts getting low, the
vehicle automatically surfaces near its counterpart. It then fires
up its generator and starts recharging its battery, while the AxV
that had been traveling at the surface submerges to take its place
underwater (Coxworth, 2020).
Terradepth has had such successful sea trials of the technology in
November 2020 that they are continuing to expand the capabilities
beyond the current depth of 6,000 meters. The next power solution
set they are working to incorporate is an air-breathing hydrogen
fuel cell system.
Technology can be used for good or evil; it just depends on how
the technology is employed. In November 2020, the US Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) captured a hard to detect narcotics
carrying submarine near Choco, Colombia. (Figure 2.11)
Figure 2.11 Electric Narco-Submarine (Sutton, 2020)
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This “fully submersible electric-powered submarine makes it very
hard to trace. The vehicle was capable of carrying 6 tons of cocaine.
The street value of such a huge amount stands at an estimated $120
million USD” (Kundu, 2020). Although not unmanned yet, it is clear
to see that the narco-traffickers are working on undersea logistics
to move their products. It will only be a matter of time before they
add unmanned underwater vehicles to their fleet.
Advancement in unmanned submersibles is tied directly to the
improvements in the AI field. AI vessels are not just being limited
to nefarious uses; many governments are working on broadening
mission sets for national defense. China has made “achievements
in AI-enabled unmanned surface vessels, which it plans to use to
patrol and bolster its territorial claims in the South China Sea. It has
also tested unmanned tanks as part of research efforts to integrate
AI into ground forces” (Tadjdeh, 2020).
It is clear that the symbiosis of human and machine to harness the
power of the seas is quickly approaching; technology laws, policies,
and governance still have a long way to go before man and machine
can claim victory.
Human Symbiosis Disrupts the Aviation Industry
In examining the idea of human symbiosis and the aviation
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industry, most thoughts immediately go to UAVs or drone type
aircraft. However, the optionally piloted aircraft/vehicle (OPV)
allows for the symbiosis in a more trusting and understood manner.
If an aircraft is only able to be flown by the computer itself, and
no human intervention is possible when a fault occurs, humans
quickly start to distrust the sensors, computers, and AI systems.
Nowhere is this example clearer than that of the Lion Air and the
Ethiopian Airline Boeing 737-Max 800 aircraft crashes that occurred
respectively in 2018 and 2019.
A preliminary report from Indonesian investigators indicates that
Lion Air 610 crashed because a faulty sensor erroneously reported
that the airplane was stalling. The false report triggered an
automated system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System, or MCAS. This system tried to point the
aircraft’s nose down so that it could gain enough speed to fly safely
(Hawkins, 2019).
The sensors that were supposed to create a human symbiosis with
the aircraft ended up creating confusion and causing the crash of
two airliners, killing 346 persons, and grounding the entire fleet of
aircraft. The cost to Boeing and the airline industry is in the billions,
the FAA lifted the grounding order for the 737 Max as of December
3, 2020.
The ability to have an optionally piloted helicopter has been
demonstrated by Airbus in 2017. Airbus has stated that the “The OPV
(Figure 2.12) is able to autonomously take-off, hover and perform
stabilized flight and maneuvers…VSR 700 flight control system is
a fully-digital, multi-channel system with a very high level of
redundancy. It takes advantage of Airbus Helicopters unique
expertise in digital autopilots” (VSR700 demonstrator performs first
autonomous flights, 2017).
Figure 2.12 VSR 700 OPV (VSR700 demonstrator performs first
autonomous flights, 2017)
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Boeing is working diligently in the arena of OPVs that handle
passenger traffic (Figure 2.13). In January of 2019, Boeing’s
unmanned passenger aircraft completed its first flight as it “tested
the prototype’s autonomous functions and ground control systems,
according to Boeing. Subsequent test flights will check forward and
wing-borne flight and the transition between vertical and forward
flight modes” (Abel, 2019).
Figure 2.13 Boeing Unmanned Passenger Aircraft (Abel, 2019)

This OPV “was designed and developed in partnership with
Boeing NeXt and Boeing subsidiary Aurora Flight Sciences. John
Langford, president, and CEO of Aurora Flight Sciences, stated,
Automation & Human-Machine Symbiosis [Mumm] | 159

“Certifiable autonomy is going to make quiet, clean and safe urban
air mobility possible” (Abel, 2019). The next project for Boeing is
reportedly an unmanned electric cargo aircraft that will carry up to
500 pounds.
Airbus is also working on a pilotless commercial jet. Airbus has
been testing the aircraft and confirmed that “while completing
alignment on the runway, waiting for clearance from air traffic
control, we engaged the autopilot and the A350-1000 achieved eight
automatic takeoffs over a period of four and a half hours”
(Hardingham, 2020). See Figure 2.14.
Figure 2.14 A350-1000 Pilotless Commercial Aircraft
(Hardingham, 2020)

Even without a fully pilotless aircraft, passenger jets are currently
landing with the “assistance of on-board computers with pilots
manually fly the aircraft for just a few minutes on average…
Autonomous technologies are paramount to supporting pilots,
enabling them to focus less on aircraft operation and more on
strategic decision-making and mission management” (Hardingham,
2020).
Further into the future of aviation and human symbiosis is the
promise of what is being called Ion Thrusters that allows flight
without a liquid type fuel. See Figure 2.15.
Figure 2.15 Ion Thruster Rendering ( IFL Science, 2020)
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This technology is being created by a team led by Steven Barrett
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the “socalled electro aerodynamic-powered plane, one that uses solidstate propulsion, meaning no propellers or jet engines with
expendable fuel” ( IFL Science, 2020)
The idea of humankind and flying machines working together
in a symbiotic relationship is moving further toward reality. The
technologies and public policies that regulate this technology must
align better in the future in order for humans to trust the machines
and the machines, understanding their role in serving humanity.
Integrating Artificial Employees-The Changing Horizon of
Human Resources
There is an old saying that all problems are people problems,
which gives rise to the issue of employees in the fifth revolution as
“we are unprepared to meet the challenges ahead. According to a
recent World Economic Forum Report, for example, 65% of children
entering the school system today will end up in careers that don’t
exist yet” (Gauri, 2019).
The study of organic life and how it evolves is steeped in history,
scientific theories, and documentation. This is in stark contrast to
the very recent evolution of artificial intelligence and artificial life.
Little is known about how a system will evolve over time and how
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this evolution will act and react in human settings such as the
workplace and our overall society. Can a virtual or physical robot
(autonomous system) truly understand the needs, emotions, and
motivations of a human? If this is possible using AI, the autonomous
systems “can anticipate what a human will need and will do, it
can provide better assistance. Furthermore, if it can appreciate, for
example, the frustration that a human feels, then it can help to find
solutions” (Sun, 2020).
The potential risk for “ loss to an organization from an Artificial
Employee (AE) making autonomous decisions is enormous” (Brand,
2019). The Canadian Chief Scientific Officer of Kindred Biomedical
states, “A subset of the artificial intelligence development in the
next few decades will be very human-like. I believe these entities
should have the same rights as humans…robots fundamentally have
to make mistakes in order to learn” (Wong, 2017). The risk could
potentially be every bit as great as that of human error. Research
in this area tends to use the Grounded Theory as it lends itself
well to organizations and human resource issues. The grounded
theory research approach “presents promising possibilities for the
development of theoretical frameworks that emerge from research
situated in practice and enhance the Human Resource Development
(HRD) theorist” (Egan, 2002). There appears to be very few
organizations with a plan for increasingly autonomous machines
capable of deep learning, as
“these machines are considered physical assets as opposed to
intelligence assets” (Brand, 2019). Machines do not have the same
issues as humans who have self-determined and intrinsic
motivations and thus are capable of autonomous choice of action
in accordance with these motivations…include not only power,
achievement, and other individualistic tendencies, but also
adherence to social norms, affiliation with other individuals, and
other

tendencies

related

to

social

cooperation

interdependence” (Sun, 2020).
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and

Most corporations adopt risk management, ethics, or training and
development plans for human employees. By contrast, machines
with any level of intelligence are considered physical assets and
are managed as such. However, a thinking machine is capable of
choices, actions, and decision making, much like that of its human
counterpart. If a machine can make an autonomous decision or
action, “the behavior of the machine must be managed and
responsible for outcomes assigned” (Brand, 2019). If so, training,
monitoring, and development programs must be considered for
managing the AEs in many of the same ways human employees are
managed. On a deeper level, human and machine resources must be
observed and managed in their interactions. The machines that will
make thinking decisions could have much broader implications and
the humans that interact with them will respond based on human
needs and human concerns.
Any organization relying on a human to make an intelligent
decision has some employee oversight system in place. An entire
field of employment and research is dedicated to the complex task
of managing humans and their decisions. The hypothesis is an
equally in-depth system of management is called for when
managing intelligent machines, with a focus on differences in the
decision making and task completion methodology. In Ethical
Dilemmas in the Age of AI, Abramson states, “In the distant future,
some machines may have to make decisions for humans. In the
case of empathy, imagine a robot having to decide if resuscitation
attempts on a deceased human should be undertaken, and if so, for
how long?” (Abramson, 2016).
In January 2017, and again in 2018, the European Union passed
a motion adopting a report that calls for the development of
“electronic personhood” – regulations for robots and AI systems
“granting special legal status, or “electronic personalities,” to smart
robots, specifically those which can learn, adapt, and act for
themselves (Withers, 2018). Although this legislation has not passed
yet, it appears that it will be approved in the next few years as
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countries and companies start to tackle the issue of leveraging
Artificial Employees.
There are far too many issues and questions to address in this
chapter, however, as a parting thought on this topic, consider what
happens if a human goes on vacation – who monitors the AE? What
is liability for a mistake by the AE? What about AE maintenance?
How do you terminate an AE? Is it a loss to the company/
government, or is it employee replacement? What could a company
potentially lose or be liable for?
Conclusions
Additional theoretical models and frameworks should be explored
in this challenging environment with many complex issues that have
yet to be discovered. Future research implementing these
theoretical models and frameworks should be used to fill the
knowledge gaps related to evolving approaches and innovative
solutions that could complement the speed of human/machine
progress. If a machine can make an autonomous decision or action,
the behavior of the machine must be managed and responsible for
the result.
The cyborg soldier of the future will “mentally link up with the
various weapons systems at their disposal…this would also be a
two-way system that could enable the systems to transmit
information back to the soldier as well” (West, 2018). If so, training,
monitoring, and development programs must be considered for
managing the symbiosis of human and machines in many of the
same ways we manage human employees. A broad range of
cognitive architectures needs to be investigated as the human mind
“needs to deal with all of its functionalities: perception,
categorization, memory, decision-making, reasoning, problemsolving,

communication,

action,

learning,

metacognition,

motivation, and so on” (Sun, 2020). The demand for AI and human
symbiosis

models

capable

of

working

with

these

broad

functionalities needs to be better scoped for future research and
integration if we are to hope for true human-machine symbiosis.
Time will tell if the human resources, maritime, and aviation
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industries can all successfully adjust into this new world. Humanmachine symbiosis appears to be just over the horizon; it will also
require guidance to incorporate the correct mix of policies and laws
to support a complimentary partnership to this new reality instead
of a hindrance.
Questions
1. What is the difference between symbiosis and the industrial
revolution?
2. Do you think human evolution will migrate to us all being
cyborgs? Why or Why not?
3. List three disruptive technologies in the aviation industry.
4. How would you to take advantage of the disruptive nature of
the fifth industrial revolution and human symbiosis?
5. Name three ways that the maritime industry is benefiting from
the fifth industrial revolution and the inclusion of human
symbiosis in next-generation technologies.
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3. UAS Regulation /
Innovation / Safety 2020 /
Privacy and Beyond [Hood]
Student Learning Objectives
UAS Regulations keep changing. This chapter is designed to bring
drone operators and enthusiasts up to date. This chapter is study
only.
Two New FAA Rules That make a Difference
Two long awaited rules from the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) regarding mandating remote identification (Remote ID) of
drones and allow drone operators of “small” drones to fly over
people and at night under certain conditions. The majority of
following information was taken from the FAA Executive Summary
and associated press release issued in December 2020.
As a parting gift to show that 2020 wasn’t all bad, the FAA released
two long-awaited rules that will help push the drone industry into
the future. The FAA’s ultimate goal is to enable routine drone
operations in the same airspace as manned aircraft, but a lot of
hurdles have to be cleared before that is possible. Like a game of
Chutes and Ladders, many small moves and a couple of big ones
are required to reach that goal, and along the way, there is an everpresent danger of sliding backwards. (Kiemen, 2021)

Figure 3.1. Embry-Riddle drone ready to fly by Scott Burgess,
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Source: Scott Burgess
ERAU
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These rules come at a time when drones represent the fastestgrowing segment in the entire transportation sector – currently
over 1.7 million drone registrations and 203,000 FAA-certified
remote pilots. (Administration, 2020) See Figure 3.1
According to the FAA, Remote ID is a major step toward the full
integration of drones into the national airspace system. Remote
ID provides identification of drones in flight as well as location of
their control stations, providing crucial information to our national
security agencies and law enforcement partners, and other officials
charged with ensuring public safety. Airspace awareness reduces
risk of drone interference with other aircraft and people and
property on the ground. (Administration, 2020)
Equipping drones with remote ID technology builds on previous
steps taken by the FAA and the drone industry to integrate
operations safety into the national airspace system. Part 107 of the
federal aviation regulations currently prohibits covered drone
operations over people and at night unless an operator obtains a
waiver from the FAA. The new regulations jointly provide increased
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flexibility to conduct certain small UAS without obtaining a waiver.
(Administration, 2020)
“The new rules make way for the further integration of drones
into our airspace by addressing safety and security concerns,” said
FAA Administrator Steve Dickson. “They get closer to the day when
we will more routinely see drone operations such as delivery of
packages.” (Administration, 2020)
As the rules are read and understood, it can be inferred which
potential industries these new rules are aimed at effecting (or
allowing) to move forward. Examples of such industries include
delivery and transit services.
Remote ID
The remote ID Rule applies to all operators of drones that require
FAA registrations. There are three ways to comply with the
operational requirements:
1: Operate a standard Remote ID drone that broadcasts
identification and location information of the drone and control
station;
2: Operate a drone with a Remote ID broadcast module (may
be separate device attached to the drone), which broadcasts
identification, location, and take-off information; or
3: Operate a drone without Remote ID but at specific FAArecognized identification areas.
(Administration, 2020)
Operations over People and at Night
This rule applies to Part 107 operators. The ability to fly over
people and moving vehicles varies depending on the level of risk a
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small drone operation presents to people on the ground. Operations
are permitted base on four categories

These Operations Categories consist of the following:
Category 1 eligible: small, unmanned aircraft must weigh less
than 0.55, including everything on board or otherwise attached, and
contain no exposed rotating parts that would lacerate human skin.
No FAA-accepted Means of Compliance (MOC) or Declaration of
Compliance (DOC) required.
Category 2 eligible: small, unmanned aircraft must not cause
injury to a human being that is equivalent to or greater than the
severity of injury caused by a transfer of 11 foot-pounds of kinetic
energy upon impact from a rigid object, does not contain any
exposed rotating parts that could lacerate human skin upon impact
with a human being, and does not contain any safety defects.
Requires FAA-accepted means of compliance and FAA-accepted
declaration of compliance.
Category 3 eligible: small, unmanned aircraft must not cause
injury to a human being that is equivalent to or greater than the
severity of injury caused by a transfer of 25 foot-pounds of kinetic
energy upon impact of a rigid object, does not contain any exposed
rotating parts that could lacerate human skin upon impact with a
human being, and does not contain any safety defects. Requires
FAA-accepted means of compliance and FAA-accepted declaration
of compliance.
Category 4 eligible: small, unmanned aircraft must have an
airworthiness certificate issued under Part 21 of FAA regulations.
Must be operated in accordance with the operating limitations
specified in the approved Flight Manual or so otherwise specified
by the Administrator. The operating limitations must not prohibit
operations over human beings. Must have maintenance, preventive
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maintenance, alterations, or inspections performed in accordance
with specific requirements in the final rule. (Administration, 2020)
Figure 3.2 EL PASO, TEXAS – NOVEMBER 20: DroneUp pilot
Andrew Holbert prepares to launch a drone to deliver a COVID-19
self-collection test kit to a home, after being ordered from
Walmart by a resident, amid a Covid-19 surge on November 20,
2020 in El Paso, Texas. Source: Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images

Operating Rules
Operations at Night (See Figure 3.2)
• – Remote pilots in command who wish to conduct small,
unmanned aircraft operations at night must complete either
the updated initial test or the updated recurrent online
training prior to conducting such operations.
• – Additionally, prior to conducting small, unmanned aircraft
operations at night, the small, unmanned aircraft must be
equipped with anti-collision lights that can be seen for 3
statute miles and have a flash rate sufficient to avoid a
collision. These anti-collision lights must be operational.
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Operations Over People
• – Category 1 eligible aircraft:
◦ o Small, unmanned aircraft must weigh less than 0.55,
including everything on board or otherwise attached, and
contain no exposed rotating parts that would lacerate
human skin. Remote pilots are prohibited from operating a
small, unmanned aircraft as a Category 1 operation in
sustained flight over open-air assemblies unless the
operation meets the requirements for standard remote
identification or remote identification broadcast modules
established in the Remote ID Rule.
(Administration, 2020)
• – Category 2 eligible aircraft:
◦ o Remote pilots are prohibited from operating a small,
unmanned aircraft as a Category 2 operation in sustained
flight over open-air assemblies unless the operation meets
the requirements for standard remote identification or
remote identification broadcast modules established in the
Remote ID Final Rule.
◦ o Requires means of compliance and declaration of
compliance by applicant.
• – Category 3 eligible aircraft:
◦ o Must not operate the small, unmanned aircraft over
open-air assemblies of human beings.
◦ o May only operate the small, unmanned aircraft above
any human being if operation meets one of the following
conditions:
▪ The operation is within or over a closed- or
restricted-access site and all human beings located
within the closed- or restricted-access site must be
on notice that a small, unmanned aircraft may fly over
UAS Regulation / Innovation / Safety 2020 / Privacy and Beyond
[Hood] | 175

them
▪ The small, unmanned aircraft does not maintain
sustained flight over any human being unless that
human being is directly participating in the operation
of the small, unmanned aircraft; or located under a
covered structure or inside a stationary vehicle that
can provide reasonable protection from a falling small,
unmanned aircraft.
◦ – Category 4 eligible aircraft:
▪ o Must have an airworthiness certification issued
under Part 21.
▪ o Must be operated in accordance with the operating
limitations specified in the approved Flight Manual or
as otherwise specified by the Administrator. The
operating limitations must not prohibit operations
over human beings.
▪ o Must have maintenance, preventative maintenance,
alterations, or inspections performed in accordance
with specific maintenance requirements detailed in
the final rule.
▪ o Remote pilots are prohibited from operating a small,
unmanned aircraft as a Category 4 operation in
sustained flight over open-air assemblies unless the
operation meets the requirements of standard remote
identification or remote identification broadcast
modules established in the Remote ID Final Rule.
(Administration, 2020)

Figure 3.3 UAV and Drone Solutions monitoring aircraft
(Source: AOPA.org)

176 | UAS Regulation / Innovation / Safety 2020 / Privacy and Beyond
[Hood]

Operations over moving vehicles (See Figure 3.3)
• – Must be Category 1, Category 2, and Category 3, eligible to
operate over people, may not maintain sustained flight over
moving vehicles; transit operations only.
• – For an operation under Category 1, Category 2, or Category
3, the small, unmanned aircraft, throughout the operation –
◦ o Must remain within or over closed- or restricted-access
sites, and all human beings located inside a moving vehicle
within the closed- or restricted-access site must be on
notice that a small, unmanned aircraft may fly over them;
or
◦ o Must not maintain sustained flight over moving vehicles.
• – For a Category 4 operation, the small, unmanned aircraft
must –
◦ o Have an airworthiness certificate issued under part 21 of
this chapter.
◦ o Be operated in accordance with the operating limitations
specified in the approved Flight Manual or as otherwise
specified by the Administrator. The operating limitations
must not prohibit operations over human beings located
inside moving vehicles.
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Figure 3.4. Las Vegas, NV, September 23, 2020. A DroneUp
employee prepares a Covid-19 test kit for delivery. (Source: Joe
Cerreta, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University)

Remote Pilot Knowledge Test Changes (See Figure 3.4)
A remote pilot in command, owner, or person manipulating the
flight controls of a small, unmanned aircraft system must:
• – Have in that person’s physical possession and readily
accessible the remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating
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and identification when exercising the privileges of that
remote pilot certificate.
• – Present his or her remote pilot certificate and identification
upon request from the FAA, NTSB, TSA, or and Federal, state,
or local law enforcement officer.
• – Make available, upon request, to the FAA and document,
record, or report required to be kept under FAA regulations.
• – Upon request, must allow the FAA to test or inspect the
small, unmanned aircraft system, the remote pilot in
command, the person manipulating the flight controls of a
small, unmanned aircraft system, and, if applicable, the visual
observer to determine compliance with the rule.
(Administration, 2020)

Design and production Rules for Manufacturers
• – Some existing Category 1 small, unmanned aircraft may meet
the performance-based requirements to be eligible for
Category 1 operations over people of this rule beginning the
effective date of the rule (Those that have already been
produced with propeller guards/shrouds that prevent the
blades from causing laceration to human skin upon impact).
• – Manufacturers may bring to market retrofit propeller guards
to install on existing small, unmanned aircraft to make them
eligible for Category 1 operations over people beginning after
effective date of this rule.
• – Some existing small, unmanned aircraft may meet the
performance-based requirements to be eligible for Category 2
operations over people of this rule once FAA-accepted MOC
and DOC are received.
• – Small, unmanned aircraft may meet the performance-based
requirements for Category 2 of this rule upon FAA-Accepted
MOC/DOC 9-12 months after the effective date of this rule.
• – Small, unmanned aircraft may meet the performance-based
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requirements for Category 3 of this rule upon FAA-Accepted
MOC/DOC 9-12 months after the effective date of this rule.
• – Category 4 small, unmanned aircraft for operations over
people may receive an airworthiness certificate beginning 6-12
months after the effective date of this rule.

Major Changes from Proposed Rule to the Final Rule
• – Category 1 small, unmanned aircraft cannot have any
exposed rotating parts that would lacerate human skin.
• – Category 1, 2, and 4 remote pilots are prohibited from
operating small, unmanned aircraft in sustained flight over
open-air assemblies unless the operation meets the
requirements of standard remote identification or remote
identification broadcast modules established in the Remote ID
Final Rule.
• – Added a Category 4 of small, unmanned aircraft that. Ay be
eligible for operations over people and moving vehicles.
• – Allow operations over moving vehicles
• – Remote pilot, owner, or person manipulating the controls
must have in their physical possession and readily available
their remote pilot certificate.
(Administration, 2020)
What Do These Two Rules Really Mean and Why is it Important?
Some major players in the drone industry are not all that happy
with the new rules as they currently stand. The following article
excerpt from Sean Hollister has a much different take and makes
some interesting points.
Alphabet’s drone delivery company “Wing” still wants drones
tracked — but differently
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Internet-based tracking is exactly what the FAA had originally
intended to do when it first
proposed the Remote ID rules back in December 2019, by the way
— before it received a
laundry list of reasons from commenters why internet-based
tracking might be problematic and
decided to abandon it. Here are just a few of the ones mentioned:
• The cost of adding a cellular modem to a drone to begin with
• The cost of paying for a monthly cellular data plan just to fly a
drone
• The lack of reliable cellular coverage across the entirety of the
US
• The cost of paying a third-party data broker to track and store
that data
• The possibility of that third-party data broker getting
breached
• The possibility of that data broker or network getting DDoS’d,
grounding drones in the US
“Personally,[1] I think it’s pretty ridiculous that the FAA felt it had
to choose between “everyone has to broadcast their location to
everyone within earshot” and “everyone has to pay gobs of money to
private industry and trust some data broker with their location,” but
the reasons why we aren’t going with internet-based tracking make
some sense to me. (Hollister, 2021)
Most proponents of Remote ID technology, including Wing, like
to explain that it’s merely a “license plate” for the skies, perhaps
nothing more intrusive than you’d already have on your car. Here’s
Wing (See Figure 3.5) on that:
This allows a drone to be identified as it flies over without
necessarily sharing that drone’s complete flight path or flight
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history, and that information, which can be more sensitive, is not
displayed to the public and only available to law enforcement if
they have proper credentials and a reason to need that information.
(Hollister, 2021)
But the thing about license plates is, traditionally, you have to be
within eyeshot to see them. You’d have to be physically following
a car to track it. That’s not necessarily true of a broadcasting
transmitter, and it’s potentially far less true of an internet-based
solution like the one Wing seems to wish the FAA had offered
instead. Naturally, it depends on who owns the internet-based
solution and how much you trust them and their security. (Hollister,
2021)
Either way, it’s going to be a while before we find out how secure
or vulnerable, how broad or narrow these Remote ID broadcasts are
truly going to be. That’s because the FAA’s final rule doesn’t actually
mandate what kind of broadcasting tech drones will be required to
use: companies have the next year and half to figure that out, and
they have to submit it to the FAA for approval. The FAA is also clear
that broadcast Remote ID is just a first step, an “initial framework,”
suggesting that internet-based Remote ID might still be an option in
the future. (Hollister, 2021)
Figure 3.5 Image: Wing. (Source: https://www.theverge.com/
2021/1/1/22209558/google-wing-faa-drone-remote-idbroadcast-rule-privacy-security)
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Drone Privacy Laws Around the World
The following sub sections are part of an in-depth survey
from Surfshark regarding drone privacy laws around the world. The
great thing about the study is that it drills down into a region-byregion analysis.
As the use of drones expands around the world — according to
the Federal Aviation Administration, there are currently 1.7
million drones registered in the United States alone — lawmakers
have been faced with new and complex regulatory challenges to
protect the privacy of ordinary citizens. The increased prevalence
of drones has raised the prospect of pervasive surveillance by
governments, companies, and individuals, and lawmakers are
struggling to keep up with the advancing technology. (SurfShark,
2021)
And while at least 143 countries have enacted some form of
drone-related regulation, many experts contend that current drone
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regulation is insufficient to deal with the threat of widespread
surveillance. Drone laws around the world range from outright bans
of the technology to relatively unrestricted flight, but most
legislation focuses on how the drone is being operated — and does
not address nuances related to privacy. Many of the privacy threats
that have lawmakers concerned are speculative and rely on the
technology of tomorrow — making it difficult to pass privacyspecific legislation today. In the meantime, lawmakers have been
able to pass laws concerning drone operation, which are a first step
to “privacy by design” legislation, restricting where and how a drone
can be flown to minimize opportunities to violate privacy in the first
place. To support the effort to establish an international regulatory
framework for drone legislation, we looked at drone operation laws
in over 200 countries around the world. (SurfShark, 2021)
Lawmakers around the world have responded to the growing use
of drones in various ways. While some countries, such as Cuba,
Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait, have outright banned the use of unmanned
aircraft, others have passed legislation allowing for more
experimental use of the technology. (SurfShark, 2021)
On every continent, at least one country allows drones to fly what
experts term “beyond visual line of sight”, meaning the aircraft can
fly to areas beyond the view of the pilot. In Finland, for example,
where the home of FAI Drone Racing World Cup is held, pilots can
obtain a permit allowing them to pilot drones outside of their view
with special first-person view goggles. To see how drones are being
regulated around the world, we compiled data on drone-related
legislation for 210 countries. We looked at drone-related legislation
for specific countries and analysis of drone-related legislation from
sources such as UAV Coach, RAND Corporation, UAV Systems
International, and the Library of Congress. (SurfShark, 2021)
We found that drone regulation in each country generally fell into
one of seven categories:
• Outright ban
• Effective ban
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• Restrictions Apply (such as drone registration or licensing,
additional observers required, no commercial usage etc..)
• Visual line of sight required
• Experimental visual line of sight (experiments where drones fly
beyond the line of sight are allowed)
• Unrestricted (when flying away from private property and
airports, under 500 ft/150metres height and with drones
weighing less than 250g)
• No drone-related legislation

We assigned each country a category status based on its
legislation as of October 2020.
Europe
Europe currently has some of the most liberal drone regulation
of any continent. Although many of the countries in the continent
have some form of drone legislation restricting drone usage, these
are often in the form of simple operational guidelines.
Drone pilots in Latvia, for example, are required to wear an
identifying piece of clothing, such as a hat or a shirt. In Austria,
pilots are required to get a license if the drone weighs more than
about half a pound and flies above 98 feet. (SurfShark, 2021)
Figure 3.6 EUROPE: Drone Privacy Laws.
(https://surfshark.com/drone-privacy-laws)
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North America
While the bulk of countries around the world require drone pilots
to be able to see the UAV at all times, 33% of countries in North
America allow for experimental drone flights beyond the line of
sight, the largest share of any continent and far above the 22%
global

average.

The

large

number

of

countries

allowing

experimental drone flights may be related to the presence of tech
companies like Amazon, Walmart, and DHL, which are researching
ways to incorporate drones into their delivery infrastructure and
developing methods to ship lightweight packages short distances.
Countries with experimental drone legislation include Canada, the
United States, the Cayman Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, and other
small Caribbean nations. (SurfShark, 2021)
Figure 3.7 NORTH AMERICA: Drone Privacy Laws.
(https://surfshark.com/drone-privacy-laws)
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South America
67% of countries with drone-related legislation in South America
allow drones to be flown, as long as the aerial vehicle stays within
the view of the pilot, the largest share of any continent. No
countries in South America have outright or effective bans on
drones. But while no countries ban drones, only one country,
Guyana, has provisions that allow for flights beyond the line of sight
— the fewest of any continent. Other countries in South America
have specific drone rules geared towards safety and environmental
conservation. In Peru, for example, drones’ flights cannot last longer
than an hour. In Ecuador, drones are completely banned on the
Galapagos Islands save for approved scientific usage. (SurfShark,
2021)
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Figure 3.8 SOUTH AMERICA: Drone Privacy Laws.
(https://surfshark.com/drone-privacy-laws)

Middle East & Central Asia
21% of countries here with drone-related legislation have outright
bans on drones, more than the 11% global share and the second
largest share of any continent. Additionally, there are a number of
countries with effective bans on drones. In Bhutan, for example,
drone flight is only allowed by the government. Overall, 15% of
countries in Asia have effective bans on drones, far more than the
8% global average and the largest share of any continent. A small
number of countries, however, are beginning to allow for drone
flights beyond the line of sight. Japan, for example, is currently
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developing a licensing system that will allow for drone flights
beyond the visual line of sight for government deliveries. (SurfShark,
2021)
Figure 3.9 ME & CA: Drone Privacy Laws.
(https://surfshark.com/drone-privacy-laws)

Rest of Asia and Oceania
56% of countries in Oceania have no drone-related legislation,
the largest share of any continent. Of the countries that do have
drone-related legislation, a majority allow drones as long as pilots
stay within the visual line of sight of the drone. No countries have
outright bans or effective bans of drones. In Australia and New
Zealand, there are provisions for drones to fly beyond the visual
line of sight of the pilot. Currently, licenses that permit drones to
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fly beyond the line of sight are limited among a few small aviation
companies. According to the RAND Corporation, licenses for
experimental flights beyond the line of sight are easier to obtain in
Australia than in the United States. (SurfShark, 2021)
Figure 3.10 OCEANA: Drone Privacy Laws.
(https://surfshark.com/drone-privacy-laws)

Africa
More than half of all countries in Africa have no drone-related
legislation. Of the countries that do have drone-related legislation,
21% have an outright ban on the technology, the largest share of
any continent. Another 13% of countries have an effective ban on
the technology, the second largest share of any continent. In Egypt,
for example, while drones are technically legal with permission from
the Civil Aviation Authority, it is very difficult to obtain permission.
But while there are obstacles to drone flight in a number of African
190 | UAS Regulation / Innovation / Safety 2020 / Privacy and Beyond
[Hood]

countries, there are also examples of innovation in the continent. In
Ghana and Rwanda, for example, drones are allowed to fly beyond
the line of sight to deliver medical supplies to remote villages. Other
African countries that allow drones to fly beyond the line of sight
include Uganda and Zimbabwe. (SurfShark, 2021)
Figure 3.11 AFRICA: Drone Privacy Laws.
(https://surfshark.com/drone-privacy-laws)

Demand for drone technology shows no signs of slowing down.
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, the
number of patents for drone technology is increasing rapidly —
growing 34% from 7,076 in 2017 to 9,485 in 2018 alone. As
commercial technology for unmanned aerial vehicles continues to
advance, it is important for the legislation regulating them to keep
up. And until there is some international standard or governing body
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for the usage of drones established, it’s fascinating to see how the
regulation of drones differs from country to country around the
world. Keep scrolling down to see the full data from our study, and
to check out the law where you live. (SurfShark, 2021)
Methodology & Sources
To see how drones are being regulated around the world, we
looked at related legislation for specific countries using sources
such as UAV Coach, RAND Corporation, UAV Systems International,
and the Library of Congress. We found that drone regulation in each
country fell into one of seven categories: outright ban, effective
ban, visual line of sight required, experimental visual line of sight
(experiments where drones fly beyond the line of sight are allowed),
restrictions apply, unrestricted, and no drone-related legislation.
We assigned each country a category status based on its legislation
as of October 2020. (SurfShark, 2021)
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4. UUVs, Advanced Sensors,
Munitions Detection & USVs
[Nichols]
Student Learning Objectives
• – To take a birds-eye view of UUVs in service of detecting,
assessing, and classifying underwater munitions
• – To study the type of sensors and their performance
objectives in underwater service
• – To focus on a specific UNCLASSIFIED NSWC PCD
demonstration of three UUVs used for detection of munitions
targets (both proud and buried)
• – To look at improvements in survey UUVs / on surface UVs
for shallow water studies.
• – To see the future of this technology as a Black Swan event.[1]

What is the Advanced Weapons Problem that UUVs can solve?
There are underwater munitions sites around the world where
the quantity and the type of munitions are either unknown or not
well documented. These sites are unsafe and can’t be used for any
other purpose. The sites need to be surveyed and all the munitions
identified and if necessary disarmed. (Leasko, 2014). Underwater
munitions falls in the murky purview (CLASSIFIED) of the National
Unmanned Systems Shared Resource Center (NUSSRC) located at
the Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division (NSWC
PCD). It has multiple offices associated with the Office of Naval
Research (ONR) Mine Countermeasure (MCM) UUV systems
integrated with advanced sonar, magnetic and electro-optical
sensors.[2] These systems provide capability for experimentation
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and demonstration of current Science and Technology (S&T) and
Research and Development (R&D) program assets as they apply to
the detection and classification of underwater mines to be used
for detection, assessment, and characterization of underwater
munitions. (Leasko, 2014)
NSWC PCD
The Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division (NSWC
PCD) is one of many naval installations conducting S&T research
around the world. NSWC PCD is a particularly fascinating one and
has a huge mission. NSWC PCD Our mission is to conduct research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and in-service support
of the following core mission areas: Mine Warfare Systems, Naval
Special Warfare Systems, Diving and Life Support Systems,
Amphibious/Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Systems and other
missions that occur in the littoral, or coastal, regions. NSWC PCD’s
Technical Capabilities include: Air Cushion Vehicle Systems;
Expeditionary

Maneuver

Warfare

Systems

Engineering

and

Integration; Special Warfare Maritime Mobility Mission Systems and
Mission Support equipment; Mine Countermeasure Detect and
Engage Systems; Modular Mission Packaging; Platform Integration
and Handling; Littoral Mission Systems integration and Modular
Mission Packages Certification; Unmanned Systems Engineering and
Integration; Autonomous Diving and Diving Support Systems; and
Surface Life Support Systems for Extreme Environments. Their
major facilities include: Diving and Life Support Complex; Mine
Warfare Complex; Special Warfare Research and Engineering
Complex; Expeditionary Warfare Complex; Landing Craft Air
Cushion (LCAC) Facility; LCAC Software Integration Laboratory;
Human Systems Integration Usability Lab; USMC Amphibious Raids
and Reconnaissance; Integration Facility; Coastal Test Range;
Prototype Fabrication Facility; Additive Manufacturing or 3D
printing for rapid prototyping;

and 3D Expeditionary Laser

Scanning. This is the purview of just one of the ten plus NSCW
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warfare centers. These are all part of the Naval Sea Systems
Command (NSSC), “The force behind the fleet.” (NSWC, 2020)

Murky Waters
We can get a OPEN SOURCE peek into the use of NAVSEA’s MCM
UUV assets to evaluate and demonstrate current technologies with
advanced detection, assessment, and characterization sensor
packages. NSWC PCD published a report (UNCLASSIFIED) on their
Post Mission Analysis (PMA) of all sensor data relating to the
performance of UUV technologies for the underwater munitions
problem so identified. (Leasko, 2014) [3]
The PMA data collection / demonstration by NSWC PCD
occurred in early 2011.
Technology
Three specific UUV assets in the NUSSRC inventory[4] that can
address

the

detection

and

characterization

of

underwater

munitions in an organic fashion are the Remote Environmental
Measuring Units 100 (REMUS 100); the Blufin12 Buried Mine
Identification (BMI) UUV systems and the REMUS 600 BMI UUV,
with a separate magnetic sensor, the Real-time Tracking Laser
Scalar Gradiometer (LSG) to collect data over the field too. (Leasko,
2014)
REMUS Group
REMUS makes four serious UUV products. REMUS 100, REMUS
300, REMUS 600 and the REMUS 6000. Figure 4.1 shows the REMUS
100/MK 18 Mod 1. The first two UUVs are described.
Source: (REMUS, 2020)
The REMUS 100 is a man-portable Unmanned Underwater
Vehicle (UUV) designed for rapid deployment, it can be easily
transported via helicopter and launched from a dock or any vessel of
opportunity. With a maximum operating depth of 100 meters and a
mission duration of up to 12 hours, it is ideal for rapid, low-logistics
deployments. (REMUS, 2020). The UUV is 67” L x 7.5” D and weighs
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80 lbs. It has a maximum depth of 328 ft and 6 hours operations
time. It is equipped with the following: (REMUS -1., 2020)
Environmental Sensor
– Fluorometer/Backscatter Sensor
– Fast Response Conductivity
Temperature Sensor
– Oxygen Optode
– Turbidity Sensor
Imaging Hardware
– Bathymetric Side Scan Sonar
– Video Camera Recorder (VCR) Module
– Lightbar for VCR Module
– Gap-Filler Sonar
Communication/Navigation Equipment
– Precision GPS
– Military GPS
– Wi-Fi Communications
– Iridium Communications
– NavP Inertial Navigation System
with Payload Processor
Software
– Navlab Post Processing Software
– RECON Software
– Reflection Post-Mission Analysis Software

Figure 4.1 REMUS 100/MK 18 Mod 1
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Source: (REMUS -1., 2020)
REMUS 600
The REMUS 600 is a midsized UUV designed for easy transport
and maximum versatility, the REMUS 600 (the US Navy MK18 Mod 2
and LBS AUV Program vehicles) is a highly configurable vehicle with
a maximum operating depth of 600 meters. Able to be deployed
from vessels as small as an 11 meter RHIB and boasting a maximum
mission duration of 24 hours, the REMUS 600 can be outfitted
with a broad range of sensors to meet the requirements of nearly
any mission. (REMUS -2., 2020) The REMUS 600 has the following
specifications: Vehicle Diameter 12.75 in; diameter varies depending
upon module (for 600 m depth configuration); Vehicle Length Min
length ~9 ft to Max length ~18 ft; length varies depending upon
module configuration; Max Weight in Air Min ~850 lbs where weight
varies depending upon module configuration; Maximum Operating
Depth 600 meters (1500 meter configuration available);Energy 5.4
kWh rechargeable Li-ion battery; (Second 5.4 kWh battery tray is
optional), exchangeable battery option available; and Endurance
Typical mission endurance is up to 24 hours in standard
configuration;

subject

to

speed,

battery

and

sensor

configurations. (REMUS -3., 2020) It is equipped with the following
(See Figure 4.2) :
Standard System Configurations
– Doppler Velocity Log (DVL)
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– Compass or Inertial Navigation System as
Standard Depending on Configuration
– Acoustic Modem (Low & High Frequency Options Available)
– Pressure Depth Sensor
– Conductivity & Temperature Sensor
– GPS/Wi-Fi/Iridium
– Emergency Recovery Equipment
– Terrain Avoidance Sonar
Optional Equipment
– Up to (2) Battery Trays
– Responder for Surface Ultra Short Baseline (USBL)
– Navigation Aiding
– NavP/HG 9900 INS with Payload Processor
– Obstacle Avoidance Sonar
Optional Sensors
– Dual Frequency Sidescan Sonar
– HiSAS 2040 Synthetic Aperture Sonar
– Dynamically Focused Sidescan Sonar
– Optical Environmental Characterization Sensors
– Video Camera
– Multi-Beam Echo Sounder (MBES)
– Electronic Still Camera (ESC)
– Sub-Bottom Profiler (SBP)
– Fish Finding Echo Sounders
– Oxygen Sensors
– Photosynthetically Active Radiation (PAR) Sensor
– LED Based Lights & Strobes for Cameras
– High Precision, Dual-Band GPS Receiver
– Terrain Avoidance Sonar (Obstacle Avoidance Sonar optional)
– Other Custom Sensor Options Available
Shipboard Devices
– Shipboard Communications Mast
– Power Box with Battery Charger/Conditioner
– Shipboard Communications System
(GPS, Iridium, Wi-Fi and Optional Freewave)
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– Acoustic Communications Bottle
– Ranger Deck Box
– Acoustic Transducer Towfish
– Releasable Acoustic Transponders
– Portable Surface Communications Station
Figure 4.2 REMUS 600 UUV

“The REMUS 6000 AUV (Figure 4.3) was designed under a
cooperative program involving the Naval Oceanographic Office, the
Office of Naval Research and the Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution

(WHOI)

in

support

of

deep-water

autonomous

operations. The REMUS 6000 AUV boasts the same proven software
and electronic subsystems found in our highly successful REMUS
100 AUV, with a depth rating, endurance, and payload that allow
for autonomous operations in up to 6000 meters of water.” (REMUS
-4, 2020) The REMUS 6000 has Vehicle Diameter 28 in by Vehicle
Length 13 ft and weighs in Air 1900 lbs; works at Maximum
Operating Depth 6000 meters (4000 meter configuration also
available); Energy 12 kWh rechargeable Li-ion battery pack for two
pressure housings; a second 12 kWh set can be purchased as an
option with system permitting 2-hour turn around; charge time is
typically 8 hours and the batteries are rechargeable up to 300 cycles
or for 5 years under recommended storage conditions; and has
Endurance Typical mission duration of 22 hours; subject to speed
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& sensor configuration. (REMUS -5., 2020) What makes the REMUS
6000 is “technical horsepower:”
Standard System Configurations
– Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler/Doppler
Velocity Log (ADCP/DVL)
– Acoustic Modem (Low Frequency)
– Inertial Navigation System (INS)
– Sidescan Sonar
– Depth Sensor
– Conductivity & Temperature Sensor
– GPS/Wi-Fi/Iridium
Optional Sensors
– Dual Frequency Sidescan Sonar
– ECO Sensors
– Multi-Beam Echo Sounder (MBES)
– Video Camera
– Electronic Still Camera (ESC) with
200 Watt-Sec Strobe Lighting
– Sub-Bottom Profiler (SBP)
– NavP/HG 9900 INS with Payload Processor
Deployment Options
– Launch & Recovery System
– Operations Van
– Side Launch Rotation Table
Shipboard Devices
– Shipboard Communications Console
– Power Box with Battery Charger
– Antenna Box
(GPS, Iridium, Wi-Fi and Optional Freewave)
– Acoustic Communications Bottle
– Ranger Deck Box
– Towfish
– Acoustic Transponders
– HiPAP USBL Capability
Vehicle Interface Program (VIP)
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The REMUS 6000 uses essentially the same Vehicle Interface
Program (VIP) as the proven REMUS 100 AUV. This highly intuitive
VIP greatly simplifies vehicle maintenance, mission planning,
vehicle checkout, and data analysis; and will run on any PC or laptop
operating under Windows.® Communication between the vehicle
and the host is conducted via a standard Ethernet connection.
Among other features, the VIP includes:
– An integrated text editor for construction of the mission file.
– A map view that illustrates the planned mission for review.
– Automatic error checking performed on all aspects of the
planned
mission, with warning messages that appear if any mission
parameters are incorrect.
– A set of quick-look indicators display system status, where
green
indicates OK, and red indicates a fault.

Figure 4.3 REMUS 6000

Source: (REMUS -5., 2020)
Bluefin 12 Buried Mine Identification (BMI) UUV System
In a paper by (G. Sulzberger, 2009) the Bluefin 12 BMI was
abstracted as follows: “The Bluefin12 Buried Mine Identification
(BMI) System is used as the platform to develop a capability for
the identification of buried mines. This system houses the bottom
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looking sonar, the Real-time Tracking Gradiometer (RTG), and an
Electro-Optic Imager (EOI).
The objective for the RTG is the enhancement of the processing
that extracts target locations and magnetic moments from the raw
RTG data. (G. Sulzberger, 2009) added the capability to conduct
real-time processing capability to provide autonomous target
classification and localization results soon after the UUV passes
the target, while the system is still performing the mission. These
results will be shared with the vehicle or other sensors for
transmission back to a base station when the vehicle surfaces. The
objectives for the EOI include additions to the control software and
the development of a set of versatile image processing techniques.
A significant goal is to develop the ability to make images viewable
remotely over the vehicle’s RF link. This allows for a quick review of
contacts and improved flexibility in mission planning and execution.
Image processing goals included the development of image
enhancement algorithms that could be applied to all EOI data. The
intent of the enhancement algorithms is to enhance image contrast
and sharpness to better differentiate targets from background and
increase target detail. The software will be used to batch process
large amounts of raw EOI images and save them in a format so
that the user can scroll through the images using a standard image
viewer.” (G. Sulzberger, 2009) (Figure 4.4)
Figure 4.4 Bluefin12 BMI
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Source: (Bluefin Robotics, 2020)
Demonstration
The objective of the NSWC PCD MR-201103 project conducted
in 2011 was to leverage the Office of Naval Research’s (ONR) Mine
Countermeasures (MCM) unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV)
assets to evaluate and demonstrate the applicability of existing ONR
MCM UUV technologies integrated with advanced sensor packages
for facilitating detection, assessment, and characterization of
underwater munitions.

Figure 4.5 Bluefin 12 Internals
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Source: (Bernstein, 29 June 2012)
A number of sensors were employed in the demonstration. The
BMI sensor suite consists of the Buried Object Scanning Sonar
(BOSS) and the Realtime Tracking Gradiometer (RTG) fitted to the
Bluefin-12 UUV. The REMUS100 system carries a dual frequency,
900/1800 kHz side scan sonar. (Figure 4.5) The REMUS system
provided high resolution acoustic images of proud objects, while the
BMI sensor suite on the Bluefin-12 UUV provided acoustic images
of buried objects and the magnetic moments of targets or clusters
within range of the RTG sensor. The combination of the data from
both UUV systems was designed to enable detection of acoustically
reflective targets and discrimination between proud and buried
state, provide size and aspect information, and indicate which
contain magnetic material of the level seen for munitions. (SERDPESTCP, 2012)

Demonstration Results
Quoting from the (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) report, the Results were
not without Implementation errors.
“A small underwater munitions test site was planted in the Davis
Point area of St. Andrew Bay near Naval Surface Warfare CenterPanama City Division (NSWC PCD). Five nominal 100-m-long target
lines spaced 2 m apart were laid parallel to each other. The first
two lines had individual targets spaced along the lines and aligned
at random orientations relative to the target lines. One line had the
targets proud and the other line had the targets flush buried. The
third through fifth lines had two clusters of targets on each line.
Lines one and two provided baseline measurement data for each
individual target type. Lines three through five provided acoustic
and magnetic data for clusters of munitions in different states of
burial and orientation. The planted locations of the targets were
determined by their drop locations from the surface vessel using
plumb lines and a GPS system.
UUVs, Advanced Sensors, Munitions Detection & USVs [Nichols] | 205

The BOSS sensor clearly demonstrated the capability of detecting
and imaging unexploded ordnance (UXO) targets of the class M
targets in proud, partially buried, and fully buried configurations.
Discriminating between the different targets was accomplished by
comparing the known target physical dimensions with the
measured dimensions extracted from the BOSS imagery. However,
discriminating multiple targets in a clustered configuration was
difficult for the case of targets closely spaced together (target
16-CL1-M). This is due to the medium resolution of the BOSS sensor.
The developer of the BOSS system has recommended increasing
the transmit frequency to increase the resolution to enhance the
imagery but funding for this effort has not been forthcoming.
The RTG experienced hardware failure during the data collection
event at the end of June, leading to lost data. A likely candidate
for this failure is the oil-filled cables that connect the sensor head
to the electronics bottle. These cables and their connection points
have failed in the past with similar effects on the data. A
refurbishment and recalibration of the RTG system would be
beneficial for future testing events and will be necessary to improve
results.” (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)
Implementation Issues
The technologies encountered numerous problems during their
deployment, including the failure of multiple channels in each
sensor, not allowing much of the data to be recovered. The sensor
suite used in the experiment was unique research and development
equipment developed by the Navy for finding buried mines. As such,
it cannot be procured commercially. Additional equipment would
have to be custom-built.
Improvements in magnetic sensors have been made since the
RTG sensor was constructed, and alternate sensor designs might
be considered, including the LSG sensor. Collaboration between
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government and contractor subject matter experts would be
required to develop a state-of-the-art gradiometer suitable for
integration with the Bluefin-12 UUV and the BOSS sensor for regular
use in munitions surveying. As a part of that effort, software for
processing gradiometer and BOSS data would be streamlined to
enable survey contractors to use the system with minimal additional
training. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)
Success Criteria and Performance Objectives
Before we describe a selected sensors and findings, it is useful to
know what the success criteria was for this demonstration. First we
need to think in terms of Performance Objectives.
Performance Objectives (PO) Remote Environmental Measuring
Units REMUS 100.
The performance objective (PO) for the REMUS 100 was to first
provide a wide area search over the entire site areas with the 900
kHz side scan sonar. Once the wide area search was complete the
sonar imagery from that search would provide information on the
overall assessment of proud objects in the area and if any are
contacts of interest. A follow-on lower altitude, small-area detailed
survey and target reacquisition of the contact of interest would be
performed operating the sonar at 1800 kHz. The 1800 kHz frequency
provided with picture quality sonar imagery that enhances
classification and identification of the proud contacts of interest.
Along with sonar data camera imagery it would provide clear
picture quality imageries of the contact of interest.
This PO was not accomplished because the REMUS camera was
unavailable. The survey was performed on a clear water day with
the EO sensors on board the REMUS 600.
Performance Objectives – Buried Object Scanning Sonar (BOSS)
Table 4.1 summarizes the BOSS system POs. The objectives
include assessment of the probability of detection, the degree of
burial, size, shape, and orientation determined and localization
accuracy

against

a

combination

of

small

and

large

UXO

targets. (Leasko, 2014) The planned tests were not blind tests. They
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were designed to determine the sidescan, BOSS and RTG combined
capabilities against proud (clearly visable and not buried) and buried
targets and to determine whether further optimization of the multi
sensor approach, and further performance testing was warranted.
The PO was to demonstrate and measure the ability to classify
all contacts using: 1) the BOSS to measure target size, shape, and
orientation, 2) the RTG sensor to determine which BOSS contacts
are ferrous and non-ferrous and to measure the magnetic moment
of the ferrous contacts and 3) compare BOSS with REMUS sidescan
data to indicate which contacts are buried and which are proud and
to enhance localization of those contacts. (Leasko, 2014)
Table 4.1 Performance Objectives for the BOSS Sensors
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Performance
Metric
Objective

Data
Required

Success Criteria

Location
of seeded
Items[5]

Pd=0.90 [6]

Quantitative
Performance
Objectives
Detection of
all munitions
of interest

Percent
detected of
seeded items

Determine
the degree of
burial, size,
shape, and
orientation
of contacts.

Percent
correct
classification
of the burial
depth, size,
shape, and
orientation of
the seeded
targets.

Validation
data for
selected
targets

Demonstration of >90%
correct classification of
the size, shape, and
orientation of the targets.
Length and burial
measurements considered
correct shall be within 25%
of actual

Location
accuracy

Average
localization
error in meters
from latitude
and longitude
ground truth
localization for
seed items

Location
of seed
items
surveyed
to
accuracy
of 1.0m

ΔLocalization Error < 1m
from ground truth

Qualitative
Performance
Objectives

Ease of Use

Feedback
from
technician
on
usability of
technology
and time
required

Source: (Leasko, 2014)
Performance Objectives – Real-Time Tracking Gradiometer
(RTG) / Laser Scalar Gradiometer (LSG)
The performance objectives for the RTG system are summarized
in Table 4.2. The objectives include a demonstration of the
performance of detection, the ability to measure the magnetic
moment and be able to localize the contacts or clusters of targets.
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Table 4.2 Performance Objectives for the RTG Sensors

Performance
Objective

Metric

Data
Required

Success Criteria

Percent detected of
seeded ferrous items

Location
of seeded
Items

Pd=0.90

Quantitative
Performance
Objectives
Detection of
all ferrous
munitions of
interest

For individual planted
targets, the percent of
targets whose magnetic
Measurement
moment is measured
of ferrous
during a flyover to
target
within 20% of that
magnetic
measured in the
moment
laboratory, for the
particular altitude
flown.[7]

Location
accuracy [9]

Average localization
error in meters from
latitude and longitude
ground truth localization
for seed items

Demonstration
of

Validation
data for
selected
targets [8]

Location
of seed
items
surveyed
to
accuracy
of 1.0m[10]

>90% of
individual
ferrous
targets
moments
measured
to within
20% of
actual.

ΔLocalization
Error < 1m from
ground truth

Qualitative
Performance
Objectives

Ease of Use

Feedback
from
technician
on
usability of
technology
and time
required
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Performance Assessments
Remote Environmental Measuring Units 100 (REMUS 100)
Figure 4.6 shows the REMUS 100 UUV mission over the test field.
The mission was a combine 900 kHz and 1800 kHz sonar surveys.
The blue lines with arrows, represents the track lines and vehicle
direction as it traveled though the test field surveying at 900 kHz.
The purple lines with arrows, represents the track lines and vehicle
direction as it traveled though the test field surveying at 1800 kHz.
The green (+) symbol represents the locations of the targets
detected. Sonar imagery of this is displayed in Figures 14 – 26. The
red (+) symbol represents the location of a detected UXO target out
of place from Cluster 16-CL1_M. It is thought that the UXO target
was moved by a shrimper’s nets as they went through the test field.

Figure 4.6 REMUS 100 mission map
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Source: (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)
Figure 4.7 shows a sample RTG 1800 kHz sonar imagery of seeded
point 04-M on Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.7 shows a sample RTG 1800 kHz sonar imagery of
seeded point 04-M on Figure 4.6
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Source: (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)
Figure 4.8 shows the interesting navigation tracks for the survey
missions performed on 25 June 2011. Note the search patterns are
designed to pick up proud and buried targets from 90 degree
approaches.
214 | UUVs, Advanced Sensors, Munitions Detection & USVs [Nichols]

Figure 4.8 Navigation tracks for the survey missions performed
on 25 June 2011.

Source: (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)

BOSS Images
The BOSS images consist of the X-Y plan view showing the
plumbed position of the target represented by an “X” and the image
of the target of interest highlighted with a circle and labeled with
the target’s designation. A zoomed, 3D multi-aspect BOSS image
for each target is also provides the X-Z and Y-Z perspective views
to show target burial state. BOSS target localization, distance from
BOSS localization to diver plumbed positions (“X”), target
dimensions and burial state information for each of the targets is
provided from BOSS PMA.[11]
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Note that all BOSS-generated images in this report are for cases
with sub-critical grazing angles in the sand bottom field. (SERDPESTCP, 2012)
Figure 4.9 shows BOSS imagery for target 10-K: (a) plan view
image and (b) zoom image of target 10-K. Vertical axes are cross
track, and horizontal axes are along track, in meters.
Figure 4.9 Example of BOSS imagery

Source: (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)
Summary – BOSS
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According to Leasko (Leasko, 2014), the BOSS sensor clearly
demonstrated the capability of detecting and imaging unexploded
ordinance (UXO) targets of the class M targets in proud, partially
buried and fully buried configurations. Discriminating between the
different targets was accomplished by comparing the known target
physical dimensions with the measured dimensions extracted from
the BOSS imagery. However, discriminating multiple targets in a
clustered configuration was difficult for the case of targets closely
spaced together (target 16-CL1-M). This is due to the medium
resolution of the BOSS sensor.
As to target localization, the BOSS system receives and uses UUV
navigation information to calculate target localization. The present
navigation package in the Bluefin12 UUV can be updated to improve
its accuracy. The present method of obtaining the ground truth
of targets deployed underwater can introduce errors especially in
deeper water making it difficult to accurately assess target
localization. (Leasko, 2014)
Modern mine warfare challenges today
What is the scope of the problem? The (Bernstein, 29 June 2012)
demonstration referred to in this chapter constitutes a relatively
small number of UXO targets to be detected, assessed and
classified.
Mine warfare remains the most cost-effective of asymmetrical
naval warfare. Mines are relatively cheap and being small allows
them to be easily deployed. Indeed, with some kinds of mines,
trucks and rafts will suffice. At present there are more than 300
different mines available. Some 50 countries currently have mining
ability. The number of naval mine producing countries has increased
by 75% since 1988. It is also noted that these mines are of an
increasing sophistication while even the older type mines present
a significant problem. It has been noted that mine warfare may
become an issue with terrorist organizations. Mining busy shipping
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straits and mining shipping harbors remain some of the most
serious threats. (Ocean Studies Board, 2012)
Clearing mines is an inexact science
Between 600,000 and 1,000,000 naval mines of all types were
laid in WWII. Advancing military forces worked to clear mines from
newly-taken areas, but extensive minefields remained in place after
the war. Air-dropped mines had an additional problem for mine
sweeping operations: they were not meticulously charted. In Japan,
much of the B-29 mine-laying work had been performed at high
altitude, with the drifting on the wind of mines carried by parachute
adding a randomizing factor to their placement. Generalized danger
areas were identified, with only the quantity of mines given in detail.
Many WWII era still exist today. Mines aren’t the only UXO in the
sea or close to land. Bomb fragments or UXO can still be found
in Germany and England. More recently, Iraq and Afghanistan has
a proliferation and specialization of IEDs. The exact number isn’t
known but the injuries to US soldiers and indigence children /
population is dramatic. For a lightly technically salted discussion of
the types of mines, deployment history, and countermeasures see
Naval Mines in Wikipedia. (Naval Mines, 2020)
Innovation seems to be the name of the game in UUV / USV
Surveying
Shallow water has always been a captain’s concern and bottom
conditions

may

obscure

objects

that

are

sonar

resistant.

Teledynemarine Oceanscience has produced a couple of interesting
unmanned surface vehicles [boats] (USVs) for shallow water use,
the 1250 and Boat 1800T – Trimble Edition. Teledynemarine
Oceanscience Q-Boats® perform reliable remotely-controlled
acoustic Doppler current profiling in streams, rivers, lakes and
coastal waters all over the world. They reduce survey time, keep
people safe during difficult conditions, and can access hard to reach
locations. (Teledynemarine, 2020) See Figures 4.10 and 4.11
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The Teledynemarine 1800-T Trimble edition has some key
features:
• – Precise Trimble GNSS positioning and guidance
• – Real-time 2D survey for inspection and identification of
obstructions
• – Cost effective method for ad hoc surveys
• – Increased safety and reduced cost: replaces dangerous diver
inspection and expensive survey boat time. (Teledynemarine-1,
2020) [12]

Figure 4.10 Q-Boat 1250 designed specifically for shallow water
applications

1250 Field shot
Source: (Teledynemarine, 2020)
Figure 4.11 Q-Boat 1800-T Trimble Ed.
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Z-Boat fleet

Source: (Teledynemarine-1, 2020)
Conclusions: Why do the authors consider UUVs and USVs
Disruptive Technologies of the future?
Several reasons.
Consider two interesting Black Swan events of the past and how
the technology exponentially grew out of small seeds.
The date is December 17, 1903.
The Wright Flyer was the first successful heavier-than-air
powered aircraft. Designed and built by the Wright brothers, they
flew it four times on December 17, 1903, near Kill Devil Hills, about
four miles south of Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. (Figure 4.12)
Figure 4.12 Wright brothers first flight photo
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Source: (Crouch, 2014)
Results:

Airline

Industry,

USAF,

Space

Command,

FAA,

Passenger and Freight Travel all over the world, bad airline
snacks, unhappy TSA employees, Space Command. To prove the
point see Figure 4.13:
17 Dec 1947–A mere 44 years to the day that the Wright brothers
took to the air for the first powered flight of 12 seconds and traveled
120 feet at Kitty Hawk, NC, the Boeing B-47 Stratojet strategic
bomber takes to the air for the first time. The Boeing B-47 Stratojet
was a long range, six-engine, jet-powered strategic bomber
designed to fly at high subsonic speed and at high altitude to avoid
enemy interception. The B-47’s primary mission was to drop nuclear
bombs on the Soviet Union. With its engines carried in nacelles
under the swept wing, the B-47 was a major innovation in postWorld War II combat jet design and helped lead to modern jet
airliners. The B-47 entered service with the US Air Force’s Strategic
Air Command in 1951. It never saw combat as a bomber but was
a mainstay of SAC’s bomber strength during the late 1950s/ early
1960s and remained in use as a bomber until 1965. Performance
comparisons: Wright Flyer: wingspan: 40ft/ gross wt.: 604lbs/
range: 120ft/ top speed: 35mph/ ceiling: 10ft/ payload: 165lbs B-47:
wingspan: 116ft/ gross wt.: 133,000lbs/ range: 4,000 miles/ top
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speed: 587mph/ ceiling 45,000ft/ payload 25,000lbs Incredible
advancement in such a short period of time!
Figure 4.13 B-47 Stratojet

Source: (B-47 Stratojet, 2020)
The Date is: September 7, 1776
On September 7, 1776, during the Revolutionary War, the American
submersible craft Turtle attempts to attach a time bomb to the
hull of British Admiral Richard Howe’s flagship Eagle in New York
Harbor. It was the first use of a submarine in warfare. See Figure
4.14.
Figure 4.14 “Turtle”
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Source: (Roland, 1977)
Results: Submarines, Submarine warfare, NAVSEA, precision
munitions’, improved propulsion, nuclear -power, UXO, 1.3 Trident
National Defense, advanced underwater technologies, Sonar
applications, EO applications, extreme depth investigations,
Search & Rescue, Sensors that work underwater and extreme
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conditions, pre-positioning of marine / maintenance platforms,
oil exploration, and treasure hunting.
There will always be wars – somewhere. Chances are the US
will be involved directly or selling munitions to a proxy. Terrorists
might realize that mining the shipping areas is easier than naval
ship warfare and its cost effective.[13] Sensors that work effectively
underwater in hostile conditions!! This is amazing to say the least.
Anyone who owns a recreational boat knows that they have to
regularly clean the hulls of their boats and replace electronics 5x
faster than the normal homeowner. Seawater is unforgiving to
electronic and human life. UUVs and USVs handle DDD work so
much better.
Just like UAS is revolutionizing the airline industry for all
applications

– especial defense, so will UUVs and USVs

revolutionize the marine industries in both civilian and military
applications. Bank on it.

Questions
1. Where do you see the next Black Swan event involving UUVs?
2. How might this technology be used to discover, recover,
classify ancient artifacts?
3. How might UUVs be used to repair data communications
cables at severe depths and tangled in unground obstructions?
4. Design a CONOP experiment for Counter UUV operations in
foreign waters beyond claimed territorial rights.
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[1] Black Swan Event- A black swan is an unpredictable event that is
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beyond what is normally expected of a situation and has potentially
severe consequences. Black swan events are characterized by their
extreme rarity, severe impact, and the widespread insistence they
were obvious in hindsight. (Black Swan Definition, 2020)
[2] The type of precision on sensors that work effectively
underwater is an interesting science in itself. A primary reference
on the subject is by Kovacs entitled “Micromachined Transducers
Sourcebook.” (Kovacs, 1998) There are many newer references, but
students should start with this one to get a fundamental basis for
the construction of specialized sensors before jumping into the next
step in the process.
[3] (Leasko, 2014)Published in 2014 means that we are 6-7 years
behind further advances in the sensors and hardening capabilities
of the assets. However, students can get a lot of information and
strategy from this UNCLASSIFIED report to chew on. This is why the
author chose it as a primary reference for this chapter.
[4] The inventory has been obviously expanded and upgraded since
this NSCW PCD evaluation. However, those upgrades have been
in the sensor technologies not necessarily the UUV packages they
arrive in. Concentrate on the beauty of being able to solve such a
MCM detection / assessment / classification problem (underwater,
cold temperatures, hostile environment, visibility issues, salt(s)
corrosion, significant pressures, magnetic and electro-optic
interferences, to name a few variables.)
[5] BOSS data will be collected over the seeded areas and analysis
will follow to identify the number of targets detected by the system.
The number of targets detected by the BOSS system will be
cataloged and verified against the target listing and ground truth
localization provided by the divers. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)
[6] Pd = Probability of Detection
[7] The magnetic moment is estimated by statistically fitting
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windowed time series to a magnetic-dipole model. The properties
of the moment, including dipole strength and orientation, are
extracted in this process. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)
[8] RTG/LSG data will be collected over the seeded areas and
analysis will follow to identify the number of targets detected by the
system. The number of targets detected by the RTG/LSG system
will be cataloged and verified against the target listing and ground
truth localization provided by the divers. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)
[9] The effectiveness of the RTG/LSG localization of proud to fully
buried ferrous targets. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)
[10] Metric: Compare the RTG/LSG target localization with the
diver provided target ground truth and determine the percentage
of BOSS detections of seeded targets that can be identified as nonferrous using RTG/LSG data. & Data Requirements:
RTG/LSG data will be collected over the seeded areas and
analysis will follow to identify and localize the targets of interest.
The RTG/LSG localization for each target will be cataloged and
verified against the target listing and ground truth localization
provided by the divers. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012)
[11] Post Mission Analysis (PMA)
[12] Disclaimer: Author has no financial or legal relationship to
vendors discussed in this chapter. Interest is purely technical.
[13] An example of this in the Straight of Hormuz which 5% of
the world’s oil transportation and gas purification processes are
located. See author article on missile effects as a another POV:
(Nichols R. K., Randall Nichols (October 15, 2019) Implications from
Attack by Iran on Saudi Arabian Oil Fields (implications-fromattack-iran-saudi-arabian-oil-fields-nichols, 2019)
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5. Challenging the Ammo
Companies from Grass Roots
[Mai]
Student Learning Objectives
1) The student will learn the 2nd
2) The student will learn the major influences that resulted in the
modern guns and ammunition we enjoy today.
3) The student is encouraged to gain further study to understand
how guns helped develop the United States, how guns protect the
other amendments outlined in the bill of rights and keep and
protect the Constitution of the United States of America.
Introduction
The Constitution of United States of America 1791 (rev. 1992)
Amendment II states explicitly: A well-regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a Free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be Infringed. (Madison, 1791) [1]
The wording leaves plenty of room for legal and political
wrangling over the meaning of words like “well regulated,” “militia,”
“right,” “people,” “keep,” “bear” and “arms.” (Ingraham, 2016) It does
not leave room for any abridgement of the word Infringed.
The term ‘Arms’ in the ‘Second’ Amendment refers to weapons.
The cutting-edge technology for weapons when the Amendment II
was written, would have been the Revolution War era smoothbore
musket (Figure 5.1):
Figure 5.1 American Revolution War era Smoothbore Musket
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Source: (Ingraham, 2016)
Without gunpowder and bullets, a smoothbore musket was and
is nothing more than a fancy walking stick or at best an artifact
of history. This fact still relevant today. The relationship between
gunpowder, bullets and their corresponding firearms/weapons/
guns/arms is as intimate relationship as they come. One without
the other, the guns and bullets intended function cease to exist
and operate as they were designed. “….a musket is a smoothbore
weapon much like a 12-gauge shotgun.” (Harrington, 2013)
Few things have changed the world as much as when humans
learned to harness the power of gunpowder. Gunpowder in its
earliest form, was not called, ‘Black Powder’, until an early version
of smokeless power was invented. At that time, it became known
as ‘Black Powder’. At the time of original discovery, it was black
in color. Gunpowder was first thought to be discovered by the
Chinese, they learned to use hollow tubes with gunpowder and
projectiles to harness its power for something different than
fireworks. Black powder formula in its purest variant is synthesized
as Potassium Nitrate (saltpeter) 75%, Carbon (in the form of
charcoal) 15%, and Sulfur 10% See Figure 5.2. (Wallace, 2018)
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Figure 5.2 Gunpowder Composition
Source: (Wallace, 2018)
There have been many iterations in the development of guns,
propellants, and bullets. The development and improvement of
these three basics tend to occur within relative similar time frames.
Guns over time have become more reliable and able to deliver
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multiple shots/rounds/bullets/projectiles in a shorter time. Black
powder was the initial propellant of a bullet/projectile. As guns
evolved, their propellants and bullets/projectile evolved with them
and were dependent on gun evolution.
Relevant History – From Muzzle loaders to Modern Cartridges
The first useable guns started as a Matchlock (Figure 5.3) where
a burning wick, typically made from hemp, was triggered to ignite a
small amount of powder in a flash pan.
Figure 5.3 Match-Lock musket

Source: (Kolander, 2016)
This was difficult to control with a burning wick, which was not
much more than a small burning piece of rope that maintained a hot
ember. In an effort to eliminate the use of a burning rope, a wheel
lock was designed to create a rotational force that created a spark.
The wheel would be wound with a crank then released upon a pull of
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the trigger. The unwinding motion would create sparks and igniting
the powder in the open pan (See Figure 5.4) .
Figure 5.4 Wheel-Lock

Source: (Kolander, 2016)
This method was better due to elimination of the burning rope!
However, being mechanical it was not without design problems
and the open flash pan was still exposed and vulnerable to
environmental moisture. (Kolander, 2016) The next most successful
design was based on a piece of shaped flint-rock that was held in
the jaws of a hammer. It would strike an extension, “Frizzen,” on a
flash pan cover.
Figure 5.5 Flint-Lock
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Source: (Kolander, 2016)
This design (Flint-Lock shown in Figure 5.4) covered the
vulnerable gunpowder laying in the flash pan until the trigger was
pulled allowing the flint to strike the Frizzen on the flash pan cover.
That action forced the Frizzen out of the way and expose the
gunpowder in the pan, allowing it to be ignited. It allowed for no
burning rope and the spark created was relayed to the gunpowder
being protected from moisture or spillage until an instant before
firing. (Author, 2020) The gun was placed in halfcocked position
while the flash pan was being loaded with powder. This design
feature was to allow the operator to perform the pan loading
procedure while not being in a fully cocked position, supposedly
safer. However, sometimes the operator would set off the trigger in
the halfcocked position either by accident or poor design. This is
where we get the saying, ‘Don’t go off halfcocked!’ (Martin, 1761 (first
Citation) 2021)
The initial, and up to this point, guns were considered muzzle
loaders and their barrels were smoothbore. Muzzle loaders were
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loaded from the end of the barrel or what is commonly called the
business end. Here are the loading steps for muzzle loaders (Figure
5.6):
• Ø 1&2) a metered amount of gunpowder was first inserted into
the muzzle end.
• Ø 3-7) a cotton wad with a round lead ball was inserted and
tamped in the gun barrel until properly compacted.
• Ø 8&9) before being able to be fired, a small amount of
gunpowder was then placed into the flash pan.
• Ø 10) Eventually, a percussion cap was developed, which sped
up the operation. If everything had been done properly, the
gun was ready to fire once the trigger was placed into the fully
cocked position.

Figure 5.6 Loading Steps of a Muzzle loader

Source: (Martin, 1761 (first Citation) 2021)
Figure 5.7 Bullet position in a Muzzle loaded gun
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Source: (Youtube, 2021)

You can see how the ball in the lower portion of Figure 5.7 is
positioned after loading. The upper portion of Figure 5.7 shows the
bullet design after the round ball. Even though, it was called the
mini-ball, it looked nothing like the earlier round ball. What the
Challenging the Ammo Companies from Grass Roots [Mai] | 237

mini-ball did was capture all the escaping gases from the barrel.
This increased muzzle velocity, distance, and accuracy. However,
that caused the pressures within the barrel to increase which
demanded that increased strength within the metallurgy of the
barrel had to be increased. You can almost say that ammunition
design and gun design became like a dog chasing its tail. An
improvement forced and improvement in the other.
Eventually, breech loading guns were designed so that the powder
and bullet could be loaded from the breech end. Several things had
to come together to allow this to happen. The breech loading gun
design had to be worked out at the same time as the cartridge had to
be invented. The two were reliant upon each other.Early cartridges
had a paper wrapped charge of powder and a mini-ball incorporated
into the pre-assembled bullet or round. A round in the world of
guns is considered to be a single bullet or called a shot. Many of the
terms relating to guns and ammunitions become interchangeable
and are usually familiar to the user or in this case the shooter.

Figure 5.8 Bullet design progression

238 | Challenging the Ammo Companies from Grass Roots [Mai]

Source: (BackCountry Chronicles , n.d.)
Figure 5.8 shows how the bullet progressed in design. Muzzle
loaded bullets and muzzle loaded guns are still used today.
The first paper cartridges to include the bullet and placed into
the breech were quickly replace with a canister called a shell or
brass cartridge. A cartridge can be called a shell and vs. versa. A
bullet can be called a shell, cartridge or a shell and ammunition. The
context the words are used in are important. As the paper cartridge
came into its existence breech loading guns became better.
Figure 5.9 Paper cartridge used in early breech loading guns

Source: (contributors, Paper cartridge, 2021)
Figure 5.10 Early breech loader w/ fitted cartridge

Source: (contributors, Breechloader, 2021)
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The above Figure 5.10 was a very early breech loading design.
The actual cartridge was loaded much like that of the earlier muzzle
loaders. However, the loading of the cartridge was then entered
into the breech end of the gun.
Eventually, the paper cartridge led to advent of the metallic cased
gunpowder and bullet. See Figure 5.11.

Figure 5.11 Bullets w/ brass casing

Source: (Jeff, 2020)
Figure 5.12 Metallic cased bullet in chamber of breech loaded
gun
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Source: (II, 2017)
Figure 5.13 Rifled barrel

Source: (BackCountry Chronicles , n.d.)
Figure 5.14 Black powder

Challenging the Ammo Companies from Grass Roots [Mai] | 241

Source: (YouTube, 2021)
Figure 5.15 Smokeless Powder

Source: (YouTube, 2021)
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Several events came together to make a more powerful, accurate,
reliable,

and

easier

to

use

gun.

Those

events

included:

Preassembled metallic case shell (see Figure 5.11), Breech loading
gun (see Figure 5.10 & 12), Smokeless powder (see Figure 5.14 &
15), improved metallurgy, gas operated case extraction and
rechambering (see Figure 5. 16), center fire ammunition (see Figure
5. 16), Barrel rifling (see Figure 5.13). This discussion is by no means
an all-inclusive recreation of the history of firearms and
ammunition, only the highlights that made major shifts in the
trajectory of guns and ammunition outcome are pointed out here.
Figure 5.16 Rim fire vs Center fire

Source: (SIMMONS, 2020)

Figure 5.17 Shell ejection and reloading using excess gas
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Source: (Sagi, 2021)
Summary
To reach the technology of modern weapons (see Figure 5.17),
it was important that a smokeless power was developed. The
smokeless powders do not only give us less smoke but also greater
chamber pressures that could push a soft metal such as lead
through a rifled barrel that had no leakage around the bullet. The
rifling spins the bullet giving it greater accuracy but also requiring
higher chamber pressures to push it through the barrel that was
fit so tightly. Only a shell that houses its propellant and bullet
could assist with the tight fit. It also allowed for ease of loading
and once the round was expended a grove at the base of the shell
244 | Challenging the Ammo Companies from Grass Roots [Mai]

could be gripped by an extractor that is powered by some of the
excess gas of the spent round to automatically remove the spent
shell casing. This action was important to take place at the breech
and is why breech loading designs became so very important to
the semi-automatic weapons we see today. The early smokeless
powder was from a nitrocellulose and nitroglycerin mix that gave
less smoke, higher chamber pressure, by complete combustion and
left less corrosive remains since it was mostly consumed, unlike
Black powder that would not work in today’s guns.
Figure 5.18 Modern AR-15 photo courtesy of Randall Mai
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Today’s shooters are typically more informed than ever before.
Many hold conceal/carry licenses, have taken hunter safety
courses, abide by all laws and regulations, some belong to hunting
clubs where ideas and understand is shared and peer reviewed.
Their reasons for owning and shooting guns vary from sport/target
shooting, personal protection, game hunting to provide food for
their families. Today’s shooters understand the need to practice
because shooting is a perishable skill and the need to be familiar
with their gun is a must. This should be understood then that a gun
owner will not buy a gun to put in a box unless they intend act as
a collector. Just like a pilot that flies, a gun owner must practice.
That being said, ammunition will be consumed on a regular basis;
therefore, there is a continual need to replace a gun owner’s
ammunition stock.
The Nub – Ammunition shortages and government suppression
of stocks
At the start of this writing there was rationing of ammunition and
complete shortages. The next section was happening just 20 hrs.
while these very words being typed:
[OREM, Utah — an amazing sight outside a Utah County gun store
as hundreds lined up to buy ammo.
The line stretched around Gunnies, located at 396 South State
Street in Orem, all throughout the day on Saturday.
Some traveled as far as Kamas to wait for hours in the cold.
KSL-TV spoke to a number of people — some said they came for
the restocked ammo; others were more anxious. They mentioned
current political events — the GA runoff, a soon-to-be transfer of
power and Wednesday’s violence at the U.S. Capitol. Many in line
also yelled out: “Biden is going to take our guns.”
“There were people down here, 200 lined up before the store
opened,” said gun owner Mark Greer who drove from South Jordan.
Recently, there has been a shortage on the most popular ammo.
“It goes fast because there’s none out there,” said Greer.
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The ammunition shortage started in late spring of 2020 when the
coronavirus altered manufacturing.
Ammo has been on and off shelves, but Gunnies restocked its
AR-15 ammo supply on Saturday.
“Perfect storm for gun supply,” said gun salesman Chris Hansen.
The masses came to get their hands-on part of that shipment.
One Gunnies employee couldn’t get the ammo on shelves fast
enough.
“This case has 1,000 rounds,” said the worker. “I have gone
through 10 boxes already in two hours.”
Because the store has seen hoarding in the past, there was a limit
placed on what a customer could buy.
“On this 223-556 that we got in that everybody’s here for today,
we’re allowing 200 rounds per customer,” said Hansen.
Gunnies sales reps said they have seen some of their busiest days
ever this year, adding that the shop is not usually busy like this in
January.
“We have seen a rush on guns and ammo before – but never in
January,” said Hansen. “Typically, after Christmas it slows down, but
this year has been just the opposite.”
They mentioned that when Obama was elected in 2008 and again
in 2012, there was a run-on guns and ammo.
Those in line expressed different reasons for showing up.
“With the changes coming of a new Presidential Administration,
people are concerned about their 2nd Amendment rights,” said
Greer. “That’s why you see so many here today.”
“People are coming in and they are pretty scared. They feel they
are being attacked,” said Gunnies employee Josh Hansen. “They feel
the need to fight back, or at least protect themselves.” ] (Tait, 2021)
According to United States Government Experts, any proposed
amendment to the Constitution needs to be passed by both the
House and the Senate, with two-thirds majorities. It would then
need to be ratified by three-fourths of the 50 states, or 38 of them.
Historically, that’s proved unlikely and challenging. In the history of
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the United States, the only amendment that’s ever been repealed is
Prohibition. (Tait, 2021)
So, what is happening? With close to 8 million new gun owners
there is no doubt that there is increased demand on the
ammunitions supply chain. But why are there so many new gun
owners? Is it because of the individuals wanting to impose gun
control on the nation? Is it because of the riots of 2020 in the
Portland area? Is because of the worries of the pandemic of 2019?
The pandemic did create the toilet paper shortages, but they
rebounded quickly. You cannot go to any of the stores and find
ammunition. Even though the manufactures claim they have
increased production.
One more little item almost 7+ years old and no one really took
notice.
“The Denver Post, on February 15th, ran an Associated Press
article entitled Homeland Security aims to buy 1.6b rounds of ammo,
so far, to little notice. It confirmed that the Department of
Homeland Security has issued an open purchase order for 1.6 billion
rounds of ammunition. As reported elsewhere, some of this
purchase

order

is

for

hollow-point

rounds,

forbidden

by

international law for use in war, along with a frightening amount
specialized for snipers. Also reported elsewhere, at the height of
the Iraq War the Army was expending less than 6 million rounds a
month. Therefore 1.6 billion rounds would be enough to sustain a
hot war for 20+ years. In America.” (Benko, 2013) The interesting
question to ponder is how much more ammo has been purchased
since 2013 for DHS “practice?”
Figure 5.19 Empty shelves at a local gun store courtesy of
Randall Mai
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Figure 5.20 online buying Courtesy of Randall Mai
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It is possible that hording, scalping, increased demand, fear
buying will throw off the normal supply and demand. However,
every caliber of ammunition and most of the guns are gone. It
starts to make a person wonder if there is more at play. Especially
when the incoming president says he is coming for people’s guns.
It should be noted that the 2nd Amendment is considered a right
from God and not given to people by the government. But it is
considered to be protected by the government, as it says, ‘…shall not
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be infringed!’ This may be true but by not supplying ammunition
to the public has the same effect as disarming the American public
and as stated at the start of this chapter, without ammunition, a
gun is nothing more than a stick. Some gun owners have resigned
themselves to reloading their own ammunition. But stores do not
have reloading supplies. It is a little ironic that it’s not just the
popular calibers no components are available to reload but ever
caliber has NO supply. That makes no sense!! Every re-loader will
tell that they do not have the apparatuses to reload all calibers
across the caliber spectrum. It makes no economic sense and would
simply not be cost effective. Another red flag!
Ammunition – Like water in an ocean, everywhere but not a
drop to drink
What do gun owners do for ammunition? Let’s take a look at
what other authors are saying: Ammunition purchasers across
America—or make that would-be purchasers in record numbers—are
finding shelves bare, and unfortunately that’s hardly breaking news.
If this were simply a Christmas-season run, we could insert a Grinch
joke here and assume things would return to normal after the
holidays. But, in fact, this shortage, as many readers can attest,
traces back at least to spring when COVID mania shocked the
country and has since intensified under an unprecedented chain
of cultural phenomena. Many gun owners feel that the only way to
ensure they have ammo when they need it is to buy in bigger-thannormal quantities, and the result is hoarding.
As detailed in a recent “Keefe Report,” nearly any caliber that’ll
go bang in whatever quantity is up for grabs is snapped up almost
immediately. (Keefe, 2020) Consumer frustration is rampant, and
there’s a real concern about personal- and home-defense shooters
not being able to get ammo they need to be prepared.
Anyone who’s been a gun owner and at least a semi-active shooter
going back a decade can remember earlier shortages, and while
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those were truly galling and nationwide, this one’s different. It’s
even more widespread and more pervasive in terms of unattainable
calibers—nearly all of them, from what we’re hearing. Like that other
lingering current event on everyone’s mind, we’re left wondering:
When it will end?
That question is landing in record numbers, too, in the inboxes,
customer-help lines and direct attention of nearly everyone
working for America’s ammunition manufacturers. We talked to a
few key executives who spoke about the inquiries and criticism
coming their way—so much of it that, at times, it threatens to
impede normal operations—and who shared anecdotal requests that
would be comical if the shortage weren’t so serious. They were
also frank in answering the question about when relief will come,
and while there are bits of good news, the outlook for returning to
normal supply-and-demand in 2021 remains murky. (Zent, 2020)
Let’s Listen to the Manufactures (See Table 5.1) : (Zent, 2020)
Table 5.1 Listen to the Manufacturer’s
Hornady
– Jason
Hornady

“Ammunition is the new toilet paper……
“The big problem here-we’ve seen it before, but not like thisis folk’s panic thinking they won’t be able to get any more and
so buy more than normal…
“We make it one day and ship it the next.”
“I’ve seen shortages six times in my career,” said Hornady,
“but the difference this time is the string of events—Walmart,
Virginia [anti-gun legislature], coronavirus, riots, an influx of
[6-7 million] new gun owners, a bad election.
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Vista
Outdoor
– Chris
Metz

“After seeing big sales spike as a result of COVID, civil unrest
and then so many more people getting out this year going
hunting – license sales are up like crazy……
“But ever since Joe Biden was named the presumed
presidential-election winner, we have seen a reaction in the
marketplace, and it hasn’t subsided…
“Demand has been strong across the board—any type or
caliber of handgun ammo; small rifle, big rifle, hunting rifle;
even rim-fire—all of it really picked up.

“We make it one day and ship it the next.” “We talk to a big
database of users on a monthly basis, and one thing we’re noting is
that what we call ‘heavy shooters,’ those who shoot 10,000 rounds
or more per year, a lot of them haven’t been purchasing. They’ve
seen the frenzied activity and are holding back in hopes it’ll subside.
Well, we all know what’s going to happen when they work through
their stockpiles and at some point, come back to the market. So,
no, we don’t foresee any slowdown in the demand in 2021.”Jason
Hornady vowed his company is doing everything it can to meet
that demand but not without concerns. “Our workforce has pushed
hard through this but is fatigued. We have an issue finding people
to keep the machines running, and trust me, everyone is working
a lot of hours,” he said. “I was in a camp back in September where
someone commented that such-and-such gun company was
‘shipping only 20 percent more than last year’ and that ‘they just
don’t care about making more.’ Please. There’s no factory of any kind
that doesn’t want to make as much as they possibly can. That’s us.
We’re doing as much, making as much as we can,’ said Hornady. “For
2020, we’ve shipped 30 percent more than we did a year ago. We are
adding capacity, but according to an existing plan.
“I’ve seen shortages six times in my career,” said Hornady, “but the
difference this time is the string of events—Walmart, Virginia [antigun legislature], coronavirus, riots, an influx of [6-7 million] new gun
owners, a bad election. It all adds up. Right then, hunting season
comes along, and you know what consumer is the maddest? The
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ones who normally buy two boxes of deer ammo a year. They go into
their local gun shops and can’t believe [the shelves are bare]. Our
local gun-store owner called to tell me about two guys who came
into his place looking for hunting ammunition, and then they told
him that Hornady has been shut down since June. Crazy!(Zent, 2020)
“At the same time, COVID is a reality for us, too,” said Hornady.
“If an employee has to quarantine, even if they’re not sick, we can’t
just send a loading press home with them. We’ve had to spread out
and guard against super-spreader events so that it won’t shut down
a big part of the factory.”
Both industry leaders cited shortage of raw materials as a
concern, too. Hornady said his firm laid in a “… six-month supply
at the first signs of how serious COVID might be. We’re grateful
that we did, but when you have a six months’ worth of material,
you also have a space problem. And not just copper and lead, it’s
also packaging, staples and other supplies. Did you know there’s
a shortage on the DOT-approved cardboard required for shipping
our loaded ammunition? We’re now having to ship in white boxes
instead of brown ones because we can get more of that.”
Chris Metz echoed that, saying it’s been challenging for his
ammunition brands—Federal, Speer and CCI to keep enough brass
and primers on hand, despite the fact that Federal and CCI are two
of the world’s biggest primer manufacturers.
The same has been true for Vista’s newest brand, Remington
Ammunition, which the outdoor conglomerate acquired in
September. “Both the workers at Remington and those of us from
Vista see this as a marriage made in heaven,” said Metz. “And it
couldn’t have come at a better time from a capacity standpoint.
That factory wasn’t working, which contributed to the shortages.”
The high-production facility in Lonoke, Ark., which for decades
has produced the familiar green-and-yellow-boxed ammunition, is
ramping up this month, offering one glimmer of hope that the
supply side will be buoyed.(Zent, 2020)
“We’ve been working to rehire 400 to 600 furloughed workers,
have been retraining them and getting the manufacturing processes
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back in place,” reported Metz. “Supplies of Remington ammunition
should be coming back on the market in early January. We all grew
up with the brand, we love it, and we know we’re not alone.”
It will also be interesting to see if some of the other names in U.S.
ammunition manufacturing are able to step up production on the
heels of developments in this pivotal industry segment. SIG Sauer,
for one, is operating an ultra-modern plant in Jacksonville, Ark., and
its loads have gained traction with several gun-owner segments.
Sierra Bullets began selling its own branded cartridge a few years
back, primarily hunting rifle cartridges, but the company made a
strong growth statement when it acquired Barnes Bullets during
the Remington Outdoor Corp asset sell-off in late September. The
Barnes installation in Mona, Utah, while not as large as the legacy
brands’ plants, has a history of producing a full range of highly
regarded rifle and pistol ammo, and now that it’s out from under
the Remington corporate umbrella, is expected to again contribute
more to the national supply chain.(Zent, 2020)
A third maker that bears watching is Fiocchi USA, which
announced in July that it will be expanding its stateside
manufacturing by adding a facility in Little Rock, Ark., to supplement
an existing plant in Missouri. Expect to see an expansion in
domestic-made Fiocchi product lines, which produces top-quality
rifle,

pistol

and

shotshell

products.

Furthermore,

Fiocchi

announced it has acquired Baschieri & Pellagri, who’s high-end
shotshells are the gold standard for many European clay’s
competitors and hunters, and they too will be produced in the
United States.
When

contacted,

a

the Winchester and Browning ammunition

spokesman
brands

for
simply

commented: “Like many manufacturers in the shooting-sports
industry, we are experiencing extremely high demand for our
products. We are continuing to manufacture and ship our highquality products on a daily basis.”
Those final words really tell the tale. All hands in the ammunition
industry are waging a daily battle to meet the unprecedented
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demand. Though there are a few reasons to expect supply to
increase, those who know this market best are forecasting
continued shortfalls. AmericanRifleman.org will keep you posted as
developments occur. (Zent, 2020)
Other difficulties affecting the ammunition industry are the fact
that many of the raw materials are no longer manufactured in the
United States.

For example: any lead is either imported or

reworked. Many store owners have claimed they here that primers
are in short supply. It is easy to understand when components can
be made cheaper elsewhere why it would be tempting to outsource
it; however, it makes about as much sense to outsource of critical
computer systems to a country that does not have America’s best
interest at heart.
Let’s play this shortage scenario out to absurdity. Let’s say no
more ammo is ever manufactured ever again. What then? It is
pretty hard to follow a business model in times like these. It is very
easy in business to get in over your head. Scaling up to a new level
of production is not always wish. Yes you can increase output of
existing machines and increase schedules. But to what percent? If
you over commit in times like this by purchasing more equipment,
what happens if there is a return to productions levels prior to the
pandemic, administration change, hording and fear purchasing?
You could easily bankrupt a busy in uncertain business cycles, like
too much demand. Better to stay in business and let frustrations
play out.
Let’s not forget the North Korean’s gave a U.S. lead NATO army a
run for their money in the 1950’s. (Figure 5.21) There source of small
arms ammunition was created underground in caves and still almost
defeated NATO. Production can be increased but to what level and
how long can that be sustained in a society where people perform
based on greed rather than with a whip at their backs.
Figure 5.21 N. Korean small arms manufacturing
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Source: (Netflix, 2021)
How do we get away from all the scarcity? What paradigm shift
can occur? Well, it already has!

There are individuals that believe

they can reproduce or substitute materials by either acquiring them
from other sources or recycle parts that are somewhat available.
The problems these individuals will encounter is substandard
materials/parts. They will be difficult to obtain and most likely
inconsistent in quality. This is not what I would consider a good
replacement for the current ammunition industry. By no means
could scavenging parts ever attain the level of production needed
to supply all gun enthusiasts with replaceable ammunition. Because
the base elements for bullets would have to come from such things
as old car batteries, dental waste, plumbing waste, wheel weights,
scrap yards, thrift stores, or maybe old sailboat ballasts/keels, yard
sales, roofing companies. Then there would have to be knowledge
of component assembly. Building dyes and running a foundry would
be another skill-set most will never have.

What about the

propellant? Will you have the license to create your own propellant
or knowledge? Not only is it illegal to manufacture explosives
because personal and public safety would be in danger if every gun
enthusiasts were running around trying to manufacture their own
propellants. Casing and primers, where would they come from?
The paradigm may have already shifted right under the noises
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of the gun world. There may already be a replacement for the
gun and its history of using propellants that detonate. Who needs
gunpowder when you have air??
Figure 5.22 AirForce Texan

Source: (Depot, 2020)
AirForce Air guns (Figure 5.22) says this is the most powerful
production air rifle in the world. It shoots .45-caliber lead
projectiles at up to 1,000 fps for over 500 foot-pounds of energy.
This is a single-shot, precharged pneumatic with a sidelever action
and a 490-cubic-centimeter pressure tank equipped with a built-in
pressure-relief device. It will effectively contain up to 3,000 psi of
pressure. (Larson, 2015)
Several calibers of air rifles are being manufactured and many
of the States are allowing hunting with these air guns. Calibers
range from .177, .22, .25, .30, .338, .45, .50. There are .25 caliber guns
that can shoot up to 60 times before needing a charge. Air guns
you could argue are in their infancy much like the early musket
muzzle loading guns. As materials, design, and projectiles improve
its anyone guess to the level of quality, accuracy, and stopping
power these forms of weapons could achieve.
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Figure 5.23 Hatsan Big Bore Carnivore

Source: (Depot, 2020)
Figure 5.24 Whitetail with an Airgun
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Source: (Clayton, 2019)
A 45 caliber Airforce Air guns Texan air rifle on the Dale River
Ranch (www.daleriverranch.com) to harvest a whitetail buck with
an air rifle. (Clayton, 2019)
The air rifle may not be the only firearm that totally disrupts the
powdered firearm industry. A new kid is on the block and he is
definitely in his infancy but shows beautiful room for improvement
that would definitely be at its matchlock stage. What gun am I
referring to you may wonder!! The hand-held coil gun. This gun
is definitely in its infancy. Even though this gun appear to bigger
and bulker, it tends to be lighter. That is because it is not slinging
around bunches of weight from the cartridge ammo. Thanks to lead
being too heavy. However, the coil gun makes some weight up with
coils that are heavy. (See Figure 5.25)
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Figure 5.25 Coil gun

Source: (YouTube, 2021)

Conclusions
Since 2020 ammunition has become less available for all calibers
in all places. Retailers, in store and online have seen less and less
ammunition come into theirs stores. The manufactures have
claimed to step up their operations. But it seems to still be getting
worse. The claim is the COVID, safety fears, hording, administration
changes, increased gun ownership is having something to do with
the lack of availability. It may not be the agenda, but the hard reality
is that by not keeping the store shelfs stocked it has the effect of
disarming the American public. And let’s not forget the incoming
administration has been noted for saying they want to take the guns
away. Whatever the situation really is, people dedicated to having
guns will switch to using something as air rifles. If they then try to
regulate air, the author will have to claim that the desire to disarm
the American public was the desire from the beginning. So rather
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than the air guns being the disruption, the government is the true
disrupter.
Questions
1. What basic components and tools are necessary to load you
own ammunition?
2. What would be necessary to build a small factory, secure the
basic materials and manufacture ammunition at less than 50%
of the market price. Develop the economic business model and
consider the regulatory and public responses. Consider risks.
Consider expected profit and market share.
3. What legal / international / ATF road blocks must be hurdled
to import components not readily available as surplus or
recycled materials?
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(something); encroach on” and “actively break the terms of (a law,
agreement, etc.) (Wiki Dictionary, 2021)
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6. Future Proof Security
[Shields]
Student Learning Objectives
Using IEC 62443 and other evolving standards, as inspiration for
requirements, Chapter 6 is dedicated to the importance of both
security

and

authentication

in

providing

secure

integrity

management for systems now and the foreseeable future.
The student will be introduced to Autonomous Key Management
(AKM) and its importance in replacing Blockchain – because it is
more secure and offers advanced features against quantum
computing.
Security Landscape
New and evolving threats to security include not only attacks
on the security of the protected assets (both “in-motion” and “at
rest”), but also to the validity of the protected assets. Requirements
focused on both simultaneously securing the data as well as
authenticating the source of the data are rapidly increasing in
significance.
Standards like IEC 62443 (ISA, 2021), have evolved over the past
five years to address this exact problem. IEC 62443 specifies a
framework to address and mitigate current and future security
vulnerabilities in industrial automation and control systems (IACSs).
It also provides a firm foundation for other industries that are
neither mission critical nor safety critical, but whose applications
are just as important to their stakeholders and for whom value
security and authentication as much as the stakeholders in mission
critical and safety critical applications.
Security and Protecting Critical Assets
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Malware on the rise and intruders increasing the scope,
sophistication, and frequency of their attacks, the realization has
been made that encryption alone cannot protect a system. The
consensus is that a more wholistic approach must be taken and this
is where IEC 62443 and other similar methodologies come to bear.
(Michelle Michael, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, TÜV NORD
GROUP, 2021)[1]
In parallel, those whose responsibility it is to provide network and
asset security have accepted the notion that breaches are inevitable
and thus, constant analysis of the system and its assets must be
done perpetually for the life of the system. What this means, is that
it is not enough to simply focus on protecting files and/or data.
The focus initially shifted to intrusion detection, but then quickly
expanded beyond that to include monitoring the entire system and
integrity management.
Each data set, each hardware element, and each electronic
component, must be identified, verified, and validated:
Asset Authentication = Asset Identity Validation + Asset Identity
Verification

(Eq 6.1)

Identity Validation refers to the concept that the identity is valid.
That it is real. For instance, the verification of a social security
number will determine if the number is a legitimate social security
number, but not necessarily if it belongs to a specific individual.
Identity Verification refers to the concept that the validated
identity is verified as being associated with the context it is being
tested for. Again, using the concept of a social security number, not
only is the social security number valid (i.e., associated with a real,
living person), but it is indeed associated with the specific person
who is claiming it as their own.
Put the two together and the result asset authentication.
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By authenticating each asset, the integrity of the overall system
is maintained. Additionally, authenticated physical assets, can then,
themselves, become trust anchors and a means for extending the
overall integrity and security of the entire system.
One-time authentication is not sufficient for protecting the
overall system integrity. It is a process that must be repeated from
power-on to power-down/reset and for the lifetime of each
individual device and the system as a whole.
The driving factor for this is that the issues and concerns of what
was once the dilemma of the Information Technology (IT) domain
has now crept into the Operational Technology (OT)[2] domain as
well. It is especially true for the critical infrastructure subset portion
of OT represented by Industrial Automation Control Systems. This
is because in an effort to interconnect OT and IT systems, OT
systems now have many of the same components as IT. Thus, they
automatically inherit and/or are susceptible to the same problems.
The problem with that is while there are plenty of security
solutions for IT, OT presents a more difficult landscape to protect
because of its diversity of systems, including systems that are
comprised of many (if not all) proprietary solutions.
The below Table 6.1, obtained from a whitepaper created by
TUViT (Michelle Michael, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, TÜV
NORD GROUP, 2021), illustrates the disparity differences between
traditional IT Security and IACS Security (and is also largely true
for many OT systems because of proprietary and non-standard OT
implementations):
Table 6.1: Differences between Traditional IT Security and IACS
Security
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Security
Topic

Antivirus

Office IT
Systems

IACS Systems

complicated &
difficult to
widely used
implement
& updated

Life Cycle

3-5 years

Awareness

Good

5-20 years

Not Good

Patch
Often
Management

Rare, approval
from plant
Manufacturers

Change
Regular &
Management Scheduled

Rare

Evaluation of Established
Log files
practice

Unusual
practice

Time
Dependency

Delays
acceptable

Critical

Availability

Not always
available;
failure
accepted

24/7

IT Security
Awareness

Good

Poor

Security
tests

Widespread

Rare &
Problematic

Testing
environment

Available

Rarely
available

Security
Audits

Regular &
expected

Rare &
avoided
(Editor added)

Source: (Michelle Michael, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, TÜV
NORD GROUP, 2021)
The takeaway from Table 6.1 is that while IT systems are
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challenged to keep up with the rapidly changing and increasing
complex and sophisticated security attacks, OT faces almost
insurmountable obstacles to overcome just to get near the same
level of protection as IT. The challenge for OT Industrial Automation
Control Systems they are almost always managing

critical

infrastructure that must operate in an environment of continued
availability and stability. Not only is there an additional constraint
that these systems can ill-afford to go offline because of the safety
concerns of the resources they are managing, but these systems
must be continually operational.
The foundation of why new and more comprehensive approaches
for providing security and integrity services to OT, particular those
managing critical infrastructure, have evolved. But one need not
think that these approaches are limited to and benefit only OT
critical infrastructure systems. These approaches also can provide
great benefit to IT based systems, particular those which directly or
indirectly impact the very fabric of our society.
Protecting Industrial Control Systems via Comprehensive &
Secure Integrity Management & Monitoring
Having now established that security solutions for systems
require more than simply encryption of data. That the basic
integrity of those systems must also be maintained. The question
then becomes, how to do this?
First, it will be easier and more straightforward to consider
systems whose operating environment can be limited. That is
systems that operate mostly as closed systems, with little to no
interaction

to

external

networks.

Second,

and

with

the

aforementioned in mind, focusing on Industrial Control Systems
(ICS) will have the greatest impact. As these systems can least
afford to have a breach and the resultant behavior as consequence
of a breach, can be catastrophic to both human life and property.
Protecting these systems provides the ultimate ROI, by saving both
money and human life.
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Given this focus, the logical progression for thoroughly examining
the challenges Industrial Control Systems face:
1) Describe characteristics of what sets Industrial Control Systems
apart from typical IT systems.
2) Outline what an ideal solution would be
3) Given the ideal solution provided in (2) above, describe how
current solutions fit within this framework, and
4) Provide alternative, perhaps yet to be defined solutions that can
address the goals of the framework described in 2) above.
Secure Communication & Integrity Management & Monitoring
Challenges for Industrial Control Systems
Systems which are typically considered as Industrial Control
Systems, usually manage mission and/or safety critical types of
systems, including critical infrastructure systems (that manage
essential services). Typical examples of such systems are:
•

Electricity: Power Generation and Power Distribution.

•

Petroleum/Natural Gas: Exploration, Extraction, Pipeline,
Production.

•

Wastewater: Treatment/Purification.

•

Transportation:
◦
◦

Aviation: Traffic Control, Aviation Vehicles.
Rail: Traffic Control (BackOffice, Wayside, and Onboard),
Other non-traffic, onboard systems.

◦

Maritime: Traffic Control, Onboard Shipping Control
systems.

◦

Automotive: Traffic Control, Individual Vehicle Control
systems.

•

Manufacturing

•

Mining

These systems come under a variety of names:
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•

Industrial Control Systems (ICS).

•

Operational Technology (OT).

•

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA).

•

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC).

•

Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID).

And, usually have most, if not all of the following characteristics:
• Communication within the system is local to the closed system.
Typical examples of this would be virtually all vehicles and
other types of mission and/or safety critical systems.
• Hardware components are static and do not change. Thus, all
possible combinations of communication paths are known up
front.
• Communication may be physically and/or logically separated
into mission/safety critical communication and non-mission/
non-safety critical communication.
• Updating of traditional security credentials is often physically
prohibitive, difficult to do, and/or financially impractical or
costly. Some practical examples of this are:

• Updating the security credentials in automotive vehicles would
be inordinately costly and practically impossible in all cases
given that some vehicles may never visit an authorized service
center to connect to the OEM backend server.
• Remote updating of security credentials of high-security
military installations is usually prohibited and done locally.
Making the overall security credential update process
inordinately costly.
• Remote updating of security credentials of space systems is
problematic both for reasons of security and practicality
(including huge delays because of time and distance from
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Earth).
• Updating of security credentials within nuclear facilities must
be done locally. Making the overall security credential update
process inordinately costly.
• Availability for many of these systems must be at or close to
100%. Meaning, the systems they control must remain online
24-hours a day, 365-days a year, without interruption. Systems
that fall under this category usually have double or triple
redundancy systems, but if there is a security breach,
depending upon the redundancy is achieved, it may easily affect
all of the redundant systems as well.
These systems, particularly those protecting critical infrastructure,
are considered to be excellent targets by potential attackers. A
successful attack on such a system can incur a huge loss to both a
country and its economy.
Even though these systems usually have limited (or restricted)
external network connectivity, because of their operational
requirements and the aforementioned potentially catastrophic
consequences in the event of failure or breach, their security
requirements are far more demanding than most IT based systems.
Careful thought must be given as to what the ideal solution would
be to solve the security and integrity challenge for Industrial
Control Systems.
The next section focuses on collating suggested requirements for
providing security and integrity management to Industrial Control
Systems, keeping in mind, the demanding nature of their
operational environment.
Ideal Secure Communication & Integrity Management &
Monitoring Requirements for Industrial Control Systems
Before delving into the suggested requirements, the concept of
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a security relationship must be defined. Which is, a security
relationship is a set of two or more endpoints that form a
communication network sharing a common set of security
credentials. Another way of viewing the concept of security
relationship would be that of a “security mesh”, given that the set
of endpoints is not restricted to point-to-point communication, but
rather multipoint to multipoint communication.
Logically, it is easier to break this task into two sections.
First, is to examine what the ideal security solution should look
like. Then, using the security framework specified for the ideal
security solution, the ideal Integrity Management framework can
then be examined as well.

Ideal Secure Communication Requirements for
Industrial Control Systems

Features

and

associated

reasoning

for

each

suggested

requirement are provided below:
• Security Credentials should be unique per security relationship,
with no interdependencies on security credentials of other
security relationships. Different security relationships should
have nothing in common with other security relationships.
• Shared secrets that could lead to a breach of one or more security
relationships, shall not be communicated between hardware
modules and preferably, are never exposed outside of a
hardware module’s secure storage. Implies, security
credentials are pre-provisioned, with no key exchange.
• Security credentials should never be static and should be
updated/refreshed on a regular basis.
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• Security credentials should not be predictable.
• Security credentials should have Perfect Forward Secrecy (even if
someone discovers the current security credentials, it should
not give them any insight as to what prior security credentials
were).
• A single set of security credentials should be capable of securing
a communication mesh of two or more nodes. That is, it shall be
possible to have security relationships of more than two nodes
(i.e., a multipoint, security mesh and not simply a P2P security
connection). This is a property of scalability.
• Hardware Modules may have multiple, overlaying
communication security relationships. Ideally, these security
relationships shall be application specific and enable different
virtual communication security relationships within the same
hardware module. Hardware Modules may have multiple,
overlaying communication security relationships. Ideally,
these security relationships shall be application specific and
enable different virtual communication security relationships
within the same hardware module. This is also a scalability
property.
• Capable of authenticating the transmitting hardware module.
• Has little to zero latency (zero ideally) (There is no session
establishment phase, implying that it automatically comes up
in “bulk encryption” mode).
• Capable of providing same level of security to small hardware
modules (ex. sensors) with minimal processing and storage
capabilities, ideally, security related algorithms are of linear
complexity and utilize less than 15-KB in executable and
runtime storage requirements.
• Initial Provisioning of new security credentials shall be
autonomous.
• Refreshing of security credentials shall be both frequent and
autonomous
• Prevention of Replay Attacks should be a built-in feature.
• Must be quantum resilient. With the advent of quantum
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computing on the horizon and serious discussions about the
negative implications for existing security, particularly the
asymmetric algorithms used for sharing the bulk encryption
key in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). It is imperative that any
proposed ideal solution be absolutely quantum resilient.
The basis for each requirement is:

Unique Security Credentials per Relationship
Ensuring

uniqueness

amongst

different

sets

of

security

relationships eliminates the possibility that a breach of the security
credentials can provide insight into the credentials of other security
relationships (as would be the case with a PKI asymmetric
encryption breach of one Public Key/Private Key pair could lead to
the breach of other Public Key/Private Key pairs).

No Communication of Shared Secrets
Eliminating communication of shared secrets prevents the attacker
from directly discovering security credentials exchanged over the
communication network. Elimination of shared secrets has the
side-benefit of mitigating Man-In-The-Middle attacks, as it severely
minimizes useful information an unwanted observer could use to
launch such an attack.
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Continually Refreshed Security Credentials
Security credentials should be updated frequently. Ideally, they
should be updated every session, so that the security credentials are
constantly moving target.

Security Credentials Cannot be Derived/Predicted
What this means is that even if an attacker gains access to a prior
set of credentials, they should not be able to predict what future
sets of credentials are. Credentials should have a legitimate amount
of randomness within the security credential creation process to
ensure future iterations cannot be mathematically derived or
predicted.

Security Credentials should have Perfect Forward Secrecy
This is a follow-on to the previous requirement, but in the opposite
direction. What this requirement means is that in the event of a
breach and if the current security credentials are compromised,
there is no way to backwards engineer what prior sets of security
credentials were. In other words, if an unwanted observer had
recorded prior sessions, a breach to the current set of security
credentials would not enable them to decrypt prior sessions that
had been previously recorded.
Security Credentials shall be Capable of Protecting Multipoint
Networks (i.e., creating a Security Mesh)
It shall be possible to have security relationships of more than two
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nodes (i.e., a multipoint, security mesh and not simply a P2P security
connection). Thus, increasing the scalability of a solution.

Hardware Endpoints may Have Multiple, Overlaying
Security Relationships
This

is

another

scalability

property

by

allowing

security

relationships to be application specific with different virtual
communication security relationships across one or more of the
same physical hardware components. Thus, enabling hardware
endpoints to have multiple, overlaying communication security
relationships.

Authenticates Hardware Endpoint
Automatic authentication of the hardware endpoint both ensures
against hardware spoofing as well as establishing the hardware
endpoint as a local trust anchor.

Significantly Mitigates Latency
Ideally, latency is reduced down to zero, as an efficient solution will
not have a session establishment phase.
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Provides Consistent High-Level Grade Security Regardless of
Processing Capability
The solution should be capable of providing the same high-level
of security to small hardware modules (ex. sensors) with minimal
processing and storage capabilities as it does with more capable
hardware architectures. Ideally, security related algorithms are of
linear complexity and utilize are capable of being compressed down
to 15-KB or less in executable and runtime storage requirements.

Initial Provisioning of New Security Credentials is
Autonomous
This feature significantly mitigates need for administrative
personnel by enabling automatic new security relationships to be
established without need for administrative oversight. The most
obvious way to implement this into a security relationship would
provide for an in-network management device the ability to
automatically configure new security relationships in accordance
with the direction of a downloaded (or modified) configuration file
or database.

Autonomous and Frequent Refreshed/Updated New Security
Credentials
This feature significantly mitigates need for administrative
personnel by enabling the frequent, automatic update of new
security credentials for perpetuity, presumably in accordance with
some preconfigured policy.
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Elimination of Replay Attacks
This is an easy enough feature to implement by including an
unmodifiable replay counter within every frame.

Must be Quantum Resilient
Effectively, this means that no brute force attack with infinite
resources is capable of breaching the security.

Ideal Integrity Management Requirements for
Industrial Control Systems
As will be obvious after reviewing the requirements, many of the
requirements for the ideal Integrity Management & Monitoring
(IM&M) solution are identical or closely related to the requirements
for the ideal Secure Communication solution. Thus, the ideal IM&M
solution should be based on the ideal Secure Communication
solution and listed below.

The IM&M Validates Hardware Endpoint
Automatic authentication of the hardware endpoint both ensures
against hardware spoofing as well as establishing the hardware
endpoint as a local trust anchor. This is identical to the Ideal Secure
Communication requirement.
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The IM&M Validates Every Software Component
Every electronic image that is part of the core application and
required supporting infrastructure should be validated. This usually
consists of a minimum of:
1) The Bootloader.
2) The Runtime Operating System Environment.
3) The Core Application (that implements the actual functionality
for which the hardware module was designed).
4) Related Data Files.

Validates Every Subsystem
Every subsystem should be validated, where a subsystem is defined
to be a collection of logically grouped, hardware modules.

Validates Every System
Every system should be validated, where a system is defined to be
a collection of all subsystems and/or hardware modules within a
physically distinct system

The Integrity Management & Monitoring System Shall
Enforce the System Configuration
Every hardware module, subsystem, system and shall be defined as
designated by a resultant configuration management file capturing
the configuration of each individual hardware module, subsystem,
and overall system.
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Enforcement of the System Configuration shall occur for the
Life of the System
The configuration specified for the overall system, its individual
subsystems, and hardware modules shall be enforced throughout
the life of the system from cradle to grave to comply with the
specified configuration (which can and usually will change over
time).

Enforcement of the System Configuration shall occur
Continuously in Periodic Intervals During Runtime
Every aspect of the configuration, including the overall system
itself, the subsystems within the system, and the hardware
endpoints within the subsystems, shall be re-validated on a
continual, periodic basis throughout the life of the system, including
and especially during runtime.

The System Configuration Shall be Simple and Crosschecked
with Other Components and Subsystems within an
Individual System
The

validation

process

shall

be

simple,

immutable,

and

crosschecked with other components and subsystems within the
system. Thus, ensuring that one module within a subsystem cannot
be changed without simultaneously altering all other modules
within the same subsystem.

Normal Operation of the Ideal IM&M, including
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Enforcement of the System Configuration, Shall be
Autonomous
The system

should

be simple

and explicitly designed to

automatically enforce the system configuration, so as to mitigate
the possibility of nefarious alteration of the associated image
integrity code and/or image. To ensure absolute compliance,
images and their integrity codes can be configured to be crosschecked again immediately prior to them being loaded. Of course,
this is the age-old tradeoff of security verses efficiency, and will be
determined by the individual customer.
At a minimum, an image to be loaded should have its integrity
code recalculated just prior to it be being loaded, to ensure it
matches the integrity code value held within the local hardware
store of the secure element.

Hardware Endpoints May be Members of Multiple
Subsystems Simultaneously
This enables overlaying of security relationships in accordance with
customer defined groupings and is an extension to the Secure
Communication requirement stating that Hardware Endpoints may
have multiple, overlaying, security relationships.
All Communication Between Logical Elements within the
System Shall be Secure
All communication between logical elements shall use a secure
communication solution that meets the requirements of an ideal
secure communication solution outlined previously.
How do Current Solutions fit within the Outlined Ideal
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Framework for Secure Communication and Integrity Management
& Monitoring?
It should come as no surprise that existing solutions (ex. PKI + TLS
and/or Blockchain) do not fit within the ideal outlined framework.
The reason for this is simple. The ideal solution was derived with
the goal in mind of solving issues currently plaguing existing
solutions. This set of ideal requirements was created with the
specific goal of correcting problems that have been discovered over
time in how security and integrity management & monitoring works
today. Thus, the only way to truly address these problems is with
a new solution that is specifically and explicitly designed to solve
these problems.

Current Solutions vs. the Ideal Secure
Communication Solution
It is nonetheless instructive to compare the ideal requirements with
the nominal solutions in use today, namely, the Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) Key Management System (KMS) and the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) communication security protocol.

How Do PKI + TLS Address the Ideal Requirements for
Secure Communication?
Unique Security Credentials per Relationship

PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
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PKI is explicitly designed to enable one to many relationships,
for as long as the security credential is in operation. Effectively,
PKI is designed to explicitly violate this principal. Further, for many
closed systems (like automotive passenger vehicles), their PKI
certificate may never be updated. Thus, leaving a single certificate
for the life of the vehicle.

No Communication of Shared Secrets
PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
The asymmetric key exchange phase of PKI is used to share the
symmetric key used for bulk encryption with the other side of the
PKI/TLS connection.

Continually Refreshed Security Credentials
PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
In many ICS/OT/SCADA/Etc. applications, security credentials
are changed at best, every 9-12 months. In the case of automotive
and automotive related passenger vehicles, these credentials may
never be changed and could be static for the life of the vehicle.
In the automotive vertical, the logic used to defend this decision
is simple:
1) It would be both prohibitively costly and physically impractical
to update the security credentials in automotive vehicles.
2) Because automotive vehicles are closed systems, the likelihood
and impact of a breach is relatively small.
Where that logic falls apart is simple. The goal of an attacker is
not necessarily a total and complete takeover of every system. The
goal of the attacker is varied and victory for some attackers could be
achieved if they were able to significantly disrupt a specific industry,
infrastructure, or company. A complete devastation of the economy
would be at the top of the list of their wildest fantasies.
Future Proof Security [Shields] | 285

Just like prior to September 11th, 2001, it was inconceivable that
someone would hijack a plane for the sole purpose of crashing it
into a building. Similarly, if a state sponsored attacker wanted to
significantly disrupt the economy, they would not need to hack
all automotive vehicles, most vehicles, or even a large plurality of
vehicles. A very minute subset, strategically placed, would do just
fine.
We already know that many of these attackers have engineering
backgrounds and could easily work within any number of vehicle
manufacturers. All it takes is time, motivation, and planning and
anything is possible. (Department of Sociology, University of Oxford,
Manor Road Oxford OX1 3UQ, 2008) [3]
Transportation Terrorist Scenario [4]
Let’s take the following example. (CENSEC, DK, 2019)
Suppose a state sponsored terrorist organization was able to gain
insight into the security credentials used for twenty vehicles each
of five of the major automotive companies. Meaning, a total of 100
vehicles. Suppose also they were patient in planning this, with their
plans measured in years, not months or days.
If you had personnel who worked at these automotive
manufacturers, discovering the security credentials programmed
into a small subset of vehicles is very much within the scope of
reality.
Now, suppose they planned the attack as such:
1) On the first day of the attack, they took over control of ten (10)
vehicles of OEM brand 1 during peak traffic hours, causing all the
ten vehicles to crash.
2) One week later, the attackers launch the second attack. This
time doing the same thing to ten (10) vehicles of OEM brand 2.
3) Then, just to mix things up a little, the attackers waited for two
weeks and one day, and launched a similar attack on ten vehicles of
OEM brand 3.
4) Then, some arbitrary number of days later, they launched the
same attack on ten vehicles of OEM brand 4.
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5) They wait another arbitrary period of time and launch another
attack on ten vehicles of OEM brand 5.
6) They, then wait another arbitrary period of time and launch a
second attack on five vehicles of OEM brand 1.
7) They again wait some arbitrary period of time and launch a
second attack on five vehicles of OEM brand 2.
Keeping in mind that at this point, they still have forty (40)
vehicles at their disposal, how far into this series of attacks do you
think it would take before significant numbers of people simply
stopped driving their cars? The answer is, of course rhetorical, one
should look no further than the current COVID-19 crisis to know
this would devastate our infrastructure, our trust in government,
our economy, and our entire way of life as we know it.
Now, to add a bit of excitement into this thought experiment,
suppose that they anticipated that people would at some point
switch to mass transit, so they also infiltrated companies that
manufactured busses used for public transportation. Thus, after
there was significant paranoia and anxiety created by the
automotive vehicle attacks, they started doing the same thing to
public transportation.
Suppose they anticipated that if people stopped using both
private and public transportation, they would switch to a workfrom-home based economy as a stopgap measure. Thus, delivery
trucks would become even more important than they are today.
Suppose this really patient group of attackers, had also infiltrated
companies that made delivery trucks for companies like DHL,
FedEx, and UPS, and launched similar attacks on these delivery
trucks.
Now, for the final coup de grâce, they also infiltrated
manufacturers of semi-trucks, doing the same sort of attacks with
them, and thus affecting how the vast majority of goods are
transported significant distances.
Think about this!
People would stop driving!
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People would stop taking public transportation (at least they
would stop using busses)!
People working for delivery company would demand something
be done before they drive their vehicles again!
Truckers would stop driving and like the delivery truck drivers,
would demand something be done before they drive their vehicles
again.
Without question, the entire economy of the Western World
would come to a grinding halt.
All of this damage could be done to the entire combined
economies of U.S., Canada, U.K., and Europe, just by having the
ability to hack into less than 200-different vehicles.
All of this could have been avoided if the security credentials were
constantly changing, not predictable, and maintained within a
tamper resistant KeyStore.
This is well within the realm of reality and it is not a matter of “if”,
but “when” someone decides to do this.
Until then, the automotive and related industries will continue
to ignore these warnings, citing the extreme unlikelihood of this
happening, just like flying planes into buildings seemed equally
unlikely prior to 9/11/2001.
The automotive vertical is an extreme case, most other verticals
within the ICS/OT/SCADA/Etc. landscape do not maintain static
certificates. Most other verticals do update their certificates on a
regular basis, but as stated in the beginning of this section, this is
a period of time that is measured in months and not weeks or days
(with the recommended period being every 9-12 months). Thus,
leaving as a static target the certificate until it is updated and, in
a world, where quantum computing has been presupposed to be
a legitimate threat to traditional cryptographic methodologies like
PKI and TLS, this does present a significant problem once quantum
computing is available.
Even without the availability of quantum computing, traditional
cryptographic methods are vulnerable if the attacker is able to
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garner even a minimum amount of information about the
certificate. From there, it would just be a matter of time before the
security credentials were fully or even partially hacked. The longer
the time between updates, the greater the exposure of the security
credentials.

Security Credentials Cannot be Derived/Predicted
PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
If the static certificate is breached in any way, even partially, the
derived security credentials are predictable.

Security Credentials should have Perfect Forward Secrecy
PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
PKI’s version of Forward secrecy typically uses an ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman key exchange to prevent reading past traffic. The
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange is often signed by the
server using a static signing key. If an adversary can steal (or obtain
through a court order) this static (long term) signing key, the
adversary can masquerade as the server to the client and as the
client to the server and implement a classic Man-in-the-Middle
attack.

Security Credentials shall be Capable of Protecting Multipoint
Networks (i.e., creating a Security Mesh)
PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
Standard PKI (plus TLS) is limited to binary security relationships.
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Thus, in order for multiple nodes to participate in a multimode
secured connection, there must either be an extension/deviation
added to PKI (plus TLS) or multiple PKI security relationships must
be created in order to provide secure communication to
interconnect all nodes within the proposed security mesh.
Example: In order to interconnect 50-nodes using PKI (plus TLS),
you would need 1,225 (i.e., [(n-1) + (n-2) + (n-3) + … 3+ + 2 + 1] or
[((n-1)**2 + (n-1))/2]) separate PKI (plus TLS) connections.

Hardware Endpoints may Have Multiple, Overlaying Security
Relationships
PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
The PKI Public Key/Private key pair is usually reserved for ALL
communication between EXACTLY two nodes and does not usually
allow different security credentials for different applications
between the same two nodes.

Authenticates Hardware Endpoint
PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
This is not a capability of either PKI or TLS.

Significantly Mitigates Latency
PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
PKI requires initialization of security credentials (the asymmetric
key exchange phase) before it can begin its initial encryption
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session. How does this address or violate the previously stated IIoT
Security Ideals?
• Requires an additional step prior to being able to initiate bulk
encryption.
• By definition, an asymmetric key exchange is significantly
greater than linear complexity.
• In order to avoid initial delay, PKI security credentials (the bulk
encryption key shared by the Public Key/Private Key, key
exchange) may remain static for a period of time.
TLS always requires a session establishment phase, prior to any bulk
encryption phase starting (meaning, in addition to any delay added
by PKI, TLS has its own delay).

Provides Consistent High-Level Grade Security Regardless of
Processing Capability
Possible PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
Not automatically a violation, but because of the asymmetric
encryption,

key

exchange

phase,

as

well

as

TLS

session

establishment, PKI (plus TLS) is challenged when it comes to
processor architectures with minimal amounts of processing power
and/or storage capacity.

Initial Provisioning of New Security Credentials is
Autonomous
Possible PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
Initial provisioning of the PKI certificate itself is definitely a
violation, but that is so infrequently done, it is not really worth
considering here. Insofar as the security credentials themselves,
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the vast majority of the time, the policy will be that new security
credentials will be issued when the TLS session is renewed (which
could be frequent).

Autonomous and Frequent Refreshed/Updated New Security
Credentials
Possible PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
The vast majority of the time, policy will dictate that new/
refreshed security credentials will be issued when the TLS session
is renewed (which could be frequent).

Elimination of Replay Attacks
Possible PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
TLS only protects the transport and thus it provides protection
against modifying or replaying of the encrypted data only. It does
not protect against any kind of modifications or replaying of the
data before the encryption or after decryption. Sending the same
data again over a TLS connection is actually perfectly valid. The
cryptographic nonce and timestamp that are used to detect replay
attacks do not protect against modification or replaying. The sender
can still use the same data but “protect” these “replayed data
frames” with a new cryptographic nonce and a new timestamp.

Must be Quantum Resilient
Possible PKI (plus TLS) Violation!
While no one will argue that PKI in its current form is quantum
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resilient, there are efforts under way to modify PKI in order to make
it quantum resilient. Perhaps this is possible, but it will be just
another band-aid that increases the threat surface of PKI and does
not fit within anyone’s concept of an ideal secure communication
solution.
In fact, Roger Grimes, a well-known, published security expert
had this to say about quantum computing and traditional security
mechanisms:[5]
“Quantum computers will likely soon break traditional public key
cryptography, including the ciphers protecting most of the world’s
digital

secrets.

These

soon-to-be-broken

protocols

and

components include HTTPS, TLS, SSH, PKI, digital certificates, RSA,
DH, ECC, most Wi-Fi networks, most VPNs, smartcards, HSMs, most
cryptocurrencies, and most multifactor authentication devices that
rely on public key crypto. If the list just included HTTPS and TLS,
it would cover most of the Internet. On the day that quantum
computing breaks traditional public crypto, every captured secret
protected by those protocols and mechanisms will be readable.”
(Cryptography Apocalypse Preparing for the Day When Quantum
Computing Breaks Today’s Crypto, 2021)

Current Solutions vs. the Ideal Integrity
Management & Monitoring Solution
When considering technologies for configuration management, a
common technology for consideration is blockchain, mostly
because of its immutable ledger capabilities.

Thus, given

blockchain’s relative popularity in this regard, it will be examined
for its capabilities as an Ideal Integrity Management & Monitoring
solution.
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How Does Blockchain Address the Ideal Requirements for
Integrity Management & Monitoring?
Blockchain is a technology (and not a product) that is primarily used
for protecting the integrity of the information stored within the
Blockchain. Thus, any Integrity Management & Monitoring product
based on Blockchain will need to be developed, since it is not an
inherent feature of blockchain.
Blockchain certainly has the fundamental infrastructure to
address Integrity Management & Monitoring, but in addition to
whatever effort it will take to first design and then subsequently
implement an IM&M application, Blockchain is well-known for being
a heavy and overly complex solution.
Therefore, because Blockchain is overly complex and heavy, any
implementation utilizing blockchain will certainly fall short in terms
of processing overhead, ease of use, complexity, security (given that
it is based on encrypting its data via PKI), etc. Thus, it is relatively
straightforward to eliminate consideration of blockchain without
going into further detail.
Provide Solutions that Address the Goals for Ideal Secure
Communication and Integrity Management & Monitoring (IM&M)
There are such solutions that exist today. As of November of
2020, a leading manufacturer of trains in it is now the official IM&M
preferred solution for a major rail manufacturer in Germany has
adopted the AKM-based Ideal Integrity Management & Monitoring
solution for all of their trains being built in the future and addresses
all facets of CENELEC 50701 (a new rail standard adopted in May of
2020 and still in a draft state, that was specifically designed to be
the rail application of the ISO standard, IEC 62443 (ISA, 2021) and
scheduled for release in mid-2021). (European Railway Association,
2020)
Earlier, it was stated that he ideal IM&M solution should be built
on top of a solution that meets the aforementioned specified goals
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for an ideal secure communication solution. In keeping with this
philosophy, that is exactly what was done for the IM&M solution
described here.

Autonomous Key Management (AKM), the Ideal
Secure Communication Solution
The secure communication solution is a concept known as
Autonomous Key Management (AKM) and was initially conceived
in November of 2014 to provide complete communication security
for automotive vehicles. (SAE International, USA, 2017) (SAE
International, USA, 2017)
AKM is both a Decentralized, Distributed, Ledger-Based, Key
Management System (KMS) and Multi-point communication
security protocol layer. AKM can naturally act as a drop-in
replacement for PKI + TLS. AKM uses a Broadcast Architecture, that
supports true, multi-point end-to-end encryption. [6]
AKM ideally sits on top of UDP and/or TCP and can be
implemented directly on top of a physical layer driver using a
proprietary thin transport layer. And, in fact, it has even been
integrated into the MAC layer of a transceiver as the security layer
for a deterministic, industrial wireless communication protocol.
Below is a list of AKM features and the underlying basis for how
each feature is provided:
• Maintenance Free – Once a security group has been
provisioned, no external maintenance should ever be required
(thus, all AKM relationships are self-maintained and
decentralized and require no external maintenance once
provisioning has been completed).
• Real-time Data Analytics – Because AKM is a protocol, Data
Analytics are available on a per frame basis and thus, in realFuture Proof Security [Shields] | 295

time.
• Intrusion Detection – Because Data Analytics can be constant
and immediate, if enabled, intrusion detection is a natural
extendable feature of AKM.
• Automatic Breach Recovery and Re-provisioning – If enabled
because Intrusion Detection is a natural extendable feature,
automatic re-provisioning of infected relationships can be reconfigured according to policy. Thus, effectively neutralizing
threats as soon as a breach is discovered.
• Secure Boot with Device Authentication – This feature uses the
unique AKM Protocol Identifier associated with the device, in
combination with an onboard, AKM enabled HSM or hardware
secure element to provide a Secure Boot Feature to AKM
enabled devices. Thus, ensuring only the precise associated
host hardware is being used.
• Anti-spoofing and Network Authorization – Because AKM can
uniquely associated with a specific device, and because
security relationships are constantly being automatically
updated, stale or substitute devices cannot be re-inserted into
an AKM protected network without being re-provisioned. This
also ensures that only authorized devices can ever be inserted
into an AKM protected network.
• Replay Attack Protection – The AKM protocol has a replay
counter located within every frame. Thus, preventing previous
frames from being retransmitted.
• Perfect Forward Secrecy – Because Next Session Security
Credentials are calculated based upon a randomly selected
subset of parameters from an AKM security relationship
specific vector, termed, the Parameter Data Vector (PDV),
there is no mathematically available means to determine which
parameters were used in prior sessions for calculating previous
session Security Credentials. The PDV minimum size is
128-bytes and can be longer if desired by the customer.
• Security Credentials are Re-Generated and NOT Derived –
Because the Parameter Data Vector (PDV) is periodically
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updated based upon configured policy, next session
credentials cannot be predicted subsequent to the
replacement of the PDV, which is randomly generated and
locally distributed within the de-centralized security group.
• Enterprise Grade Entropy – Because the minimum PDV size is
128 and because the smallest allowable PDV subset is 15,
assuming an evenly distributive function is used for selecting
the PDV parameter subset, the entropy as calculated by the
nPr function (the function which calculates the number of
permutations of set size, ‘n’, and subset size, ‘r’), is said to be:
1.72831541602 x 1031. For reference the age of the universe as
calculated in seconds is said to be somewhere between 1016
and 1017. Thus, even with a quantum computer, these
parameters cannot be predicated without also knowing
information that is never exposed (i.e., the internal seeds
which are part of each set of AKM Security Credentials).
• Scalability at IoT Scale – Because AKM may be configured as a
broadcast architecture, and Security Credentials can be
configured for any number of ‘n’ nodes, where ‘n’ is any value
greater than ‘1’, there is no limitation with respect to the
number of nodes or size of an AKM Security Group
Relationship (a security group is the entity for which the
security credentials protect).
• Unlimited Virtual Security Relationships (i.e., Security Groups)
– Each security relationship is unique from every other
security relationship. Security relationships may be defined
according to attributes and may co-exist with other virtual
security groups on the same AKM Node. Thus, communication
can be performed securely on a per attribute basis.
• Each member of a security group maintains the same exact
ledger containing the security credentials. This is the primary
mechanism for how all nodes within the same security
relationship can stay in sync with each other because they all
have the exact same information stored within their ledger.
Thus, if any information within a particular ledger is not in
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100% agreement with the information contained within the
same security group ledger for the other members (hardware
devices) of the group, then it will become immediately
detected and the security group will become out-of-synch.
Thus, a security group ledger may be considered to be
immutable.
• All security groups have at least two levels of
resynchronization in the event that one or more members of a
group becomes out-of-synch. In truth, more than two levels
exist within AKM, but the methods beyond the initial two levels
are for special circumstances and add additional features;
primarily for mobility and dynamic expansion/contraction of a
security group and are not covered within this chapter.
• Low-Power and Energy Efficient – Because only linear hashing
functions and symmetric encryption are used, implementation
of AKM requires minimum computational resources.
• Low-overhead – Because Bulk Encryption begins with the very
first frame of an AKM session, there is no appreciable latency
(other than the protocol header) associated with an AKM
protected network.
• Minimal Digital Footprint – Edge Node AKM Software Applets
are typically under 20K bytes and can be compressed down to
below 10K bytes.
• True Multipoint End-to-End Encryption – Security Credentials
applied to ‘n’ nodes, where ‘n’ can be any number greater than
or equal to 2.
• Quantum Resilient – Because no public key is used (as in PKI
with asymmetric encryption used for the key exchange, which
in a closed IOT system is usually there for the lifetime of the
system) and because AKM does not share any secrets, there is
nothing for a quantum computing device to attack.
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AKM Based IM&M, the Ideal Secure
Communication Solution
Based on AKM which was explicitly designed to be an “ideal secure
communication” solution, it was simple and straightforward to
design a corresponding ideal solution for Integrity Management &
Monitoring, building on the principles already present within AKM.
As AKM provides the framework for many of the concepts that the
ideal IM&M solution also needs. This concept of the ideal IM&M
was derived over a period of two years, between May 2018 and
August 2020 and is designed directly from requirements contained
within CENELEC 50701 (which as mentioned previously is the rail
application of the ISO standard, IEC 62443).
Features of the AKM-based IM&M solution are:
• Physical Device Validation (i.e., Identification + Authentication
of the Physical Hardware) – This feature uses the unique AKM
Protocol Identifier associated with the device, in combination
with an onboard, AKM enabled HSM or hardware secure
element to provide a Secure Boot Feature to AKM enabled
devices. Thus, ensuring only the specified associated host
hardware is being used. This guarantees against accidental
misconfigurations or intentional spoofing of the hardware.
• Electronic Image Validation (i.e., Identification +
Authentication of the electronic image)– This feature Identifies
and Authenticates every electronic image within the release
set for the specified hardware.
• Subsystem Validation (i.e., Identification + Authentication of
the logical subsystem) – This feature uses a combination of a
unique AKM Protocol Identifier associated with the subsystem
and shared immutable ledgers of all of the physical devices
within the subsystem (direct downlinks at the subsystem level).
• System Validation (i.e., Identification + Authentication of the
entire system) – This feature uses a combination of a unique
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AKM Protocol Identifier associated with the system and shared
immutable ledgers of all of the subsystems that are
immediately beneath the system level (direct downlinks within
at the system level).
• User Validation (i.e., Identification + Authentication of the
individual users, both human and otherwise) – This feature
uses a combination of a unique AKM Protocol Identifier
associated with user and a physical ledger item maintained
locally within the secure element hardware store of the
devices, subsystems, and systems, for which the user is
associated with to ensure the validity of the user.
• Remote Access – This feature enables remote access to the
system via both legacy mechanisms like RADIUS, as well as
AKM protected communication.
• Audit Trail of Assets with Tamper-proof Audit Logs – This
feature is derived from the AKM concept of shared immutable
ledgers for members of the same security relationship and
extends the ledger by adding the capability of an audit trail.
• Military Grade Secure Communication between Devices – This
feature comes from multiple facets of the AKM framework.
First, because AKM is crypto-agile, any cryptographic function
or encryption algorithm may be used. Second, because of the
extremely limited threat surface, protecting the threat surface
is straightforward and simplistic. Third, there is no
information that are ever communicated as part of the normal
session security credential update process that could ever lead
to a breach if intercepted. Fourth, as is mentioned within the
list of AKM features, new and refreshed security relationships
are created with Enterprise Grate Entropy (which can be easily
increased with minimal increase in overhead). Last, all
sensitive information is continually protected within a
hardware secure element or Hardware Security Module (HSM)
and is never exposed outside of the hardware secure element
or HSM.
• Real-time Data Analytics – This feature is inherited directly
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from AKM, given that AKM is used to exchange information
between hardware devices, and subsystems. Thus, AKM-based
IM&M inherits and extends real-time data analytics as well.
• Intrusion Detection – Again, this is an inherited feature of
AKM, and is facilitated by an IM&M Network Management
Module, which locally manages the entire system (or
subsystem if a large system and hierarchical management is
required) and utilizes the real-time data analytics gathered by
AKM as well as utilizing traditional intrusion detection
mechanisms.
• Maintenance Free – This is another inherited feature of AKM.
Once an IM&M security group has been provisioned, no
external maintenance should ever be required (thus, all AKM
IM&M relationships are self-maintained and decentralized and
require no external maintenance once provisioning has been
completed).
• Automatic Breach Recovery and Re-provisioning – Because an
IM&M Network Management Gateway is required within the
system or subsystem level (depending upon complexity of the
overall network), this feature is always present, but the degree
of automation is determined by configured policy. The IM&M
Network Management Gateway automatically configures the
network and acts as the local trust anchor. Thus, Intrusion
Detection is a natural extendable feature, as is, automatic reprovisioning in the event of infected relationships that require
re-configuring (in according to policy). This feature effectively
neutralizes threats as soon as a breach is discovered.
• Anti-spoofing and Network Authorization – Because AKM is
uniquely associated with a specific device, and because
security relationships are constantly being automatically
updated, stale or substitute devices cannot be re-inserted into
an AKM protected network without being explicitly reprovisioned by a trusted device (such as the Backoffice server
remotely or the In-Network Management Gateway locally).
This also ensures that only authorized devices can ever be
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inserted into an AKM protected network.
• Other features directly inherited from AKM are: Replay Attack
Protection, Perfect Forward Secrecy, Security Credentials are
Re-Generated and NOT Derived, Scalability at IoT Scale,
Unlimited Virtual Security Relationships (i.e., Security Groups),
True Multipoint End-to-End encryption, Quantum Resilience.
• Low-Power and Energy Efficient – Another AKM inherited
featured, but also because IM&M uses static integrity codes
that are calculated based upon linear hashing functions, AKMbased IM&M requires minimum computational resources.
• Low-overhead – Because AKM-based IM&M runs in the
background during runtime, uses only linear hashing functions
for the integrity code calculation of the individual components,
and simple compares of the integrity codes for validating the
components, the overhead of AKM-based IM&M is extremely
low, with the frequency of background component integrity
code recalculation adjusted in accordance with policy.
• Minimal Digital Footprint – Edge Node AKM Software Applets
are typically under 20K bytes and can be compressed down to
below 12K bytes.

Summary
While both of these solutions were initially designed for OT centric
closed systems, over time, the author has discovered that they are
equally applicable to the IT world and many of the problems that IT
faces.
AKM can easily be a drop-in replacement in IT applications for the
traditional cryptographic Key Management Systems (KMS) of Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the secure communication protocol,
the Transport Layer Security protocol, with the most current
revision being TLS 1.3. As AKM and AKM-based IM&M addresses
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all of the problems plaguing both PKI and TLS because that is what
it was explicitly designed to do (address problems in IoT centric
systems for both solutions).
More recently, it was discovered that the IM&M solution would
provide an excellent framework for solving the larger problems of
ransomware, malware, and zero-day attacks.
Using AKM & AKM-Based IM&M for Solving the Most Difficult
Problems Plaguing IT Communication and Systems
AKM and its IM&M derivative provide the perfect foundation for
solving the Ransomware/Malware/Zero-Day Attack, computer
problem at the enterprise level (a solution for the individual small
business/home office solution has also been addressed but will
be presented in a future edition for the purpose of brevity and
importance). Using both AKM and its derivatives, like IM&M, an
extension to the concept of whitelisting, which is termed, White
boxing within this document, is able to:
1) Identify, verify, authenticate, and monitor all known executables
and data, marking them as “safe to use” once authenticated and
moved to the “Trusted Component” list (the White box).
2) Calculate an integrity code derived from a hash based, digital
signature for each “safe to use” software component. Thus, enabling
instant verification of all known, components on the “Trusted
Component” box.
3) Identify, verify, authenticate, and monitor each hardware
endpoint, ensuring that only trusted hardware devices are on the
network.
4) Create a digital signature for each “trusted” hardware device,
that is based upon the aggregation of all “Trusted Components”
within the device. Thus, enabling instant verification of each
“trusted” hardware device.
5) Create logical security groups of hardware devices in
accordance with application context and customer preferences, for
which all hardware devices within the security group will
communicate integrity data using its own, unique set of security
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credentials that is refreshed on a per session basis, with perfect
forward security, and without exchanging any secrets.
6) Ensure the immutability of each trusted device’s integrity code
information (distributed ledger based) given that all integrity codes
and other related information for each trusted device within a
security group is shared with all other trusted devices. Thus,
ensuring that the integrity code of an individual device cannot be
altered without altering the same integrity code contained within
the secured integrity information of the other trusted devices that
are part of the same security group (i.e., each device within a
security group contains a copy of the integrity codes of all of the
other devices within the same group, plus an integrity code
representing the security group itself).
7) Create a digital signature for each security group based upon
the aggregation of integrity codes of the individual trusted devices
within each group. Thus, enabling instant verification of each
security group.
8) Group the security groups hierarchically, so that the top-level
security group represents the entire network, thus, enabling a quick
check of the entire network, with a very simple, fast, linear crosscheck of the system integrity code.
9) Periodically update the integrity codes of each component,
both hardware and software within the entire system, on an
ongoing and continual basis in the background, so as not to
interfere with normal processing.
10) Using malware scanning functionality, scan each unknown
application (or single executable if not contained within an
encapsulating application) for validation of existing threats. If it is
not on the existing threats list, add it to the list of applications to be
cross verified by a human operator.
Figure 6.1 White boxing
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Source: Olympus Sky (See endnote 5)

11) Once authorized personnel have authorized a new/unknown
application (set of executables & related files) as safe, the IM&MFuture Proof Security [Shields] | 305

based White-boxing solution automatically updates the “Trusted
Component” box with the new, trusted, application.
Figure 6.2 Human Operator moves Application V to Trusted
Applications

Source: Olympus Sky (See endnote 5)
12) Application White-boxing denies the execution of any
application that has not previously been explicitly approved as
“known to not be malicious” (i.e., has not been previously placed
within the Trusted Component” box). This “default deny” approach
offers a much higher degree of security than traditional antivirus
blacklisting approaches for a number of reasons, with the single
biggest reason that it denies “zero-day” attacks. Whereas, with
standard “blacklisting”, typical antivirus blacklist databases will not
recognize the malware on “day zero”, because it has never seen it.
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The most difficult part of Application White-boxing (AWB) is
admittedly managing what is and is not within the White-box. It
is extremely difficult to keep the list of what is and is not allowed
within a system where there are hundreds of thousands of files
and many of them have a legitimate need to dynamically change
at runtime. This is perhaps the core problem that modern AWB
solutions exists to solve and is a very solvable problem. What makes
it solvable is not expecting end users or IT administrators to figure
out the details, but to ask them only for high-level approval of an
entire action and then using software to track the precise details of
exactly what files need to change, which is exactly how the IM&Mbased White-box Enterprise solution operates (see steps (10) and (11)
above).
Core elements of the IM&M-based White-box Enterprise solution
are: AKM and AKM-based IM&M. The IM&M-based White-box
Enterprise application sits on top of AKM-based IM&M, which in
turn sits on top of AKM.
AKM-based IM&M first validates and authenticates the hardware
device it resides in and then, for each software component within
the hardware device that is part of a designated set of release files,
executables, database files, configuration files, html files, etc., the
AKM-based IM&M derives a unique integrity code for each software
component. AKM-based IM&M then uses a hash of an aggregation
of values from the hardware device in combination with the
integrity codes from each software component within the
designated set of release files, to create an integrity code for the
hardware device.
Files that are part of the specified set of release files are all
tracked and controlled using the aforementioned, unique integrity
code. The AKM-based IM&M maintains a list of all integrity codes
that are part of the system’s release file set.

Executable files that

are part of this file list form the initial set of trusted applications.
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The AKM-based IM&M then, on a periodic basis, performs a check
to ensure that the list of known valid files remain intact.
AKM-based IM&M maintains integrity across all nodes within a
system by allowing nodes to be organized into logical groups in
accordance with user preferences. Then, each node within that
a logical group will form a security group based upon those user
defined

preferences.

Using

ledger-based

technology,

each

individual node that is part of a security group, maintains a ledger
both for itself, as well as each of the other nodes within its same
security group. Therefore, rendering the ledgers of the individual
nodes immutable, since identical copies of all ledgers are
maintained across all nodes within the same group.

AKM-based IM&M allows as many of these logical group
relationships as the customer wishes to create and they may be
formed into any combination, and hierarchically as well. Thus,
enabling the integrity code of any logical group to be an instant
indicator of whether or not all hardware and software components
within that group have been identified and authenticated. Meaning,
the ability to discern the state of any part of the system is
instantaneous and because the components are continually being
reverified and authenticated in the background, the likelihood of
malware being able to spread throughout the system is significantly
mitigated.
This is the best of both worlds. AKM-based IM&M ensures release
set files remain valid, while intrusion detection monitors for
anomalous digital signatures.
The IM&M-based White-boxing solution takes this a step further,
by managing the contents of the White-box.

Only trusted

applications will be allowed to execute. All other executables will
be denied the ability to run. Working with the intrusion detection
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module, non-release set executables can be added to the list of
trusted applications, but first must be checked against the known
set of malware digital signatures for verification purposes.
Once a non-release set executable has been added to the set of
trusted applications, it too is added to the designated set of release
files and is assigned an integrity code, thus being tracked in the
same way as if it had been one of the original sets of release files. In
this way, the ability to instantly and continually verify the integrity
of each hardware component, its subgroup, and the overall system
to which it belongs, is maintained even as the system grows in its
components list while simultaneously decreasing the overall threat
surface.
The key attributes of this approach are threefold:
1) Using information known at system instantiation, it creates
a list of all known good (validated) applications and continually
verifies these known good applications throughout the lifetime of
the system using a simplistic method for maintaining the integrity of
the individual applications and comparing the resultant calculated
integrity code with the previous known value of the application’s
integrity code.
2) Disallows any unknown application from running and isolates it
a logically separate part of the system.
3) Uses human validation to admit new and/or unknown
applications into the White box.
Clearly, the potential for exploitation is the human aspect, but a
clear audit trail will be created for each interaction ensuring at the
very least, the ability to trace actions with resultant consequences.
Conclusions
This chapter has focused on current problems plaguing both
secure communication and the overall integrity of systems today.
It has also suggested sets of requirements for what “ideal” solutions
for both secure communication and integrity management and
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monitoring. Looking into the future, it has suggested a solution
for some of the biggest remaining issues in IT and OT today,
ransomware and malware, including zero-day attacks.
Questions
1. AKM states that it has the concept of Perfect Forward Secrecy.
What is this feature and why is it important? Does this give
AKM an advantage over PKI?
2. AKM couples a hardware endpoint (i.e., a hardware module) to
a particular AKM Hardware Identifier ( which is similar to a
MAC address). How does this feature help AKM prevent
hardware spoofing or ransomware?
3. Why will quantum computing be detrimental to PKI based
security implementations?
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7. Failure of Climate Change
[Nichols]
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed
– and hence clamorous to be led to safety – by menacing it with an
endless series of hobgoblins[1], all of them imaginary.”
– L. Mencken(Wrightstone G. , 2017)
Student Learning Objectives
Man-made / Influenced Catastrophic climate change (CC) and
global warming (GW) are contentious issues hyped in the news and
parroted with almost a religious following. It is time to at least
understand the basic scientific elements that make up the climate
change claims and real natural phenomena and driving forces.
It some cases, we need to push back against the outrageous and
irresponsible. Our SLO is
• To understand the CC / GW processes,
• To separate facts from fiction regarding key natural
phenomena: CO2 emissions, warming, temperature rise,
tornadoes, hurricanes, forest fires, greenhouse gases (GHG),
• To develop facts that we can use to make up our own minds
about CC / GW and its correlation to man-made behavior –
especial in the last 50 years.

Introduction
Amy Coney Barrett declined to say that climate change is real,
calling it instead a “a very contentious matter of public debate,
especially one that is politically controversial.” during the third day
of her Supreme Court confirmation hearings. (Boyle, 2020)[3] The
judge made the comment on Wednesday as she was questioned by
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California Senator Kamala Harris, the Democratic vice-presidential
nominee, (now VP)

and a member of the Senate Judiciary

Committee. The Supreme court nominee doubled down on
comments she made on Tuesday, where she said that she has no
“firm views” on climate change because she is “not a scientist”. [4]
(Boyle, 2020)
According to the UK Independent (Bolton, 2016), “Some 97
percent or more of climate scientists agree that climate-warming
trends over the past century are being driven by human activities,
largely the burning fossil fuels.” Maybe.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a point – counterpoint
discussion of fundamental concepts underlying climate change /
global warming (GW). If we accept climate change as a disruptive
technology or clear global megatrend, it behooves us to at least know
the facts.
The Open Mind
Let’s take a step back for a moment and recognize four key
concepts: 1) science is not accomplished by consensus – just the
opposite; scientists constantly challenge the status quo to improve
understanding of our world; 2) since 1785, scientists have used a
very organized methodology to continually test the validity /
repeatability of the status quo by the Scientific Method. It is based
on fact and quantifiable observations, not on political motivation, or
money (university or private funding) or hyped up news; 3) humans
do not control / influence everything in their world – it is arrogant
to think so; and 4) data based on limited or biased scope yields
limited / incorrect / spurious / or potentially fraudulent results.
Policy decisions made on such reduced data / observations are
bound to be incorrect.
This chapter is not meant for those who have made up their minds
and will never challenge themselves or change – irrespective of
political organization. It is meant for those who are uncomfortable
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with the information that we are barraged with each day and at
are least open to discussion so that they can make up their own
minds. The author will concentrate heavily on two important and
diametrically opposing references with widespread appeal. Pierre
Coutu wrote Global Megatrends and Aviation: The Path to FutureWise Organizations. (Coutu, 2019) He devotes a full 77 pages to the
subject of climate change. His book is the status quo. The second
reference is by Gregory Wrightstone entitled Inconvenient Facts:
The science that Al Gore doesn’t want you to know. (Wrightstone
G. , 2017) It is packed with facts and counterpoints, 2000 years
of reference temperature data, and exquisitely sourced for each
observation. Science, unlike religion or politics, is not a belief
system. Science is based on a disciplined method of inquiry, by
which a scientist applies pre-existing theory to observation and
measurement, so as to develop or reject a theory, so as to unravel
as clearly and as certainly as possible the distinction between “that
which is and that which is not.” (Wrightstone G. , 2017)
Scientific Method
The scientific method is an empirical method of acquiring
knowledge that has characterized the development of science since
at least the 17th century.[5] It involves careful observation, applying
rigorous skepticism about what is observed, given that cognitive
assumptions can distort how one interprets the observation. It
involves formulating hypotheses, via induction, based on such
observations; experimental and measurement-based testing of
deductions drawn from the hypotheses; and refinement (or
elimination) of the hypotheses based on the experimental findings.
These are principles of the scientific method, as distinguished from
a definitive series of steps applicable to all scientific enterprises.[6]
(Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 2020)
Although procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another,
they are frequently the same from one to another. The process
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of the scientific method involves making conjectures (hypotheses),
deriving predictions from them as logical consequences, and then
carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those
predictions. A hypothesis is a conjecture, based on knowledge obtained
while seeking answers to the question. The hypothesis might be very
specific, or it might be broad. Scientists then test hypotheses by
conducting experiments or studies. A scientific hypothesis must be
falsifiable, implying that it is possible to identify a possible outcome of
an experiment or observation that conflicts with predictions deduced
from the hypothesis; otherwise, the hypothesis cannot be meaningfully
tested. (Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 2020)
The purpose of an experiment is to determine whether observations
agree with or conflict with the predictions derived from a hypothesis.
Experiments can take place anywhere. There are difficulties in a
formulaic statement of method, however. Though the scientific
method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it represents
rather a set of general principles.
Common steps /elements of the scientific method are: Question,
Hypothesis, Prediction, Experiment, and Analysis.
There are additional components to the scientific method even
when all iterations of the steps above have been completed.
Replication
If an experiment cannot be repeated to produce the same results,
this implies that the original results might have been in error. As
a result, it is common for a single experiment to be performed
multiple times, especially when there are uncontrolled variables or
other indications of experimental error. For significant or surprising
results, other scientists may also attempt to replicate the results for
themselves, especially if those results would be important to their
own work. Replication has become a contentious issue in social and
biomedical science where treatments are administered to groups of
individuals. (Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 2020)
External review
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The process of peer review involves evaluation of the experiment
by experts, who typically give their opinions anonymously. Some
journals request that the experimenter provide lists of possible peer
reviewers, especially if the field is highly specialized. Peer-review
does not certify the correctness of the results, only that, in the opinion
of the reviewer, the experiments themselves were sound (based on the
description supplied by the experimenter). If the work passes peer
review, which occasionally may require new experiments requested
by the reviewers, it will be published in a peer-reviewed scientific
journal. The specific journal that publishes the results indicates the
perceived quality of the work. (Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 2020)
Scientific Inquiry
Scientific inquiry generally aims to obtain knowledge in the form
of testable explanations that scientists can use to predict the results
of future experiments. This allows scientists to gain a better
understanding of the topic under study, and later to use that
understanding to intervene in its causal mechanisms (such as to
cure disease). The better an explanation is at making predictions,
the more useful it frequently can be, and the more likely it will
continue to explain a body of evidence better than its alternatives.
The most successful explanations – those which explain and make
accurate predictions in a wide range of circumstances – are often
called scientific theories. (Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 2020)
Most experimental results do not produce large changes in
human understanding. Improvements in theoretical scientific
understanding

typically

result

from

a

gradual

process

of

development over time, sometimes across different domains of
science. Scientific models vary in the extent to which they have
been experimentally tested and for how long, and in their
acceptance in the scientific community. In general, explanations
become accepted over time as evidence accumulates on a given
topic, and the explanation in question proves more powerful than
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its alternatives at explaining the evidence. Often subsequent
researchers re-formulate the explanations over time, or combined
explanations to produce new explanations.
Properties of scientific inquiry
Scientific knowledge is closely tied to empirical findings and can
remain subject to falsification if new experimental observations are
incompatible with what is found. No theory can ever be considered
final since new problematic evidence might be discovered. If such
evidence is found, a new theory may be proposed, or (more
commonly) it is found that modifications to the previous theory are
sufficient to explain the new evidence. The strength of a theory can
be argued [by whom?] to relate to how long it has persisted without
major alteration to its core principles. (Wikipedia, Scientific Method,
2020)
Beliefs and biases
Scientific methodology often directs that hypotheses be tested in
controlled conditions wherever possible.
The practice of experimental control and reproducibility can have
the effect of diminishing the potentially harmful effects of
circumstance, and to a degree, personal bias. For example, preexisting beliefs can alter the interpretation of results, as in
confirmation bias; this is a heuristic that leads a person with a
particular belief to see things as reinforcing their belief, even if
another observer might disagree (in other words, people tend to
observe what they expect to observe). (Wikipedia, Scientific Method,
2020)
This is a good place to Segway into the 97% claim.
97% Consensus can’t be spelled without “con”
We have heard the drumbeat that 97% of scientists agree on
human-driven climate change. (Bolton, 2016) (Coutu, 2019) We have
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also heard that those that don’t buy into the climate -apocalypse
mantra are Luddite science deniers. The author has been
questioned “do I believe in climate change? His answer: “of course,
it has been happening for hundreds of millions of years.” The real
question relates to the human-driven actions.
Scientists do agree on two quantifiable truths:
• Carbon dioxide concentration has been increasing in recent
years
• Temperatures, as measured by thermometers and satellites,
have been generally increasing over the last 150 years.
What is impossible to quantify is the actual percentage of
warming that is attributable to increased anthropogenic (humancaused) CO2. There is no scientific evidence or method that can
determine how much warming we’ve had since 1900 was directly
caused by us. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) We know that temperature
has varied greatly over the millennia. (Coutu, 2019) We also know
that for virtually all of time, global warming and cooling were driven
entirely by natural forces, which did not cease to operate at the
beginning of the Industrial Revolution. (Wrightstone G. , 2017)
The claim that most modern warming is attributable to human
activities is scientifically insupportable. So what is the basis of the
97% conjecture?
Cook’s chaos
The primary paper that is often cited as the ultimate source of the
97% consensus “con” was written by John Cook and his merry band
of climate extremists. He maintains a website where the paper has
been downloaded more than 600,000 times. Cooks’ volunteer team
[7] reviewed abstracts from 11,944 peer-reviewed papers related to
clior global warming, published over 21 years 1991 -2011 to assess
the extent to which they supported the “consensus view” on climate
change. (Cook, 2013) Per Cooks paper:
“ We analysed a large sample of the scientific literature on global
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CC [climate change], published over a 21-year period, in order to
determine the level of scientific consensus that human activity is
very likely causing most of the current GW (anthropogenic global
warming), or AGW)….” (Cook, 2013)
The paper concluded,
“Among the abstracts that expressed a position on AGW, 97.1%
endorsed the scientific consensus… Among the papers expressing a
position on AGW, an overwhelming percentage (97.2% based on selratings, 97.1 % basted pon abstract ratings) endorses the scientific
consensus on AGW.” (Cook, 2013)
Cook’s paper asserted falsely that 97% of the papers the reviewers
examined had explicitly endorsed the opinion that humans are
causing the majority of the warming on AGW! (Wrightstone G. , 2017)
When one looks closely at the data, one finds that 7,930 of the
papers took no position at all on the subject and were arbitrarily
excluded from the count on this ground. Adding these back into the
total papers reviewed in the 97% count , the actual claim falls to
32.6%! But a further look at the data shows that three categories of
endorsement. (Table 7.1) Only the first category amounts to explicit
statement that humans are the primary cause of recent warming.
The 2nd and 3rd categories would include most of sceptics of AGW.
(Wrightstone G. , 2017)
Table 7.1 Expanding the “consensus” broadly
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Level of
Endorsement

Description

(1)Explicit
endorsement
with
quantification

Explicitly states that humans are the primary cause
of recent global warming

(2) Explicit
endorsement
without
quantification

Explicitly states that humans are causing global
warming or refers to AGW /CC as a known fact

(3) Implicit
endorsement

Implies humans are causing AGW; e.g. research
ASSUMES greenhouse gas emissions cause warming
without explicitly stating that humans are the cause

Source: (Cook, 2013)
Here is a new word: Agnotology.[8] David Legates and his co
authors used this word to review / describe the Cook paper as an
attempt to falsely promote the notion of broad scientific consensus
surrounding the subject

of a looming, man-made, climate

apocalypse. (Legates, 2015) Legates reviewed their actual papers
used by Cook and found only 0.3% of the 11,944 abstracts and 1.6% of
the smaller sample that expressed those papers expressing no opinion
endorsed man-made global warming as they defined it. (Legates,
2015)
97% [9] Consensus = con.

Global Warming – Status Quo ( as applied to the aviation
industry)
According to Contu, “at the heart of global warming are
greenhouse gases (GHG) which are generated by human activity.”
He also states that “climate change is both a reality and a potential
threat that “experts” believe could lead to global catastrophe if not
addressed diligently and with vigor.” “Lastly, the potential
catastrophic consequences of climate change and global warming
loom large in the public discourse, from headlines in the news and
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social media to boardrooms and living rooms, yet current measures
to mitigate the phenomenon and begin reversing its destructive
effects seem eerily wanting.” (Coutu, 2019) [10]
Contu leads us down a path of 77 pages increasing expenditures,
extreme policy making, fear and complete hype applied to emission
controls in the aviation industry. Try these on for size: “ The global
climate change is one of the greatest, if not THE greatest humanmade threats to its survival that humanity has ever faced.”[11]
“Humanity may not survive..”

“There is no doubt that the

Environmental / Climate Change megatrend will have major
impacts on the aviation industry over the next 15-20 years and
beyond. “ (Coutu, 2019) Finally, his core premise is “ Greenhouse
gases (GHG) generated mostly by human activity are at the heart
of climate change, (aka global warming). Half the fossil-fuel CO2
emissions produced by human activity in the last 300 years have
occurred since the late 1980’s and the 2014 global fossil-fuel carbon
emission estimate was an all-time record.” (Coutu, 2019) Again we
have a good segway into a discussion about GHG.
Greenhouse Gases – our security blanket
The greenhouse effect,(GE) the important mechanism by which
the earth remains, comfortably warm, and livable, is also the pretext
for the advancement of the doomsday predictions about carbon
dioxide-driven global warming. It is central to the CC debate. It is
central to the (Coutu, 2019) presentation. Lets see if we can boil
down the GE to basics.
While 30% of the Sun’s radiation is reflected by clouds, most of
it passes through the earth’s atmosphere and strikes the surface.
There it is absorbed and its energy is emitted in the near-infrared
spectrum. [12] Some of the re-emitted energy is absorbed by
greenhouse – gas molecules. As they absorb radiation, they in turn
emit energy in the form of heat. This is the greenhouse effect.
(Wrightstone G. , 2017)
Greenhouse gases and the warming they cause keep the Earth at
a comfortable average temperature of 15o
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Celsius (59o Fahrenheit). Without them, the Earth would be
unlivable – 18o C (-0.4o F). (Wrightstone G. , 2017)[13] Extremes of
GE warming are nearby planets of Venus & Mars. See Table 7.2 The
Goldilocks effect. (Wrightstone G. , 2017)
Table 7.2 The Goldilocks effect.

Planet

Surface
Atmospheric Temperature ( no
composition greenhouse
effect)

Relative size
of
greenhouse
effect

Mean
surface
temperature

Venus

96% CO2

–40 oC (-40 o F)

100

462 oC (863
o F)

-18 oC (-0.4 o F)

1

15 oC (59 o
F)

-56 oC (–69 o F)

0.1

-55 oC (-67 o
F)

Earth
Mars

0.04% CO2
Ideal for life
95% CO2

Source: (Wrightstone G. , 2017)
The most significant greenhouse gas (driver) of all is water vapor.
CC enthusiasts (Coutu, 2019) do not mention it at all. National
Geographic and EPA list the greenhouse gases “include carbon
dioxide (CO2) , methane, nitrous oxide (N2O), fluorinated gases,
and ozone.” (Wrightstone G. , 2017) A breakdown of these gases
excluding water vapor is methane 19%, carbon dioxide 63% and
other 18%. But including water vapor the breakdown is water vapor
90%, carbon dioxide 6%, methane 2% and other 2%. So water vapor
contributes the lions share of the greenhouse effect. (Wrightstone
G. , 2017) Both (Coutu, 2019) and (Wrightstone G. , 2017) agree that
water vapor is a primary driver. There is serious disagreement on
how much warming will occur due to increases of GH gases, or
how much of that warming is or will be man-made. (Wrightstone
G. , 2017) Warming allows the atmosphere to increase the amount
of water vapor it can carry, which can then add to the GH effect
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(water-vapor feedback), but neither reference agrees on magnitude
of this multiplier effect on global warming. Overblown estimates
of water-vapor feedback will lead to overestimating the future
warming in the climate models. This is why they fail. (Wrightstone
G. , 2017)
Fact 1
Carbon dioxide is NOT the primary greenhouse gas.
Analysis
It is no more sensible to attempt to regulate weather by declaring
CO2 to be a pollutant than it is to try to regulate water vapor or
declare it to be a pollutant. Water vapor is the main contributor
to the GH effect. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) The role of water vapor
in climate models and predictions on it is an inexact science. The
amount of water in the atmosphere varies markedly from place to
place and from day to day. Absolute humidity can range from near
zero in deserts and Antarctica – the Earth’s driest continent to
about 4% in the steamy tropics. Small changes in water vapor can so
affect the GH effect as would a doubling of the present CO2 in the
atmosphere. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) Downplaying or disregarding
water vapor, or assigning too large a magnitude to feedbacks such as
water vapor feedback will amplify the direct warming from CO2, and
overemphasize man’s contribution to the GH effect. (Wrightstone G.
, 2017)
Fact 2
The warming effect of CO2 declines as its concentration
increases.
The warming effect of each molecule of CO2 decreases
logarithmically as its concentration increase. (Wrightstone G. , 2017)
Think about Fact 2 for a moment. Why haven’t we experienced
runaway GH warming when the concentration of CO2 was
approaching 20X that of today? If you think about this fact, it
undermines the theory of future catasphrophic climate change.
[prediction per (Coutu, 2019)] Figure 7.2 shows that the principle of
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diminishing returns applies, i.e. as CO2 concentrations increase, the
global warming effect diminishes. (Hoskins, 2014)
Figure 7.1 The Greenhouse Effect

Source: (Deshmukh, 2020)

Figure 7.2 The diminishing influence of increasing Carbon
Dioxide on temperature
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Source: (JoNova, 2010)
From Facts 1 & 2, we note that CO2 is a GH gas and that increasing
CO2 concentrations will increase global temperature to a small
degree. However, is this slight warming effect overwhelmed by
natural climate drivers that have been active for hundreds of
millions of years? (Wrightstone G. , 2017) And is it worth $100 trillion
dollars or more to reduce a small increase of CO2?
Combined Fact(s) 3
CO2 is not the demon causing catastrophic global warming; it is
in fact an essential plant food. It means more plant growth, more
food for people worldwide, and soil with more moisture.
According to the NIPCC, higher CO2 concentrations has the
following benefits:
• Nearly all plants increase photosynthesis in response to
increasing CO2 (CO2 fertilization)[14]
• More CO2 makes plants grow faster, with less stress and less
water.
• Forests grow faster in response to increasing CO2
• More CO2 stimulates growth of beneficial bacteria in both soil
and water.
• CO2 fertilization, leads to more plant growth, means less
erosion of topsoil.
• More CO2 means bigger crop yields, and bigger flowers.
• More CO2 fosters glomalin, a beneficial protein created by
root fungi.
• More CO2 means less water loss, less irrigation, and more soil
moisture.
•

More CO2 helps plants to create natural repellents to fight
insect predators. (Carter RM, 2014)(Wrightstone G. , 2017)

Figure 7.3 improves on the above benefits description.
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Figure 7.3 Shows 45 crops with crop yield growth and cash
benefit with 300 ppm more CO2 (based on 3,586 experiments on
549 plant species)

Sources: (Monckton, 2019) (Idso, 2014)
Fact 4
400 PPM of CO2 is not a tipping point, not science and
disinformation (propaganda)

“We are on the precipice of climate system tipping points beyond
which there is no redemption.”
–James Hansen, Former head of NASA’s Goddard Institute for
Space Studies. (Wrightstone G. , 2017)
“This March [2014], global levels of CO2 passed 400 PPM..Already
we are seeing the deadly effects of climate change in the form of
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rising seas, monster storms, wildfires, and extreme weather of all
kinds. Passing 400 PP is an ominous sign of what might come next.”
[15] (400.350.org, 2014)
The concentration of CO2 in the air has increased from about 280
PPM by volume in the mid-18th century, to a little above 400 PPM
today. If we view this recent data through a narrow time-frame of a
few decades
or centuries, this increase in 120 PPM in CO2 appears significant.
But it is not on the timeline of Earth’s history. (Wrightstone G. , 2017)
(Coutu, 2019)

Figure 7.4 Carbon Dioxide – 600 Million Years of Data

Source: (Berner RA, 2001)
The notion of a “tipping point” beyond which Earth cannot
recover, without a drastic reduction in CO2 emissions, is not
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science. It is disinformation by climate extremists and contradicts
Earth’s history (reality).
Figure 7.4 shows that CO2 levels were many multiples of 400 PPM
during virtually all of Earth’s history.
400 PPM represents an arbitrary number that was selected
because it could likely be reached by 2014. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) It
was an easy way to stoke fires of anti-CO2 legislation.
Fact 5
Our current geological period (Quaternary) has the LOWEST
average CO2 levels in the history of the Earth[16]
Contrary to the disinformation from the media that today’s CO2
concentration is unprecedented, our current geologic period, has
seen the lowest average levels of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s long
history. The average CO2 for the past 800,000 years was 230 PPM.
(Lüthi, et al., 2008)
The average CO2 concentration in the preceding 600 million
years (Figure 7.4) was more than 2600 PPM, nearly 7X our current
amount and 2.5 X the worst case predicted by the IPCC for 2100. Our
current geological period (Quaternary) has the LOWEST average
CO2 concentration in the history of the Earth. (Berner RA, 2001)
Ed Ring wrote a scathing letter which is quoted in part:
“What historians will definitely wonder about in future centuries
is how deeply flawed logic, obscured by shrewd and unrelenting
propaganda, actually enabled a coalition of powerful special
interests to convince nearly everyone in the world that carbon
dioxide from human industry was a dangerous, planet-destroying
toxin.”
“It will be remembered as the greatest mass delusion in the
history of the world; that carbon dioxide, the life of plants, was
considered for a time to be a deadly poison.” [17] (Ring, 2015)
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The carbon dioxide molecule, which has been more recently
defined by radical environmental groups as a pollutant or poison, is
absolutely essential to sustain plant and animal life here on Earth.
To corrupt the English language in this way is simply a sleazy tactic
to demonize this life-giving gaseous molecule.”
Temperature
Climate change enthusiasts tell us that the warming of recent
decades is unusual and unprecedented. (Coutu, 2019) Climate
-science research has focused on recent record – 250 years for
thermometers and 50 years for satellites. This short time span
skews interpretation of data. (Wrightstone G. , 2017)[18] To put the
data into proper context, we need to take a long-term geologic
perspective – thousands and millions of years.
Hockey- Stick Graph and prediction of Unprecedented Global
Warming
Until 1998 the consensus view was that over the last several
thousand years temperatures had risen and fallen as shown in noted
climatologist Hubert Lamb’s graph, Figure 7.5. (Houghton J. J., 1990)

Figure 7.5 Hubert Lamb’s temperature graph of the past 1,100
years
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Source: (Houghton J. J., 1990)
Study this figure. The figure shows warming beginning in the late
17th century as earth began to extract itself from the Little Ice Age
(1250-1850). It was followed by recent temperatures significantly
less than those experienced in the Medieval warming period
(950-1250). Previous “consensus” established several warm periods
had occurred over the last 10,000 years[19] and all were warmer
than today, even though CO2 concentration was only 70% of today’s.
Note that higher temperatures at lower CO2 concentrations does
not support the notion that connects rising CO2 to a harmful
temperature increase to justify draconian measures to reduce
carbon footprint. (Coutu, 2019) v (Wrightstone G. , 2017) Another
observation by IPCC is that the current warming trend began more
than 200 years before any significant man-made contribution to the
GHG in the atmosphere. (Houghton J. e., 2001) See Figure 7.6.
Michael Mann
Mann and his team purported to reconstruct 1,000 years of the
Earth’s temperature. They stated “ temperatures in the latter half
of the 20th century were unprecedented and that even the warmer
intervals in the reconstruction pale in comparison with the midto-late 20th- century temperatures.” This is the famous “hockey
-stick graph” which shows the 900-year shaft of slowly declining
temperature followed by by a short blade of rapidly increasing
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temperature. (Mann ME, Global-Scale temperature patterns and
climate forcing over the past six centuries , 1998) (Mann ME,
Northern Hemisphere Temperatures during the post millennium:
Inferences, Uncertainties, and Limitations, 1999) (Houghton J. e.,
2001)
The hockey-stick graph became the linchpin as “proof” of the
causal link between GHG and dangerous warming. (Houghton J. e.,
2001)

Figure 7.6 Mann-made Hockey Stick

Source: (Mann ME, Global-Scale temperature patterns and
climate forcing over the past six centuries , 1998) (Houghton J. e.,
2001)
If Mann’s depiction of temperature is correct, then his work is
fundamental basis for recent warming being man-made. However,
both sides of the CC argument have criticized the Mann graph.
Two fundamental errors are data sourcing and data handling. Mann
based his work on temperature proxies on a relatively small dataset
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of tree-ring data from California bristlecone pines, and a very small
sample from cedars on the Gaspe Peninsula. The IPCC (his biggest
fan) challenged the sourcing as a poor choice because the width of
annual tree-ring will grow thicker only when the weather is warmer,
but also wetter, or when more CO2 in the air fertilizes the tree and
boosts growth. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) Mann ignored a significant
number of trees in the sample area that did not show results that he
desired. (Mann ME, Global-Scale temperature patterns and climate
forcing over the past six centuries , 1998)
Two Canadian researchers McIntyre and McKitrick (MM) found
that ANY data they plugged into Mann’s formula produced the
hockey-stick

effect.

They

concluded

that

the

temperature

reconstruction was fatally flawed, poor handling of data and
incorrect calculation. (Mann, 1998) (Jones, 2004) (Rutherford, 2004)
To be fair, the MM challenge was also challenged by climate change
enthusiasts as false procedures. (McKitrick, 2005) (Anonymous,
2004) [20]
Temperature Measurement
Of the three ways to measure atmospheric temperature: land
and ocean surface thermometers (since 1659); weather balloons
(mid-1950’s) and satellites (since 1979) , satellites is the most reliable
but with a short history. So what does this tell us? For the last 50
years , temperature measurements are accurate and this supports
the Mann proposition of rapidly accelerating temperature data in
the most recent five decades. If Mann’s modelling of global
temperatures were correct, then 900 years of cooling would be
followed by a sharp temperature increase in the 20th century. This
would be strong evidence linking man’s activities to modern GW.
The counter evidence to the Mann argument would be data showing
that modern warming began before CO2 began to rise sharply.
(Wrightstone G. , 2017) (Coutu, 2019) does not address this
important issue. If the latter can be demonstrated , it would suggest
that natural forces were the primary driver of warming prior to 1900
and likely remain in effect today.
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HadCET
The Central England temperature record (HadCET) contains the
longest continuous measured regional temperature dataset in the
world. It goes back more than 350 years. It began in 1659, during
the coldest temperatures in the last 4,500 years. (Parker DE,
1992)(Boden TA, 2016)(Wrightstone G. , 2017)
Fact 6
Modern Warming began long before SUVs, Model T’s or coalfired plants, or modern planes

Figure 7.7 Central England Temperatures (CET) from 1659-2017
and CO2 levels

Source: (Best, 2017)[21]
Each period on Figure 7.7 has a name and associated effects on
humanity. The key takeaway is that warming began more than 200
years before any significant contribution of man-made CO2 to the
334 | Failure of Climate Change [Nichols]

atmosphere. This contradicts the Mann hockey-stick depiction of
steady cooling during this time. The natural forces driving
temperature increases during the 18th and 19th centuries did not
abruptly cease to act during the 20th century. (Wrightstone G. ,
2017) (Boden TA, 2016) sees the same CET data but measures the
CO2 in billions of metric tons emissions globally on the right
horizontal axis. This is more dramatic in that CO2 emissions (bmt) is
practically zero in 1759 -1859; is still less than 2 bmt in 1959 and then
rises to 11 bmt in 2009. (Boden TA, 2016)
Melting Glaciers and Rising Sea Levels
(Wrightstone G. , 2017) spends considerable space on the
argument that melting glaciers and rising sea levels confirm
warming predated increases in CO2. The most significant Figure is
his I-30 showing 10,000 years of warmth. Look at Figure 7.8.

Figure 7.8 10,000 years of warming

Sources: (Alley, 2004)
Figure 7.8 is a substantial dataset that shows that modern warming
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is neither unusual or unprecedented. The data show that for more
than 6,100 years (60%) of the current interglacial warm period,
the temperature was warmer than it is today. Of the 9 significant
periods of warming, since the last ice age, 5 had higher rates of
temperature increase and 7 had larger total increases in
temperature. This should lead to fact 7.
Fact 7
The current warming trend is a natural and predictable result
of driving forces since the last ice age (aka The Little Ice Age
(1250-1850)
Forest Fires
Noted climatologist and egg layer, VP nominee Kamala Harris , in
her attacks on Supreme Court nominee, Judge Amy Coney Barrett
(ACB) stated unequivocally that forest fires are accelerating in
frequency and size, owing to man-made climate change.

The

National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) provides extensive
information on forest fires in the United States. (NIFC, 2017) See
Figure 7.9.

Figure 7.9 More CO2 but fewer forest fires

336 | Failure of Climate Change [Nichols]

Source: (NIFC, 2017)
Fact 8
Forest fires in the northern hemisphere are decreasing
A supporting study by the Canadian Forest Service (CFS)
compared temperatures, CO2 concentrations and forest fire
frequency over 150 years in North America. (Flannigan, Bergeron,
Engelmark, & Wotton, 1998)
Their conclusions:
“Despite increasing temperatures since the end of the LIA[22],
wildfire frequency has decreased as shown in many field studies from
North America and Europe. We believe that GW since 1850 may have
triggered decreases in fire frequency.”[23]
Tornadoes
Tornadoes are scary because they kill and injure US citizens more
than any other storm. The unique geography of the US makes it
tornado-prone. The Rocky Mountains and the Gulf of New Mexico
provide the key ingredients for formation of severe thunderstorms
that spawn tornadoes: warm, moist air close to the ground; cool,
dry air aloft; and horizontal winds that travel faster aloft than near
the surface. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) NOAA keeps the records on
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tornadoes. [24] (NOAA, NOAA NCEI Historical Records and Trends,
2017) NOAA recommends only using the strongest tornadoes as
a measure of pre-radar numbers. Doppler radar detection has
facilitated better identification and reporting of tornados after
WWII. Table 7.3 shows the tornados rank. NOAA recommends using
3+ on the scale for reporting. (NOAA, NOAA NCEI Historical Records
and Trends, 2017)
Table 7.3 The Fujita tornado scale
F

0

1

2

3

4

5

Fastest ¼ mile
(mph)

40-72 73-112 113-157 158-207 208-260 261-318

Fastest 3-second
gust (mph)

45-78 79-117 118-161 162-209 210-261

262-318

Source: (NOAA, NOAA NCEI Historical Records and Trends, 2017)
Combined Facts 9
1. The number of tornadoes is decreasing with 2016 showing
the lowest on record (NOAA, NOAA NCEI Historical Records
and Trends, 2017)
2. CO2 global emissions has increased at the same time severe
tornadoes ( F3+) has decreased (Boden TA, 2016)[25]
3. US tornado deaths per million population continues to fall
through 2000 (NOAA, us-annual-tornado-deathtolls-1875-present/, 2009)
4. Science and data show no correlation between tornadoes and
rising temperatures over the last 50 years. (Wrightstone G. ,
2017)
Figures 7.9-7.11 support the above FACTS 9. Figure 7.10 shows the
decline of severe tornadoes (F3+) over last 50 years. Figure 7.11
shows that 2016 was a banner year. Figure 7.12 shows that tornado
deaths per million population is also decreasing than 50 years ago.
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Figure 7.10 Severe tornadoes (F+4) are less frequent

Source: (ustornadoes.com, 2015)
(Boden TA, 2016) confirms the growth of CO2 global emissions
(bmt) [26] plotted against the same Figure 7.10 as increasing from
1954 -2015 to just under 10 bmt.

Figure 7.11 Lowest number of tornadoes in 2016

Source: (NOAA, Storm Prediction Center, 2020)
Note that 2106 had 901 tornadoes. 2020 logged 1004.
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Figure 7.12 US tornado deaths per million population

Source: (NOAA,

us-annual-tornado-death-tolls-1875-present/,

2009)
Hurricanes
Noted climatologist and egg layer, VP nominee Kamala Harris
(now elected VP), in her attacks on Supreme Court nominee, Judge
Amy Coney Barrett (ACB) also stated unequivocally that hurricanes
are accelerating in frequency and size, owing to man-made climate
change. The conventional wisdom behind this thinking is that GW
raises ocean temperatures, fueling tropical cyclones and hurricanes.
Actually, this sounds reasonable. However, we saw in our treatment
of deadly tornadoes that the CW was wrong, and that the evidence /
data suggested that frequency of deadly tornadoes was decreasing
over last 50 years. (NOAA, NOAA NCEI Historical Records and
Trends, 2017)
Promoters of the notion of GW causation of more severe
hurricanes includes the National Climate Assessment (NCA) of 2014.
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(Kossin JP, 2007) There review of power dissipation index vs time
, using satellite-based re-analyses does show an solid increasing
trend. Dr Ryan Maue challenged that data for insufficient range
analysis.[27] (Maue, 2016) Using the entire dataset (not 15% like
the NCA2014) and including land-falling hurricanes his conclusions
were quite a bit different. (Maue R. , 2017) See Figure 7.13.
Figure 7.13 Global tropical storm and hurricane frequency is
falling

Source: (Maue R. , 2017)
Dr Maue concluded that from 1970-2018 there is a downward
trend of hurricane and tropical storm frequency. The author
reviews the same data and sees an even or slight downward trend
but not increasing.
Fact 10
There has been no increase in frequency of hurricanes in
recent data
But what about the warming argument? Dr Landsea, a
meteorologist at the National Hurricane Center (NHC) has
quantified what an increase in intensity of major hurricanes, driven
by GW, might mean. (Landsea, 2011) His work indicates that the
warming over the last several decades translates into an increase of
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intensity of 1%. For Katrina (Cat 5), the wind speed would increase 2
mph. He wrote:
“The 1-2 mph change currently in the peak winds of strong
hurricanes due to man-made GW is so tiny that it is not measurable
by our aircrafts or satellites technologies available today, which is
only accurate to about 10 mph for major hurricanes.” (Landsea, 2011)
Which brings to Fact 11.
Fact 11
There is no significant increase in hurricane intensity due to
warming
(Landsea, 2011) (Wrightstone G. , 2017)
Conclusions
This chapter has taken the idea that because of man-made GW
/ CC, our society is headed for climate Hell from which we cannot
return. But Earth, its ecosystems, and we humans are actually
thriving because of the increasing CO2 and rising temperatures, not
in spite of it! (Wrightstone G. , 2017)
Yes there is a GH effect. Yes there is some warming. Yes, some
of it might be man-made. We can expect more. They are all
demonstrable. (Wrightstone G. , 2020)
But no, past and future anthropogenic warming does NOT mean
that catastrophe will follow, or that measures to prevent GW are
scientifically and economically justified. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) [
Here we drastically differ from the thrust / organizational and
investment measures suggested by (Coutu, 2019).]
As Wrightstone suggests, “the first and most important conclusion
is that the correct policy to address the non-problem of man-made
global warming is to have the courage to do nothing.” (Wrightstone G.
, 2017)
Questions
1) There are other claims about GW affects: ocean acidity, polar
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bears, melting ice caps, droughts, crops, and sea-level rise to name
just a few. Choose one topic to research and see if you agree with
the conventional wisdom and “consensus” or can you develop / find
data / synthesize data using the scientific method that at least puts
CW into question on your choice as to voracity. Make up your own
mind. [28]
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[1] Translate as “crises.”
[2] Special Disclaimer:
The author of this chapter is not a climatologist. His formal
training in weather is limited to USCG courses taken as an Ensign
in USCGA, to better his experience as a boat captain. He is an
experienced engineer, scientist, advanced mathematician, author,
managing editor, and qualified researcher. His experience includes
five decades of advanced simulation and modeling experience for
chemical engineering, business, and INFOSEC / counterterrorism
processes. He is recognized as a Subject Matter Expert in
cryptology and forensics by the USDOJ and an SME in
counterterrorism by the DTRA. He knows how to differentiate facts
from fiction and to develop complex risk assessments of key threats,
vulnerabilities, impact, and countermeasures for information and
intelligence systems – most recently with unmanned aircraft
systems. The point is he is neither a sheep nor parrot of
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conventional wisdom. He knows how to think and judge for himself
the issues/ information in dispute. Climate change is a contentious
issue where many minds are closed to challenges of their basic
beliefs. However, by definition, scientific research is a constant
challenge of our beliefs in the natural processes and order. By its
very nature and methodology, scientific research provides us with
tools to better understand our environment free (or should be free)
of political or financial pressures to divine an answer because of
popularity or agenda. Recognizing that the author does not breathe
in a vacuum, this chapter does not necessarily represent the
opinions of my employer, my professional Board(s) associations,
certifying authorities, my team, my colleagues, my oldest daughter
or newest daughter-in-law, my congressmen or state senators and
any individual or organization that sponsors / reads my work or
hears my presentations on unrelated issues like counter unmanned
aircraft systems. The information provided is based on personal
reasonable research and proffered as an alternative to “conventional
wisdom.”
[3] This is exactly what a SCOTUS nominee should do. Remain
neutral and avoid public comment on contentious issues of public
policy.
[4] This statement has been thrown around in so many media that it
goes unchallenged. Saul Alinsky in his “Rules for Radicals” is credited
with “if you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will
eventually come to believe it.“ The actual source is Joseph Goebbels,
Nazi propaganda minister. (JVL, 2020)
[5] The author is both a scientist and engineer. He was introduced
to the method in 1959. In 1962, the author was awarded, as a senior
in HS, a scientific internship and scholarship to Rockefeller Institute
of Technology in NYC. In that august body one of the most famous
scientific discoveries was made and awarded the Nobel Prize to
James Dewey Watson KBE

an American molecular biologist,

geneticist, and zoologist. In 1953, he co-authored with Francis Crick
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the academic paper proposing the double helix structure of the
DNA molecule. Watson, Crick and Maurice Wilkins were awarded
the 1962 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine “for their discoveries
concerning the molecular structure of nucleic acids and its
significance for information transfer in living material” (Wikipedia,
James_Watson, 2020) The author’s contribution to DNA human
genome mapping project was merely running a gas chromatograph
and summarizing datasets for the “suits.” But I met the top guns
at a celebration of Nobel Prize in the auditorium. My point – the
DNA project is a terrific example of the application of the scientific
method. The reference also details the methodology. (Wikipedia,
Scientific Method, 2020)
[6] Note there is no political, financial influence or consensus
required in this definition.
[7] Cooks’ team has 12 volunteers who classify themselves as
activists and 9 of them have no training at all in any science.
[8] Agnotology is defined as the study of how ignorance arises via
circulation of misinformation calculated to mislead.
[9] It appears that Cook and his co-authors manipulated the data to
present an altogether untrue narrative of overwhelming support for
catastrophic human-caused warming.
[10] Try to recognize the bias, hysteria, and lack of scientific basis in
this status quo approach. Look at the inflammation in the words.
[11] Seems to me that nuclear war at the instigation of hostile
nations or complete economic failure of society might rank fairly
high.
[12] See Nichols CUAS textbook (2020) for a complete description
and frequency allocation of the EMS and small the near-infrared
spectrum is in terms of the entire allocation of frequencies. (Nichols
R. K., et al., 2020)
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[13] Fahrenheit is the authors choice, but the world adores Celsius.
Engineers can work with both F or C. o F = 1.8 (o C) +32
[14] Photosynthesis is the process by which green plants and some
other organisms use sunlight to synthesize foods from carbon
dioxide and water. Photosynthesis is important to living organisms
because it is the number one source of oxygen in the atmosphere.
Green plants and trees use photosynthesis to make food from
sunlight, carbon dioxide and water in the atmosphere: It is their
primary source of energy. Photosynthesis is usually represented by
the equation 6 CO2 + 6 H2O + light –> C6H12O6 + 6 O2. During this
process, organisms such as plants go through the light-dependent
and light-independent reactions to convert carbon dioxide and
water into sugars and oxygen. The O2 produced is used by living
organisms as a vital part of the synchronicity of the ecosystem.
(Wikipedia, Photosynthesis, 2020)
[15] We will examine some of these extreme weather conditions in
this chapter.
[16] All “Facts” statements in blue are based on or quoted from
(Wrightstone G. , 2017)
[17] Ed Ring writes for the Climate Disinformation Database,
https://www.desmogblog.com/global-warming-denier-database .
(Ed Ring, EcoWorld, 2008) Dick Pilard picked up his Letter in
Aspentimes

https://www.aspentimes.com/opinion/letters-to-

the-editor/letter-politics-disguised-as-science/
[18] During the writing of this chapter, the author of (Wrightstone
G. , 2017) was suspended for 3 weeks for his anti-global warming
opinion piece on LinkedIn. I personally felt that Linkedin was the
last bastion of reasonable professional level discussions. Such
censorship and non-acceptance of differing professional opinions
on key issues is common place to the level of vulgarity on Twitter
and Facebook. Their leaders are under investigation by Congress.
It is most disappointing that a professional network like Linkedin
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should join the anti-FOS crowd. (Author opinion only) It behooves
us to remember that science is NOT consensus and consensus is
not science. Another interesting issue is does the First Amendment
apply to publicly held social networking corporations. Evelyn
Beatrice Hall wrote the phrase: “I disapprove of what you say, but I
will defend to the death your right to say it.” (Tallentyre, 1906) This
quotation – which is sometimes misattributed to Voltaire himself
– is often cited to describe the principle of Freedom Of
Speech. (Boller & George, 1989)
[19] This included the Modern, Medieval, Roman, Minoan, Egyptian
Old Kingdom and Holocene climate optima periods.
[20] The author has reviewed all four documents. The counterattack
on MM claims by an anonymous “mike @ 4 December 2004” has
some interesting points but hiding from the public strains the
credibility.
[21] The Best figure is better representation of CET data than Figure
I-24 in (Wrightstone G. , 2017) However, there many images
covering the same CET / Hadley dataset and some showing
declining warming. This contradiction can be resolved by
presentation XY scales and units.
[22] LIA = Little Ice Age (1250-1850)
[23] The Flannigan team further attributed the decline in wildfires
to the combined effect of CO2 fertilization and rising temperature,
leading to greater soil moisture.
[24] For a tornado to be counted, it must be observed. Early records
and evidence of tornadoes – even in Tornado Alley – are unreliable
for the sparsely populated early 20Th century. (NOAA, NOAA NCEI
Historical Records and Trends, 2017)
[25] CO2 emissions per bmt previously shown in Figure 7.8. (Boden
TA, 2016)
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[26] Bmt = billions of metric tons
[27] Insufficient range = “cherry picking the data”
[28] Keep looking because there are active efforts to censor any
dissent. Scientific inquiry and discoveries are not political tools,
they are the basis of intelligent life.
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8. Nightmare Technologies
[Nichols]
Student Learning Objectives
Two simple objectives: To be technology aware and think about
their harmful effects on your life.[1]
Emerging vs Disruptive Technologies
There is a difference between emerging technology trends and
disruptive ones. Emerging technologies are technologies whose
development, practical applications, or both are still largely
unrealized,

such

that

they

are

figuratively

emerging

into

prominence from a background of nonexistence or obscurity. (Wiki,
2021) Some sources say that emerging technologies are taking over
the world by a storm and if misused, it could turn out to be our
worst enemy. (Rose, 2019) Toward Data Science magazine lists Drone
Swarms as number one in their list. The topic is covered in detail
in (Nichols R. , et al., 2020). Smart home devices that spy, ex. IoT or
AI / IoT is number two, followed by facial recognition, spy dust and
autonomous robots. (Rose, 2019)
A Disruptive technology is one that displaces an established
technology and shakes up the industry or a ground-breaking
product that creates a completely new industry. (Rouse, 2021) ,
In this chapter, we explode and explore nightmare disruptive
technologies, that if they come to full fruition may do more harm
than good. Some of them might reach Black Swan event status.[2]
The technologies are not presented in any particular order. They
all have the capability of bringing evil to our doorstep and crushing
what is left of our right of privacy.
Surveillance Technologies
On 6 January 2021, the author asked his writing team of twelve
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SMEs in their respective fields, the following questions: 1) What
surveillance technology would you consider the most invasive to our
privacy as citizens?
2) What surveillance technology has the potential to be the most
damaging to our society or military defenses or law enforcement
operations? The list was fascinating and ranged from the real to
semi- fantasy.
The list included:
• Alexa / Siri / Cortona [ASC group] (cute names for a massive
systems of systems – always “listening” )
• Quantum computing, especially when coupled with the ASC
group,
• AI driven quantum systems
• Voting machines that tilt the scales or select a candidate rather
than tabulate / confirm results. Voting machines designed to
be the perfect transparency laundering tool. This results in the
ability to fake manual voting in scale.
• Cellphones (an addition that has destroyed personal
communications and catalogued our lives for fodder). They are
vessels for listening / data collection / tracking / and
biometric identification theft.
• Implant technology – for use on humans – similar to use on
animals for location rendering
• AI driven mechanics / robotics -replacements for humans
when not really justified
• IoT – connecting things that were not meant to be connected
and made available online.
• Blockchain (however, two major pitfalls exist: a) a replacement
better security technology see our Chapter 6 on Future Proof
Security and b) regulations by banks, IRS, agencies will crush
speculative use.)
• Exploiting Automation & Human-Machine Symbiosis for the
wrong reasons. See chapter 2 on this subject.
• Mini drones (covered in (Nichols R. , et al., Unmanned Aircraft
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Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air
Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019) . Drones can be made so small
Chinese stink bugs can’t tell the difference.
• Nanobots or intelligent sand (aka MEMS)
• Drone Swarms [covered in detail in (Nichols R. , et al., 2020)
and (Nichols R. , et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in
Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd
Edition, 2019)]
• Face / Voice / Biometrics recognition
• Weaponized social media – especially FB, & Twitter
• GPS units in everything from cars, phones, boats, animals,
aircraft, watches, hearing aids, you name it the technology has
become ubiquitous.
• Identity cards / Health vaccination cards / Social media
scores ( like the Chinese experiment) Real ID/ ammunition
purchase cards / gun registration – bureaucratic control
-paperwork designed to erode U.S Constitution and its
amendments for purposes of “our safety or for our kids”
• Legalization of every known illegal drug – tracking by health
agencies and permission slips to replace doctor’s script.
• Enforcement of politically correct speech by investigations,
informants, indoctrination camps
• Surveillance of radio stations and advertisers with federal
enforcement of against alternative views.
• Registration and subsequent licensing of every facet of our
lives.
• Coordinating databases and information storage facilities (
where every conceivable piece of information on individuals
and All their communications, in every media; in every
language with translation capabilities are kept, catalogued,
interrogated using keywords and summarized for intelligence
dossiers.) (Burrington, 2015) Large amounts of encrypted data
are also sucked up by this surveillance vacuum on the
assumption that new crypto-cracking methods will be
developed as they have since 1972. (Nichols R. K., ICSA Guide to
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Cryptography, 1999)
• Ransomware, AI, and Bot-enabled Blackmailing, Hacking and
Extortion
• AI Cloning – Deep fake Technology for Voice and Video
recordings.

The above list combines actual technologies with the abuse of
those technologies. It is not all inclusive. Every new method of
control and surveillance has been abused by authorities and
recently by corporations. This abuse is usually discovered and
legislated against – from habeas corpus to mail, telegraph,
telephones, cell phones, internet, GPS on transportation, to
implants. (Elliott, 2019) The trend according to Timo Elliott, noted
Innovation Evangelist, is bound to continue – and potentially get
much worse- with AI -powered technologies such as face
recognition. (Elliott, 2019)
All the above technologies bring together many diverse /
disparate information sources [3] to get a single view of an
operation, location, geopolitical activity, defense theater of
operations, or market. (Elliott, 2019)[4]
This can be a boon to businesses but a nightmare for society if
used by malevolent minds.
Col Joel Anderson,[5] OVPR at KSU is quoted: “ He who controls
information controls the world.”
To that the chapter author would add that the most effective vehicle
to gain information is unrestricted surveillance.
For years businesses and agencies around the world were
essentially leveraged or perhaps held hostage for ransom using
software and network flaws that were kept deliberately secret by
NSA and CIA to use for 1) against enemies and 2) wield influence.
(Elliott, 2019) (Zegart, 2017)
But these same agencies were hacked, and their secrets exposed
/ spread across the globe. (Kass, 2020) (Shane, 2019)
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Today’s secrets will not stay secret for long. All you have to do
is look at the deleted, purged emails, text messages, GPS locations,
of politicians, criminals, cheating spouses, drug dealers, terrorists,
and movie stars exploited every day in the news media to convince
yourself of this fact.
Alexa / Siri / Cortona [ASC group]
Perhaps the most invasive of the ASC group is Alexa. “Would you
let a stranger eavesdrop in your home and keep the recordings? For
most people, the answer is, “Are you crazy?” Yet that’s essentially
what Amazon has been doing to millions of us with its assistant
Alexa in microphone-equipped Echo speakers. And it’s hardly alone:
Bugging our homes is Silicon Valley’s next frontier.” (Fowler, 2019)
“Many smart-speaker owners don’t realize it, but Amazon keeps a
copy of everything Alexa records after it hears its name. Apple’s Siri,
and until recently Google’s Assistant, by default also keep recordings
to help train their artificial intelligences.” (Fowler, 2019) Fowler
really hits the target point blank: “For as much as we fret about
snooping apps on our computers and phones, our homes are where
the rubber really hits the road for privacy. It’s easy to rationalize
away concerns by thinking a single smart speaker or appliance
couldn’t know enough to matter. But across the increasingly
connected home, there’s a brazen data grab going on, and there are
few regulations, watchdogs, or common-sense practices to keep it in
check.” (Fowler, 2019)
Author

Privacy

Recommendation:

Disconnect

and

delete

everything you can find associated with ASC group.
Addiction
We are addicted to our cellphones! We are addicted to cell phone
market basket of technologies. Forget the standard addictions
(drugs, booze, cigarettes, sex, news, TV, porn). These pale in
comparison to the need to immediately respond to a text message
(even when driving at 60 mph).
Here is a fun set of statistics compiled by GSAA.
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Smartphone usage statistics suggest that an average person
spends 2 hours and 51 minutes per day on their mobile device.
What’s more, 22% of us check our phones every few minutes, and
51% of users look at it a few times per hour. (Miljic, 2019) [ My
personal stats show a daily average of 8h 16m] [6] Some more fun:
• 71 billion people in the world own a smartphone in 2019.
• More than 5 billion people in the world own mobile devices.
• Kids get their first mobile device around the age of 12.
• 194 billion mobile phone apps were downloaded in 2019.
• 92% of Americans believe that cell phone addiction is real.
• Two-thirds of the world is now connected via mobile devices.
• Mobile owners worldwide will increase to 7.33 billion by 2023.
• An average smartphone user has 63 interactions on her phones
a day.

Have you ever tried counting the number of times you check your
phone during the day? According to recent findings, an average
person casually checks his/her phone about 63 times a day. Even
87% of us do it one hour before going to bed, while 69% check
smartphones within the first five minutes of waking up.
Further, smartphone usage stats say that 86% of people
constantly check their phones while talking to friends, which can
be pretty annoying if you are the other person in the conversation.
(Miljic, 2019)
5+ hours of smartphone usage a day increases the chances of
obesity. Recent health studies have revealed an alarming number of
obese people in the world. The risk of obesity has increased by 43%,
and much is to blame on the modern and unhealthy lifestyle many
people are leading. (Miljic, 2019)
Cellphone usage statistics coincide with this trend, and many
doctors suggest that the prime cause for obesity are computers and
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handheld devices. Some doctors go as far as to say that cell phones
and their overuse are the prime cause for some people getting
overweight. (Miljic, 2019)
Increasing smartphone usage can diminish our ability to interpret
information. A recently published study revealed a fascinating
insight into smartphone use. The study included two controlled
experiments that were based on current smartphone usage trends.
It shockingly revealed that using smartphones too much diminishes
our ability to understand the deeper meaning of the information
that we get. (Miljic, 2019) You need more proof than the attention
the public has on taking selfies and videotaping everything from
bugs to riots to ? Do you think people really care about the subject
or is it some deep down loss of connection which we had before the
cellphone explosion? I have seen an employee fired with just a text
or a date dumped on Valentines Day with a brief email. What does
that tell you about the level of rudeness that we are experiencing
in society today? (Nichols R. , Heinleins-symptoms-decaying-dyingculture, 2016)

Some clever people are designing algorithms to maximize
engagement by ad clicks. This is an awful metric for society. Casino’s
use analytics to determine exactly how to get gamblers back to the
gaming tables after losses – so they can lose more. Social media
and gaming companies do the same thing on a massive scale, to
make their platforms as “sticky” – i.e., as addictive – as possible.
(Elliott, 2019) More engaging does not mean better. Hate is a virus,
and we are spreading it more efficiently than ever before thanks to
modern algorithm targeting. (Elliott, 2019) Fake news is engaging,
interesting, but it is a lie and those that spread it or create it have no
Honor. (Nichols R. , A Case for Honor, 2017) Speaking of fake news,
lets look briefly at Deep Fake technology.
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AI Cloining (Deep Fakes)
All that is needed to clone a person’s voice is AI and a snippet of
audio. Similarly, AI can take several photos or videos of a person
and then create an entirely new – cloned video that appears to
be original but with a very different message. AI can create an
artificial YOU. The results are so convincing our brains have trouble
differentiating between what is real and what is cloned. (Marr, 2019)
Deep fake technology uses facial mapping, machine learning, and
AI to create representations of real people doing and saying things
they never did. Celebrities are not the only targets; ordinary people
are too. The technology is so advanced that it does not require
much raw data to create a convincing fake video, plus there are a lot
more images and videos of ordinary people from the internet and
social media channels to use. (Elliott, 2019) An example is Facebook
(FB) which people use extensively to swap images or post publicly
things that 99% percent of us don’t care a cent about. FB owns all
those images!
De-Censoring Images
There is an interesting analog to deep fake technology called decensoring images. The technology is not perfected but is making
great strides via AI. A censored photo is an image with certain parts
of it painted over or pixelated. Like this:
Figure 8.1 Censored Image The Birth of Venus by Sandro
Botticelli, 1480 Source: (Birth of Venus, 2021) (InPlant, 2021)
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It seems surprising that anyone would want to censor the
extraordinary skill of Botticelli. Can this somehow be fixed? Is there
a way to uncensor such an image and get its censored parts back?
To answer this question, let’s go into what a censored image is. A
photo can be censored in multiple ways of which the most popular
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are two: painting over and pixelating. Censorship of the first type is
a black (or any other color) box painted over some part of the image,
possibly with a “censored” mark on it. The second censoring method
takes the area of the photo to censor and artificially lowers the
image resolution of that area. The resulting image loses quality and
becomes unreadable. Censoring is irreversible. You cannot restore
original pixels of the image that are now painted over or blurred.
There is a way to recover a part of original information using the
surrounding (uncensored) pixels using Inpaint.© There are three
steps: 1) Load the image into implant; 2) Mark the censored area
using the marker tool; and 3) Run the retouching process. Inpaint
lets you retouch the censored area and hide it from the picture by
extrapolating surrounding pixels to the censored part of the image.
Inpaint© will try to recover information from the surrounding pixels
and makes the whole image look like it is not censored. (InPlant,
2021)
Can I uncensor a face or a bikini?
No, not yet. The censored image simply does not contain
information about face or body features anymore. After all, that’s
the point of censorship, is it? Inpaint can only restore the censored
part of the image by analyzing its other parts and applying them as a
patch to the censored zone. As long as your photo does not contain
another copy of the same face, there is nothing you can do here.
However, Inpaint© can remove censored boxes from logotypes,
labels, vehicle number plates and such. It can recover non-essential
parts of the photo that was censored, like smoking cigarettes or
any other small objects, censored territories on satellite photos and
such. (InPlant, 2021)
Weaponized Algorithmic Addiction (Social Asymmetric Warfare)
and Asymmetric Warfare
On Asymmetric Thinking / Warfare / Fear (Nichols R. , 2017)
Before we jump into social asymmetric warfare (aka Weaponized
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Algorithmic Addiction), let’s review some important concepts:
terrorism, asymmetric thinking / warfare, and fear.
Terrorism
Terrorism is violence or threatened violence against innocent
people or symbols to change behavior by producing fear. Our foes
of the future, will by necessity, engage in asymmetric warfare – the
strategy, tactics, and tools a weaker adversary uses to offset the
superiority of a foe by attacking the stronger forces vulnerabilities,
using both direct and indirect approaches to hamper vital functions
or locations to exploit advantage.
The author sees this as a struggle of intangibles constituting will:
fear, morale, surprise. We will see both the kinetic (symmetric)
elements (bullets, bombs and attrition) and non-kinetic elements
(asymmetric) – such as perception management, deception,
knowledge exploitation, and cyberspace assault. The war against
terrorism is a struggle for survival for a way of life and conflicting
cultural and religious perspectives.
Our asymmetric foes of the future hope to recreate the massive
second-and third- order effects that struck our country’s social,
political, economic, financial, military, and information systems on
11 September 2001. Asymmetric warfare and hence thinking,
involves intangibles- achieving offsets through surprise, shock
effects, and the ability to influence information ICGs[7] to create
aggregate effects in command-and- control systems, the decision
making of leaders, the will of the public to support them. (Nichols R.
, 2017)
Knowledge War and Fear
Two areas where everybody can help defeat terrorism are:
Knowledge war and recognizing Fear for what it is. Knowledge war
deals with how people use information and knowledge in the
intellectual sense – it’s about superior thinking, planning and
decision making under uncertainty.
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One of the most important implications for people involved in
knowledge war lies in the absolute requirement for expending
resources to find and identify the intricacies of the opponent’s
decision-making processes. The concept of information center of
gravity (ICG) has emerged. ICG is confluence of streams of
communication, collection, automation, thinking, planning, and
decision-making. Whether found in physical or virtual space, it is so
important that its demise or manipulation can seriously jeopardize
the success of a mission or task.
Aggregation
Asymmetric thinking involves aggregation. A great force comes
from the power of aggregation. When we find relationships, then
combine and exploit them, we are aggregating for advantage. A
certain degree of synergy (the whole greater than the sum of the parts)
comes from aggregating and connecting things, activities, actions,
networks, and societal values. When things are connected in tightly
woven relationships, they move together. However, the slightest
perturbation or variance in one critical element can cause dramatic
changes to whole (dominoes falling). This also explains the incredible
power in the second-and third order cascading effects we
witnessed after 11 September 2001.
Our most recent example of aggregation was on 6 January 2021,
when the capital was stormed and Congress was breached by
protestors. They were allegedly unhappy about President Trump’s
loss of his presidency and VP Pence not standing up to decertifying
the results of the electoral college. They wanted an an audit of
states laws, practices, and alleged allegations from 1000’s of
deposed witnesses in 6 key states. Witnesses claimed they were
involved with / or witnessed fraudulent ballot counting or
practices, and allegedly questionable results from Dominion
machines.
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Coping with Asymmetric Warfare
Asymmetric warfare represents the most significant challenge to
this country in our entire history. How do we cope? First, we must
change the way we think, plan and view the world. Second, people
involved with security have to accept the concept of possibilities
(potentialities not bound by constraints and avoid falling into the
well-camouflaged trap of following the past and concentrating on
capabilities (potentialities bound by constraints) and intent. Third,
we must avoid mirror imaging our self on the world. This is a fatal
flaw in our national character. Fourth, planners must consider the
perceptions of the public, because asymmetric foes will target them
as soft and vulnerable. The next big attack is on the National Will.
The opponent’s perception is more important than ours in this
concept. Fifth, asymmetric assaults should be anticipated from any
quarter, any time, and any place. Sixth, a learning, adaptive threat
could very well know and understand our systems, process, and
psyches almost as well as we do. Knowledge is available to all people
and this must force improved decision-making and anticipation on
our security people. (Nichols R. , 2017)
FEAR
The second factor is Fear. In teaching my self-defense and rape
defense courses, I ask participants to experience meeting their
Fears head-on. We all have them. Many of them irrational and many
are real. Note, I did not say understand Fear. (In life, understanding
is the door prize, whereas experiencing something is truth and selfactualizing.) Let me give you a new definition for Fear. Fear is False
Evidence Appearing Real. Fear can be reduced / controlled / used
to our own advantage / energizing and channeled into effective
action through training and practice of skills.
In life, with or without terrorism, we have One Encounter- One
Chance to make the correct decisions to protect ourselves. There
is no going back. We embrace our fears, we improve our skills,
we challenge our knowledge assumptions, we create new choices,
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we think asymmetrically (potentialities not bound by constraints),
better, faster, more holistically, making more effective decisions.
(Nichols R. K., ONE ENCOUNTER – ONE CHANCE, 2018)
Weaponized Algorithmic Addiction (aka Asymmetric Social
Warfare)
In traditional fighting, smaller armies using guerrilla tactics win
much more often than would be expected. Now we are seeing
asymmetric social warfare, where small groups with an agenda can
destabilize society. Large companies like Facebook,© Google, © and
Twitter© who all have public, on-camera, clear biases can leverage
the potential deliterious effects of these small groups with an
agenda by setting their business algorithms to support their attacks
(aggregation). There are two very decent examples of this
weaponization COVID-19 and social media reaction to POTUS after
6 January 2021 Congress breach. (Both these are discussed in detail.)

COVID-19
COVID-19 (and variants) has viciously struck the world. So many
have died. COVID -19 does not discriminate on the basis of color,
race, origin, sex, time, curfews, laws, business type, or age. It doesn’t
give a damn. It just kills. Evidence of the terrible numbers and
losses are out there, all you have to do is let the information in.
[8] Scientists all over the globe have been developing a vaccine
to counter COVID-19. At least two companies, Pfizer and Moderna
in the US have reached the goal posts and are distributing their
life-saving vaccines in two inoculation packages. They are ~95%
effective! It is no secret that the US government under President
Trump’s urging / direction sped up the normally long-time federal
approval process and contracted for millions of doses to be
distributed to the American populace. It is also no secret that
Democrats as a group are not fans of the outgoing president.
Extremists in their party have publicly derided the effort and
fostered FEAR about the vaccine as ineffective (all scientific
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evidence to the contrary). Many have called for Not taking the
vaccine even though it represents a life-saving measure available to
100,000’s citizens / non-citizens – especially seniors.
Americans have a relatively low understanding of disease and
vaccines, in general. Many respondents a consumer survey[9] were
unable to name the leading COVID-19-vaccine manufacturers and
had limited knowledge of the vaccine candidates’ key attributes.
There are multiple reasons for this reality including the emergence
of social media as a major source of information and the welldocumented growth of the “antivaccination” or “ANTIVAX”
movement. A recent in-depth analysis of online narratives about
vaccines on social media by the organization First Draft found that
the majority of social media discussions about COVID-19 focus on
“political and economic motives” of actors and institutions involved
in vaccine development and the “safety, efficacy, and necessity”
concerns around vaccines. (Conway, 2020)
Regardless of which vaccines emerge, it is reasonable to assume
that significant amounts of incorrect or misleading information will
be spread. This is especially problematic given that, based on a
recent survey, more consumers source their COVID-19-vaccination
information from social media (27 percent) than from physicians (16
percent) or from state-, local-, and federal-government officials (22
to 24 percent). (Conway, 2020)
According to a recent US-consumer research, 63 percent of
respondents are cautious about or unlikely to adopt COVID-19
vaccination.

The

“cautious,”

who

comprise

45

percent

of

respondents (the largest segment), are those who will wait and see
how a vaccine performs in the “real world” before deciding if they
will get vaccinated. Another 18 percent say they are unlikely to
vaccinate. The relative proportion of consumers in the “interested,”
“cautious,” and “unlikely” segments has remained largely consistent
in the past five months, with some slight positive shifts in
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subsegments of the “cautious”, even following positive readouts
from the clinical trials of the Moderna and Pfizer–BioNTech
vaccines. (Conway, 2020)
At-risk Americans are also uncertain. Despite the welldocumented risks that elderly people face when contracting
COVID-19, only 65 percent of respondents older than 65 years
reported that they are interested in getting vaccinated. Only 31
percent of black respondents and 36 percent of Hispanic
respondents said that they are interested. Other recent surveys
show similar results. While 60 percent of those earning more than
$100,000 per year report that they are interested in getting
vaccinated, only 31 percent of those who earn less than $25,000
report the same. These findings are consistent with observed,
historical behavior among higher-risk segments with respect to
other vaccines. (Conway, 2020)
Consumer sentiment does not always predict actual behaviors,
of course. First, sentiment can and does evolve. Second, there has
always been a gap between what people say they will do about
public health and what they actually do. That said, the research
suggests that about 30 to 50 percent of people are interested in
getting vaccinated against COVID-19, and the other 50 to 70 percent
are uncertain or unlikely. That means that among the 195 million
Americans who would likely need to be vaccinated to reach herd
immunity in the population, about 100 million to 150 million would
need to be engaged further to decide and take action to get
vaccinated. (Conway, 2020)
Another look at the COVID-19 through the eyes of a destabilizing
social agenda is superbly illustrated in the cartoon ( Figure 8.2)
below on the ANTIVAX movement by Dragoes de Garagem.
Figure 8.2 Antivax Movement by Dragoes de Garagem (Elliott,
2019)
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Twitter© & Facebook© Actions
The headline read Twitter, Facebook (permanently)[10] block
Trump from posting amid Capitol violence. In an unprecedented
step, Facebook and Twitter suspended U.S. President Donald Trump
from posting to their platforms Wednesday following the storming
of the Capitol by his supporters. (Hindi Staff Editor, 2021)
Twitter locked Mr. Trump out of his account for 12 hours and
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said that future violations by Mr. Trump could result in a permanent
suspension. The company required the removal of three of Mr.
Trump’s tweets, including a short video in which he urged those
supporters to “go home” while also repeating falsehoods about the
integrity of the presidential election. Mr. Trump’s account deleted
those posts; had they remained; Twitter had threatened to extend
his suspension. (Hindi Staff Editor, 2021) Facebook followed up in
the evening, announcing that Mr. Trump wouldn’t be able to post for
24 hours following two violations of its policies.
While some cheered the platforms’ actions, experts noted that
the companies’ actions follow years of hemming and hawing on
Mr. Trump and his supporters spreading dangerous misinformation
and encouraging violence that have contributed to Wednesday’s
violence. (Hindi Staff Editor, 2021)
Forget the obvious position of the aforementioned report and
clearly recognize two things: 1) two organizations have so much
control that they can cut off millions of interested people (globally)
from any discussion or reasoning because they are setting the
agenda. They can force their opinions and bias on a huge populace.
This is a disturbing technology trend. How can an organization be so
arrogant as to think they know the hearts and thoughts of millions
based on their weaponized algorithms?

Drone Swarms
The British, Chinese, Russians, Israelis, Iranians, Syrians, North
Koreans, South Koreans, and United States armed forces are testing
how interconnected, cooperative drones can be used in military
operations. Drone Swarms represent a real threat and technologies
to support their use are in major development. (Nichols R. K., et
al., 2020), (Nichols R. , et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in
Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition,
2019), (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020), and (Nichols R. K., 2018) all devote
considerable writing effort to the operation, organization, threat,
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application, risks, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures required for
Drone Swarms.
Inspired by a swarm of insects working together, drone swarms
could revolutionize future conflicts by overwhelming enemy
sensors with their numbers and unrelenting mission devotion, or to
effectively cover a large area for S & R missions[11]. They can reduce
lives lost or cause more to be lost.
The difference between swarms and how drones are used by
the military today is that a swarm can organize itself based on
the situation and through drone interactions with each other to
accomplish its mission. (Marr, 2019) The reality of a swarm smart
enough to coordinate (without human intervention) its own
behavior is approaching. The thought of killer machines being able
to “think” for themselves is fodder for nightmares and movies. (Marr,
2019) Swarm technology is being deployed in all conflicts and will
be in future conflicts. (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019) (Nichols R. , et al.,
2020)
IoT and ASC Devices in the Home – The spy in the home
For smart home devices to respond to queries and be as useful as
possible, they need to be listening and tracking information about
you and your regular habits. This is exactly what the ASC group
does. When you added the Echo to your room as a radio and alarm
clock (or any other smart device connected to the Internet via IoT
or directly or wirelessly or Bluetooth or IR), you also allowed a
spy to enter your home. All the information smart devices collect
about your habits such as your viewing history on Netflix; where
you live and what route you take home so Google can tell you how
to avoid traffic; and what time you typically arrive home so your
smart thermostat can make your family room the temperature you
prefer, is stored in the cloud. Of course, this information makes your
life more convenient, but there is also the potential for abuse. In
theory, virtual assistant devices listen for a “wake word,” before they
activate, but there are instances when it might think you said the
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wake word and begin recording. Any smart device in your home,
including gaming consoles and smart TVs, could be the entry point
for abuse of your personal information. There are some defensive
strategies such as covering up cameras, turning off devices when
not needed and muting microphones, but none of them are 100%
foolproof. (Marr, 2019)
Smart Electric Meters
One of the most deceptive and invasive devices is the smart
electricity meter. Modern meters can track not only when you’re not
home, but what you’re up to when you’re there. When you are home,
it can determine how many times you flush your toilet. [12] (Nichols
R. K., Invited Speaker, (19 September 2018) Lions Club, speaking on
Personal Privacy: How to Defend against Invasions of It, 2018)
Consumers already face a laundry list of daily privacy issues
ranging from Facebook’s failure to police how user data is abused, to
ISPs that routinely track your every online movement down to the
millisecond.
But another, less talked about privacy problem has slowly been
gaining steam: the modern, electrical utility smart meter. Modern
electricity usage meters provide innumerable benefits to utility
companies, including a variety of remote access and monitoring
tools to better manage the power grid. They also dramatically
reduce the cost of technician visits for on-location meter readings.
The benefits to consumers have been less impressive, however.
Some models have been found to interfere with some home routers,
and, like so many internet-connected devices, other variants are
easily hacked. But these devices also collect an ocean of private
customer data, including detailed information that can be used to
infer when you wake, when you sleep, and when you’re at home or
away. In the past, electricity meters delivered a lump monthly KW
use figure to utilities; but smart meters transmit data in granular
detail, often in increments ranging from fifteen minutes to every
few hours. This, in turn, has sparked concern from locals in places
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like Naperville, Illinois, where, since 2011, one citizen group has
been fighting the intrusive nature of the devices. Under the name
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, citizens sued the city over a
policy mandating that all city residents must have smart meters
installed by the local city-owned power utility. In their lawsuit,
they argued that the city’s smart meter data collection violated
their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. This week, the group notched a notable win when the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Fourth Amendment
does in fact protect energy-consumption data collected by smart
meters. The ruling leans heavily on the Kyllo v. United States
precedent that declared the use of thermal imaging tech to monitor
citizens without a warrant also violates the Fourth Amendment.
(Bode, 2018)
The court was quick to point out smart meter data collection
often provides much deeper insight than could be obtained via
the thermal imaging tech that was at issue in the Kyllo ruling. In
large part because modern appliances often have distinct energyconsumption patterns or “load signatures” that not only tell the
utility when you’re home, but precisely what you’re doing. (Bode,
2018)
“A refrigerator, for instance, draws power differently than a
television, respirator, or indoor grow light,” the ruling notes. “By
comparing longitudinal energy-consumption data against a growing
library of appliance load signatures, researchers can predict the
appliances that are present in a home and when those appliances
are used.” The ruling could prove to be important for the growing
number of homes that have smart meters installed. This is especially
true given the growing interest among law enforcement and
intelligence agencies in gaining access to this data without a
warrant, and the apparent lack of interest in meaningful federal
or state privacy protections for consumers. “The Seventh Circuit
recognized that smart meters pose serious risks to the privacy of all
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of our homes, and that rotely applying analog-era case law to the
digital age simply doesn’t work,” Jamie Williams, staff attorney at the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, told Motherboard. “We hope that
courts around the country follow the Seventh Circuit and find that
the Fourth Amendment protects smart meter data,” Williams added.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Association, roughly 70.8
million smart meters were already deployed by the end of 2016,
with roughly 88% of them in residential homes. It’s expected that
about 80% of U.S. homes will have a smart meter installed by 2020.
While this ruling generally only applies to government access to this
smart electricity data, Williams noted that state regulators can also
play a sizeable role in preventing corporate utilities from collecting
and potentially selling this data without your permission. Said data
could prove invaluable to data brokers that also traffic in cellular
location data. In 2011, the California Public Utilities Commission
passed regulations protecting the privacy and security of
consumers’ electrical usage data. In 2014, the CPUC also passed
rules that let users pay a fee to opt out of such data collection.
California’s Pacific Gas and Electric wasn’t a fan; and was busted for
spying on activists in a bid to undermine smart meter opposition.
“In order to protect consumers, other state utilities commissions,
including the Illinois Commerce Commission, should pass similar
regulations,” Williams recommended. (Bode, 2018)
Back in Illinois, the court warned that the entire fight could have
been avoided if the city-owned utility had simply provided users
with the option of using a traditional meter instead of forcing the
upgrade. They also could have provided consumers the ability to
opt out of data collection. “Naperville could have avoided this
controversy—and may still avoid future uncertainty—by giving its
residents a genuine opportunity to consent to the installation of
smart meters, as many other utilities have,” the court said. (Bode,
2018)
As the country debates new privacy rules in the wake of endless
hacking scandals, rampant social media and broadband ISP data
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collection, it’s important not to forget about the lowly electrical
meter.
Facial Recognition
There are some useful applications for facial recognition.
However, it can easily fall into sinster hands. China stands accused
of using facial recognition technology for surveillance and racial
profiling. They can spot Hong Kong protestors and monitor to
control Uighur Muslims who live in their country. Russia’s cameras
scan the streets for “people of interest”. Israel tracks Palestinians
inside the West Bank.
What about the US?
A raging battle over controversial facial recognition software used
by law enforcement and the civil rights of Americans might be
heading to a courtroom. The latest salvo includes the American Civil
Liberties Union suing the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the
Drug Enforcement Agency for those federal agencies’ records to see
if there is any secret surveillance in use nationwide. The lawsuit,
filed Oct. 31, 2019 comes as organizations and law enforcement are
going toe-to-toe over what is private and what isn’t.
A facial recognition system uses biometric software to map a
person’s facial features from a video or photo. The system then tries
to match the information on databases to verify someone’s identity.
(Collins, 2019)
Police departments regularly use facial recognition to find
potential crime suspects and witnesses by scanning through
millions of photos; the software is also used to provide surveillance
at public venues like concerts and schools and used to gain access
to specific properties. But there’s organized opposition against it,
buoyed after California passed a law that puts a temporary ban
on police across the state from using facial recognition in body
cameras. The move comes while more than half of Americans polled
in a recent Pew Research Center survey trust that officers would
use the software responsibly. (Collins, 2019)
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Apple’s iPhone uses its Face ID facial recognition authentication
system to help unlock the device for users, and is the subject of a $1
billion lawsuit. Social media giant Facebook uses facial recognition
to recognize when members or their friends are tagged in photos.
Some U.S. airports use facial recognition scanners in cooperation
with the government to improve how travelers enter and exit the
U.S., and some major airlines use facial recognition to help
passengers check in flights, luggage, and boarding. The National
Human Genome Research Institute also uses facial recognition to
detect a rare disease that causes a change in appearance known as
DiGeorge syndrome. (Collins, 2019)
Currently, there are no federal regulations on the use of this
technology for commercial or government use as several questions
emerge about whether facial recognition violates the First
Amendment, granting certain freedoms including speech, religion,
assembly, and the press; the Fourth Amendment, which protects
people from unlawful searches and seizure; and the 14th
Amendment, which guarantees equal protection of the laws.
(Collins, 2019) Some companies may also use facial recognition to
pitch products based on our social media profiles. This practice
occurs despite the fact that many Americans despise the practice,
according to the Pew Center survey; others may use the technology
when it comes to people getting a loan to purchase a car or a house,
and even hiring for jobs. (Collins, 2019)
While Congress has held multiple hearings about whether to ban
or regulate facial recognition, law enforcement contends that the
software is an invaluable tool that can quickly root out dangerous
people.
According to a report from the Government Accountability Office,
there are more than 640 million facial photos that are available
for use that come from databases that can be searched by the
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Facial Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation, also known as FACE, an
internal unit of the FBI. (Collins, 2019)
In addition to tracking people without their knowledge, facial
recognition is plagued by bias. When the algorithm trained to a
dataset that is not diverse, it is less accurate and will missidentify
people more. (Marr, 2019)
Ransomware
Ransomware is malware that is used to prevent access to a
computer system to achieve criminal and malicious activities.
According to CISA, It is on the rise and the ransoms cost less than
just one year ago, because it is a popular scam and people pay.
Scary as it is, standard encrypted backups of the user’s PC’s and
networks to off-site and disconnected storage is a simple solution
coupled with a complete wipe of the machines after infection. Or
pay the $500 dollars. Generally, the hacker will give you the decrypt
key. And if you think you are not vulnerable later, well there is a
bridge in…. Why? When the infection has been successful, the target
generally does not remove the original vulnerability. So fake emails,
spear phishing, used to get private information are successful again
and again and again. They have an “in” to the target. They usually
leave backdoors. (Nichols R. K., Invited Speaker, (19 September 2018)
Lions Club, speaking on Personal Privacy: How to Defend against
Invasions of It, 2018) (Marr, 2019)
Smart Dust ( MEMS)
Nichols covers the use of MEMS technology for taking down
malicious UAS by Accoustic or DEW means. (Nichols R. K., et al.,
2020) MEMS are Micro-Electro-Mechanical systems, the size of few
grains of salt. They have sensors, communications mechanisms,
autonomous power supplies, cameras and SCADA controls. (Nichols
R. , et al., 2020)
Another name for MEMS is motes, or smart dust, and the
technology has many postive uses. It also can be used to invade
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privacy practically without detection. This is an advanced
technology and it is in play. (Rose, 2019)
Fake News Bots
GROVER is one AI system capable of writing a fake news article
from nothing more than a headline!. The articles created such are
believable.

Elon Musk created the “deepfakes for text” that

produces news stories and fiction so effectively, the organization
initially did not release the research to the public. (Marr, 2019)
Lethal Autonomous Robots
Our last disturbing, nightmarish technology is Killer Robots (real
life

terminators).

Currently

five

countries

are

developing

autonomous robots with the intent to use them in combat. Our
friendly Amazon and Microsoft have already come up with
prototypes of terminator robots! (Rose, 2019) “Buy our product
and we don’t break legs anymore, we have a new collector.” Can
you imagine when one of these robots gets hacked? Hollywood has
already developed the screen play and looking to buy the rights.

Conclusions
Technology is meant to make life simple, but it is imperative to
make sure that these technologies are used only for good. This
might mean regulations, new laws, restrictions on imports, quality
checks, security audits, whatever. Per Neil Postman: “The effects of
technology are not always unpredictable. But they are not always
inevitable.” (Rose, 2019)

Questions
1) Review the list of Disturbing Technologies in the first section.
Choose two that interest you. Develop the Risk profile for your
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choices which includes the Risks , Threats, Vulnerabilities, Impact
and Countermeasures for misuse of those technologies. [13]
2) What is your prognostication about the misuse of social media?
Where do you see the solutions?
3) Choose your top three Disturbing Technologies, rank them,
research them, justify your arguments.
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[1] Disclaimer: This chapter contains opinions not necessarily
endorsed by the author’s employer, clients, writing team or any
entity quoted or cited. The author takes full responsibility for his
opinions.
[2] A Black Swan is an unpredictable event that is beyond what
is normally expected of a situation and has potentially severe
consequences. Black swan events are characterized by their
extreme rarity, severe impact, and the widespread insistence they
were obvious in hindsight. (Scott, 2021)
[3] See (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) Chapter 1 and Dr Ryan’s Chapters
on Information superiority in (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020), (Nichols
R. , et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Cyber Domain: Protecting
USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd edition, 2019), (Nichols R. K., et al.,
2019).
[4] Author added to this citation.
[5] See Contributors for a biography of this brilliant man.
[6] One of my first assignments I give in my graduate Homeland
Security classes is to not allow students to use their cell phones
short of an emergency for the first weekend. A prize is given for
the longest time reported without the phone. In a class of 22, only
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1 student went the entire weekend. He was on his honeymoon. The
rest of the class average was 2 hours or less.
[7] ICG = Information Centers of Gravity. See Dr Ryan’s brilliant
chapter in (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) & (Nichols R. , et al., Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced
Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019)
[8] Author interpretation / paraphrase of a Tom Selleck- Jesse Stone
movie line.
[9] The Carlisle Sentinel, Carlisle, PA
[10] Two days later Twitter completely banned Trump and several of
his major supporters.
[11] S & R = Search & Rescue
[12] How? Simple. Flushed water is measured in exact units of 1gpf
or similar. Water comes to the toilet via a valve that is electrically
controlled to determine how much hot water (sink, shower) is
needed. The valve electrically opens or closes based on the need
for hot water / cold water. It also measures the amount of water
transferred and registered the minute amounts of electricity used
to open or close the gate valve. Trace the water back to the water
heater. Heat is generated by electricity to the heating coils. The
measurement of how much heat is required and the flow of water
through the heater to the gate valve (regardless of other cleaning or
purifying systems) is measured and logged by the smart meter. This
system, in turn, can and has been hacked. Now the criminal knows
your behaviors: microwave, TV, bed warming blanket, telephone,
alarm system toilet, radio alarms, lights, internet, AC.. if its attached
, it is measured, catalogued and discoverable.
[13] Students will recognize that this is set up for parameters of the
qualitative information Risk equations- the Ryan-Nichols equations.
Where

Risk

=

Threats

x

Vulnerabilities

X

Impact

/
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Countermeasures. And Risk ~ F( Threats / Countermeasures). The
latter equation recognizes the differential state, where both Impact
and Vulnerabilities are held constant with respect to time. See:
(Nichols R. , et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber
Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019) &
(Randall K. Nichols, 2000)
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9. Social Media - The Next
Battlefield in Information
Warfare [Lonstein]
Student Learning Objectives
This chapter will expose students to the design and deployment
of information warfare throughout the annals of the history of war.
We will examine concepts such as disinformation, censorship,
suppression, consumption, dissemination of information, and their
implementation throughout history. Next, we will introduce social
media platforms as a ubiquitous form of communication. We will
consider whether corporate control of the communication with no
constitutional free speech protections, actions of de platforming
and censorship, and their impact upon the 2020 United States
Presidential election. Finally, we will consider possible methods to
address the risks this new reality poses to various stakeholders
ranging from individuals to governments, politicians, national
security interests, and businesses.
THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION WARFARE
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the
definition

of

investigation,

“information”
study,

or

is

“knowledge

instruction.”

obtained

Conversely,

the

from
term

“disinformation” is “false information deliberately and often covertly
spread (as by the planting of rumors) to influence public opinion
or obscure the truth.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020) While these
definitions are the product of centuries of human experience with
the dissemination of information from the days of cave drawings to
the written, spoken, and eventually electronically transmitted, the
reality is from a perspective of its use in warfare to at least the late
400’s BC and the famed Military Strategist, Sun Tzu. In his treatise
“The Art of War,” he postulated “all warfare is deception,” which is,
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in essence, the seminal discussion of information or disinformation
usage as a warfare tool. (Tzu, 1971) Over many centuries, Chinese
military treatises include and expand upon this concept. For
instance, in Essentials of Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Submarine
Operations, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army publication
highlighted four information/disinformation concepts espoused by
Sun Tzu
• “Show yourself to intimidate the enemy.”
• “Show the false to confuse the enemy.”
• “Create momentum to harass the enemy.”
• “Deceive to obstruct the enemy.” (Shixin, 2002) (Metcalf, 2017)
While ancient civilizations had minimal technology, written, and
spoken communication was available and used just as effectively as
today. Conflict was also a very significant reality in ancient China,
with the conquest of adversaries a necessary and ever-present
reality of any empire which sought to survive.
Figure 9.1 (Voice of America, 1957)
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According to Major Nathaniel Bastian, in the 18th century,
Frederick the Great created a Prussian spy’s system that would
gather information from travelers and conduct reconnaissance
missions to determine infrastructure, weaponry, and other potential
capabilities of its adversaries. He further references propaganda
campaigns by Napoleon in the 1800s to publicly portray France
as a victim of aggression by adversaries to craft public opinion in
neighboring European countries. A few examples of this information
warfare included domestic and foreign placards, articles and
proclamations, and publications such as the “Bulletin de la Grande
Armée” as examples of crafting public opinion, adversarial
impressions of Frances military capabilities, and adversary’s
responses to the information. (Bastian, 2019)
In the 20th Century, World Wars I and II, as well as many other
global conflicts, involved significant implementation of Information
warfare whether it be an interruption of information flow via signal
jamming, code-cracking, Office of War Information, Office of
Strategic Services (now CIA), Voice of America and many
more. (Crane, 2019).
Figure 9.2 Social Media Collage (PressureUA/iStock, 2019)

Social Media - The Next Battlefield in Information Warfare [Lonstein] | 389

Later in the century, new technologies started to emerge,
eventually leading to what is now commonly known as the internet.
Names such as Compuserve, Usenet led to the introduction of
GENie (General Electric Network for Information Exchange) and
Listserv platforms of electronic mail lists, which started to rapidly
gain popularity as the price and acceptance of connected
technology led to ubiquitous acceptance. As the 1990s came and
went, the first “Chatrooms” and employment sites such as the
Palace, Friendster and LinkedIn were introduced and surged in
popularity. By 2004 Facebook began to commercialize, quickly
followed by YouTube, Twitter, and 100’s of others. (McFadden, 2020)
Information warfare had evolved from a prehistoric display of cave
art to an instant communication method, capable of being instantly
and globally disseminated on a peer-to-peer or peer-to-billions
basis.
SOCIAL MEDIA TODAY –- INSTANT, PERSONAL, GLOBAL
What is Social Media? According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
Social Media is “forms of electronic communication (such as
websites for social networking and microblogging) through which
users create online communities to share information, ideas,
personal messages, and other content (such as videos)” (MerriamWebster, 2020) For our examination Social Media is not a standalone concept or technology; instead, it exists as part of a class
of information dissemination referred to as Information and
Communications Technology (“ICT”). According to Van Niekerk,
Pillay, & Maharaj, ICT is “traditional mass media, online media,
including social networks, and communications technologies such
as mobile telephones.” (Van Niekwek, 2011)
ICT in the digital age is ubiquitous, affordable, and widely
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accepted. Even in the most remote and impoverished corners of
the globe, the concept of connectivity via computer, smartphone,
or other connected technology is a reality for most. Accordingly,
the ability to control the access to, quality of, or the accuracy of
the information has never been more critical when discussing
Information Warfare (“IW”). In a military setting, information
warfare is “a class of techniques, including collection, transport,
protection, denial, disturbance, and degradation of information, by
which one maintains an advantage over one’s adversaries.” (Burns,
1999)
Figure 9.3 “Traditional” Information Warfare Lifecycle (Van
Niekwek, 2011)
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Dan Kuehl of the National Defense University provided another
more succinct definition, who described IW as the “conflict or
struggle between two or more groups in the information
environment.” (Stupples, 2015)A close examination of Figure 9.3,
created in 2011, reveals it is devoid of any substantive reference to
Social Media and its role in Information Warfare.
In mid-December 2010, a phenomenon known as the “Arab
Spring” began in Tunisia. Essentially the “Arab Spring” consisted
of an amalgam of disaffected youth, ethnic minorities, political
outcasts, and academia engaging in demonstrations, protests, and
ultimately revolutions. They were mainly protesting repression,
censorship, lack of economic opportunity, and human rights
violations in governments throughout North Africa and the Middle
East. This movement was fueled in large part by leveraging the
power and scope of mobile social media. The campaign almost
immediately spread virally through real-time mobile phone video,
tweets, hashtags, Facebook, and other social media tools. The
governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were left
overthrown in its wake, with numerous others still embroiled in
various unrest and even civil war stages. The speed with which the
Arab Spring grew is a testament to mobile social media’s power and
its ubiquitous instant access. Borders, oceans, and continents were
no longer barriers to the transmission and viewing of live, first-hand
accounts and media depicting the movement’s rapid growth and its
efficacy in toppling governments. (Van Niekwek, 2011)
The power of mobile social media continues to be felt far beyond
the Middle East and North Africa. The influence of mobile social
media will be felt long after the Middle East and North Africa events.
In 2015 the murders of Journalists Allison Parker and Adam Ward
were streamed online shortly after they occurred (Shear, 2016). The
shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the subsequent
protests almost instantly rocketed social media streaming to new
heights, not only as a media reporting tool but also as an
organization and command and control tool for social information
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operated by a diverse group of sources ranging from media
reporters to citizen journalists, to activists. (Solsman, 2014)
Every corner of the globe began to feel the effects of social media
as a tool of information warfare. Viewers saw live violence, political
upheaval, and perhaps most tragically, actual death—those who
wanted to terrorize orchestrated attacks to stream their final acts
of horror to millions watching online. A few examples include the
Livestream of a mosque shooting in New Zealand, The Bataclan
Nightclub attack in France, and The Parkland High School shooting
in Florida.
Figure 9.4 Christchurch New Zealand Mosques Shooter (Tighe,
2019)

What started as an idea to allow people to interact with
each other on an easy to use, instant platform with global reach
seemed like a great idea when Facebook hit its stride publicly in
2006. Soon Facebook started to understand its technology’s power
to collect data regarding its user’s preferences, behaviors, and even
darker sides. As did its social media brethren, it discovered that
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its platforms were excellent marketing tools since they already
collected massive amounts of personal data about its users. This
acquired knowledge of the users, in turn, allowed the media to
market products to the users based upon their profiles and custom
design what news and information they see in their information
feed further to embed themselves into the lives of billions globally
Many believe that today’s Facebook marketing and influence model
reflects Edward Bernays’ teachings, who is referred to as the “father
of public relations.” (Gunderman, 2015)
In his 1928 book “Propaganda,” Benays wrote:
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized
habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in
democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism
of society constitute an invisible government which is the true
ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are
molded, our tastes formed, and our ideas suggested, largely by men
we have never heard of…. It is they who pull the wires that control
the public mind.” (Bernays, 1928)
Perhaps no other technology has ever been able to mold the
“habits and opinions” at the speed, scale, and individualized
sophistication of social media. While other forms of communication
such as print, broadcast radio, and television have undoubtedly
expanded the ability to reach masses globally, no technology was
ever as inexpensive, simple, ubiquitous, and always in the palm of
our hands as social media.
Figure 9.5 Social Media Adoption 2004-2019
(Chaffey, 2020)
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ENTER DONALD TRUMP – SOCIAL MEDIA DISRUPTOR
By 2015 it was apparent that social media was more than
just a popularity contest where users could monetize pet tricks,
extreme sports, memes, and other provocative content. With almost
four billion users, social media represented entertainment and
Donald Trump, a tool of disruption. In the final days of the Barack
Obama administration, Donald Trump had become a vocal critic
of its policies. While criticism of presidential administrations is
nothing new, what was different about Trump was how he
communicated his disagreement to the public. Previously critics or
would-be presidential candidates would use television and radio
appearances, write magazine or newspaper opinion pieces, or
appear at events to help drive name recognition and following.
Trump was different. On May 4, 2009, Donald Trump, or someone
on his behalf, tweeted for the first time: “May 4, 2009, 01:54:25
PM Be sure to tune in and watch Donald Trump on Late Night
with David Letterman as he presents the Top Ten List tonight!”
(Brown, 2020). In 2009, Trump was the host of his reality show
“The Apprentice,” which was a huge success and was likely using
Twitter and other Social Media to drive engagement and ratings.
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In 2011 he started to tack his use of Twitter by criticizing Obama
and commenting on political issues of the day. In March of 2011, he
began to discuss the prospect of entering the 2012
Presidential race. (Twitter, 2011)
Figure 9.6 Trump 2011 Election Tweet – (Courtesy Twitter
@realdonaldtrump)

What followed was nothing short of amazing. Trump decided
not to run in 2011 however chose to enter the fray in 2015, which
eventually led to his defeat of former First Lady and Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton in the 2016 United States presidential election.
The fact that a political outsider could win the Presidency was not
the story. In the past, candidates ranging from Andrew Jackson &
Lincoln to Coolidge and Carter positioned themselves as political
outsiders. However, most had some degree of governmental or
political service on their resume. (WNYC, 2015) Donald Trump
indeed was an outsider, a real estate and business mogul, and
celebrity; he was even different than former actor Ronald Reagan
who ascended to the presidency having first served as Governor of
California.
While the broadcast media, who perceived him as a side-show
and potential train wreck, during the Republican primary, it was
only too quick to give Trump nearly unlimited press in the 2016 race.
To that end it was clear that Trump was a social media juggernaut. In
a 2016 election post-mortem, Barbara Bickart, Susan Fournier and
former New York Times digital, CEO Martin Nisenholtz wrote:
“Big-seed” marketing beats viral. Duncan Watts, a principal
researcher at Microsoft Research, has been studying the sociology
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of networks for decades. His notion of big-seed marketing suggests
that a message can spread faster and more systematically if it is
“seeded” among many people……….. Trump exploited Watts’s theory
at scale. He began with an enormous seedbed: Just before Election
Day he had more than 19 million Twitter followers, 18 million
Facebook fans, and nearly 5 million followers on Instagram. The
broadcast and cable networks — almost unwittingly — amplified
Trump’s network capabilities. Every time they reported on a tweet
or posting, they effectively seeded the message among millions of
viewers, many of whom, in turn, shared these messages. This
offline/online complementarity helped Trump double his Twitter
following during the campaign. Social and broadcast media work
hand in hand, and Trump understood this better than his rivals,
gaining by some estimates almost $2 billion in free air time through
March 2016.” (Bickart, 2017)
THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: DISRUPTING THE
DISRUPTOR
TAKE AWAY THE MICROPHONE
Stopping Trump from being re-elected would require nontraditional multi-faceted approach designed on the reality of how
Trump totally disrupted the electoral process using social media as
a primary tool to influence the coverage and behavior of traditional
print and broadcast media. Before Trump is even inaugurated, the
focus becomes clear, the 2020 United States Presidential Election
would be less of a political campaign and more of an information
warfare operation than even seen before in United States Politics.
In early November 2017, an “accident” occurred at Twitter when a
technology journeyman by the name of Bahtiyar Duysak, a German
citizen of Turkish descent was working on a work and study visa
at Twitters Trust & Safety department received a “report” of an
offensive or otherwise unpopular tweet coming from the account
of one @realdonaldtrump. Duysak just happened to have formerly
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worked at Google and YouTube during the term of his visa and even
more curiously this was to be his last day on the job at Twitter.
In an interview with Tech Crunch, shortly after the event when
he returned to Germany, Duysak recalled the how the events
transpired:
“His last day at Twitter was mostly uneventful, he says. There
were many goodbyes, and he worked up until the last hour before
his computer access was to be shut off. Near the end of his shift, the
fateful alert came in. This is where Trump’s behavior intersects with
Duysak’s work life. Someone reported Trump’s account on Duysak’s
last day; as a final, throwaway gesture, he put the wheels in motion
to deactivate it. Then he closed his computer and left the building.”
(Lunden, 2017)
Figure 9.7 TwitterGov on Deactivation of @realdonaldtrump
(Courtesy Twitter
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The

events

surrounding

the

deactivation

of

the

@realdonaldtrump Twitter might be a case of coincidence, even
though, according to Statista, it employed almost 4000 people with
additional labor coming from independent contractors and
employees or vendors. (Statista, 2020) The curious circumstance
where the employee happened to be leaving the company and
country almost immediately may suggest a trial balloon about
censoring Trumps’ social media account. If “likes” are an indicator
of reaction, it was undoubtedly positive since over 200,000 people
liked the tweets.
CREATE A BOTTLENECK
What is clear is that Trump’s supporters, opponents, and neutrals
all recognized his deft implementation of social media as a tool
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to end-run, traditional media. Opponents became fixated on
penetrating Trump’s “Silicon Curtain” of individual communication
with many millions of followers and foes alike.
Figure 9.8 Twitter Account @realdonaldtrump December 29,
2020

By the time, the 2020 presidential election season had arrived,
Trump’s Twitter account had an incredible 85.5 million followers
who could instantly be accessed by his tweets. In contrast,
according to the Neilson Company, the average combined
viewership of the major broadcast and cable news channels in
December 2020 was approximately 26.7 million viewers. (Schneider,
2020) [1]
According to George Lakoff, an emeritus professor at the
University of California at Berkeley, and an expert in cognitive
science and linguistics, “Trump uses social media as a weapon to
control the news cycle. It works like a charm. His tweets are tactical
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rather than substantive,” “He is as good as it gets [at using social
media],” “He is not ranting, that is strategic. Even when he is ranting,
it’s strategic. (Buncombe, 2018 )
The disruptive use of technology is nothing new when it comes to
the presidency. In May of 1862, Abraham Lincoln, an apparent fan
of technology, adopted widespread use of the Telegraph to message
Union troops rapidly and efficiently in the field, administration
officials, and to the public. In a 2012 opinion piece in the New York
Times, Tom Wheeler wrote, “ As he put down the message, Grant
(General U.S.) laughed out loud and exclaimed to those around him,
“The President has more nerve than any of his advisors.” He was
correct, of course, but more important than the message was the
media: he held in his hands Lincoln’s revolutionary tool for making
sure that neither distance nor intermediaries diffused his
leadership.” (Wheeler, 2012) As we will see later on, technology is
only useful as long as information transmission is uninterrupted.
“THE SECRET OF WAR” LIES IN THE COMMUNICATIONS”
Napoleon Bonaparte
On August 3, 2020, a group calling itself the Transition Integrity
Project issued a report entitled “Preventing a Disrupted Presidential
Election and Transition.” The first paragraph reads:
“In June 2020, the Transition Integrity Project (TIP) convened a
bipartisan group of over 100 current and former senior government
and campaign leaders and other experts in a series of 2020 election
crisis scenario planning exercises. The results of all four table-top
exercises were alarming. We assess with a high degree of likelihood
that November’s elections will be marked by a chaotic legal and
political landscape. We also assess that President Trump is likely to
contest the result by both legal and extra-legal means, in an attempt
to hold onto power. Recent events, including the President’s own
unwillingness to commit to abiding by the results of the election,
the Attorney General’s embrace of the President’s groundless
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electoral fraud claims, and the unprecedented deployment of
federal agents to put down leftwing protests, underscore the
extreme lengths to which President Trump may be willing to go in
order to stay in office.” (Transition Integrity Project, 2020)
Almost immediately upon its release, the media gave the report
extensive coverage. One of its authors, notably Rosa Brooks, spent
the better part of late summer of 2020 discussing her fears of a
Rogue Trump losing the 2020 election by a narrow margin and how
he might attempt to cling to power. Although carefully crafted as
a “bipartisan” group of experts, in reality, the project members and
its war-game participants were either democrats, former Bush and
Obama Administration officials, or, as the term goes, “Never Trump”
republicans. (Gerber, 2020) Former George W. Bush Press Secretary
Ari Fleisher was even more concerned about the Transition Integrity
Project’s dangerous narrative.
“It strikes me in the era of Trump to be one of the most
irresponsible statements I’ve ever heard,” said Fleischer, who was
not part of the war games. “I’m perfectly willing, and I do so often,
to criticize Donald Trump, but this is pernicious. This is beyond the
call. You talk about being divisive. “He called the suggestion that
Trump might not accept election results “dangerous.” “Where’s the
evidence that this is what Trump is going to do according to his
accusers? If the results are clear, the results are clear,” Fleischer
said. (Garrison, 2020)
In the age of social media, it has never been clearer that
communication is not analogous with or necessarily intended to
present facts or truth. Remember, as Bernays wrote, “We are
governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, and our ideas
suggested, largely by men we have never heard of…. It is they who
pull the wires that control the public mind” (Bernays, 1928) Social
Media has become the wires used in that process. It is hard to
separate truth from fiction online, not to mention whether the
content posted emanated from a person, a nation, an organization,
or a machine. Suppose the public is unable to self-authenticate the
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legitimacy and credibility of the author of online content. In that
case, it’s undoubtedly going to be a challenge to verify the content
they post as accurate or factual. A 2018 editorial on the Investor’s
Business Daily website distilled the issue in a fashion that leads
back to the only way to determine truth and accuracy is doing it
ourselves.
“As the Weekly Standard’s Mark Hemingway explained: “It’s
basically a way for a bunch of reporters with no particular expertise
to render pseudoscientific judgments on statements from public
figures that are obviously argumentative or otherwise unverifiable.
Then there’s the matter of them weighing in with thundering
certitude — pants on fire! — on complex policy debates they
frequently misunderstand.” In the end, the best way to judge the
veracity of claims being tossed around is to become better informed
about the issues, not contract out that job to people who aren’t
necessarily qualified to do for you.” (Investors Business Daily, 2018)
According to Paul Horner, an individual who enriched himself
during the 2016 presidential election, Hemingway is correct. We
have identified the fake news enemy, and it is us! In an interview
with the Washington Post in November 2017, Horner blamed the
reader’s laziness and bias for the proliferation of “fake news.”
Essentially he accurately believes if someone tells you are right, you
are much less likely to fact check them than someone who criticized
you.
“Honestly, people are definitely dumber. They just keep passing
stuff around. Nobody fact-checks anything anymore — I mean, that’s
how Trump got elected. He just said whatever he wanted, and
people believed everything, and when the things he said turned out
not to be true, people didn’t care because they’d already accepted it.
It’s real scary. I’ve never seen anything like it. (Dewey, 2016)
In this environment, it is easier to conduct information warfare
using social media (which is now often picked up and repeated by
broadcast and print media) to further a narrative throughout society
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rapidly and at scale. People read it, like the content, believe it, and
often spread it.
MARGINALIZE THE MESSAGE – TOXIFICATION OF THE
CONSUMER
In October of 2020, the University of California, Berkeley, through
its Othering & Belonging Institute, published an online book entitled
“Trumpism and its Discontents,” a compilation of content by various
authors who drill home the same theme. The forward, written by
Professor John A Powell, Director of the Othering & Belonging
Institute, contained the following statement: “If the rise of Donald
Trump is not grappled with critically, we will not release ourselves
from the social corrosion we are all acutely experiencing. The work
will be difficult—for many reasons, the least of which is not that it
demands a look inward. We must reconsider who we are and who
we think we are and think more carefully about how we have tried
to answer those questions through the creation and exploitation of
other beings instead of by searching for ourselves in relationship
with those believed to be the “other.” If we are to together forge a
society in which a Trump phenomenon would not be possible, the
conversation must be contextualized on these terms.” (Obasogie,
Osagie K, 2020)
The marginalization can be seen in hundreds of examples of literal
claims of toxicity of Trump and his followers in the media here are a
few:
“NBC Boss: Trump Is Toxic, “Demented” April 13, 2017 Daily Beast
(Daily Beast, 2017)
Figure 9.9 Trump Is Toxic – Demented (April 13, 2017 Courtesy
Daily Beast)
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LET THE BATTLE BEGIN
Caveat: Though this chapter mainly focuses on Twitter because
they have, in the author’s opinion, been the most aggressive in
taking remedial action for what it deems disinformation, violence,
or other content of concern to it, it does not mean that it has taken
steps other social media platforms have not. Facebook, Google, and
YouTube streaming services, and many others have also engaged
in and been subject to both praise and criticism for censoring,
warning, or otherwise protecting what they feel is a public interest
when it comes to content posted on their platforms.
After a tumultuous four years of the Trump presidency, the plan
was now clearly crystallizing, given the breadth of the president’s
popularity, and following on social media. Leverage his following
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through a three-step process could be successfully implemented to
defeat his reelection. In 2019, Park Advisors prepared a report for
the United States Department of State, entitled “Weapons of Mass
Distraction: Foreign State-Sponsored Disinformation in the Digital
Age.”
Figure 9.10- Social Media Weaponization (Courtesy Daily
Times.PK)

Although the report’s focus was on the use of social media
disinformation by Foreign States or their proxies, in reality, it laid
out the roadmap of how to use the popularity of social media against
one of its biggest stars to effectively silence his message.
Spreading false narratives on social media relies on three main
premises:
1. The medium – the platforms on which disinformation
flourishes;

2. The message – what is being conveyed through
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disinformation; and

3. The audience – the consumers of such content. (Park
Advisors, 2019)

Recall the events of November 2, 2017, when fate struck
and a Twitter worker in his last hour of work gets an abuse report
for a tweet from the president and disables his Twitter account for
11 minutes. Is a simulated attack replete with penetration testing?
Was it even possible to judge reactions to the occurrence to predict
actual long-term censorship or disabling of President Trump’s
Twitter account? Perhaps.

Other operations directed at the

Presidents access to social media were ongoing since before his
inauguration in 2017. On January 22, 2017, shortly after Trumps
inauguration an individual by the name of Yoel Roth Tweeted as
follows:
Figure 9.11 Yoel Roth Tweet January 22, 2017 (courtesy Twitter
@yoyyoel)

While accusing the President of the United States of being a Nazi
is distasteful for the office, it becomes especially problematic when
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the person tweeting happens to be a part of the same Trust and
Safety Team as Bahtiyar Duysak. They “mistakenly” deactivated the
President’s Twitter account in November of 2017. In fact, during
the 2020 election, Roth was the Head of Site Integrity at Twitter.
(LinkedIn, 2020)
In May of 2020, Twitter escalated its battle against what it called
disinformation when for the first time, it placed a warning message
on the President’s tweet regarding the issue of fraud and mail-in
election ballots.
Figure 9.12 Trump Tweet, May 26, 2020 (Courtesy Twitter
@realdonaldtrump)

Three days later, Twitter took a more aggressive stance when it
hit a tweet from President Trump behind a warning. Twitter took
this unprecedented action because it claimed:
“This tweet violates our policies regarding the glorification of
violence based on the historical context of the last line, its
connection to violence, and the risk it could inspire similar actions
today.
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“We’ve taken action in the interest of preventing others from
being inspired to commit violent acts but have kept the tweet on
Twitter because it is important that the public still be able to see the
tweet given its relevance to ongoing matters of public importance.”
(TwitterComms, 2020)
Figure 9.13 Trump Tweet, May 29, 2020 (Courtesy Twitter
@realdonaldtrump)

Perhaps the most telling salvo of the censorship war being waged
by online and traditional media against the Trump campaign
occurred on October 14, 2020, a mere three weeks before the
Presidential election. According to the New York Post, it obtained
a laptop believed to be owned by and dropped off for repair at
a Delaware computer repair shop by Hunter Biden, son of thencandidate Joe Biden. Upon examining the computer, the repairmen
found what he felt were critical national security emails. He sent the
laptop to the FBI after being unclaimed for many months and being
treated as abandoned. Not hearing back from the FBI and knowing
the contents of the computer were of critical national interest to
the nation in light of ties between Hunter Biden and the Ukrainian,
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Russian and Chinese governments and businesses, the repairmen
provided a copy of the hard drive he had made to presidential
attorney Rudolph Giuliani.[2]
Giuliani and the Trump campaign then provided the hard drive
image to the New York Post for confirmation and reporting. When
the New York Post reported the story, it was big news. Almost
immediately, the Posts’ Twitter account was banned, and Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube restricted sharing of the story, and broadcast
media largely ignored the story.
Figure 9.14 New York Post October 14, 2020 (Courtesy NY Post)

Almost immediately, the Trump campaign and many print and
online media outlets protested this unprecedented act of
censorship, and Jack Dorsey, Twitter’s CEO, had to eat crow and
admit that Twitter’s “actions” surrounding the New York Post article
“were not great.” (Twitter, @jack Twitter, 2020)
Figure 9.16 Twitter Apology New York Post October 14, 2020
(Courtesy Twitter)
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Censorship was not the only weapon in the Information Warfare
campaign during election 2020. In 2020 the term “disinformation”
became widely used to suggest social media or online content
contained much falsehood which, relates to many claims regarding
the

2016

Presidential

Election.

See;

Russia’s

Pillars

of

Disinformation and Propaganda Report.. (United States Department
of State, 2020) Case in point, in the early summer of 2020, the
Biden-Harris team launched an online pressure campaign targeting
Facebook claiming,
“Facebook…. It continues to allow Donald Trump to say anything
— and to pay to ensure that his wild claims reach millions of voters.
SuperPAC’s and other dark money groups are following his example.
Trump and his allies have used Facebook to spread fear and
misleading information about voting, attempting to compromise the
means of holding power to account: our voices and our ballot boxes.”
(Biden for President, 2020)
This tactic relied upon classifying the message and the messenger
to drive a narrative to the masses that Trump’s social media
statement was, in fact, disinformation. This tactic’s objective was
to create an assumption that all Trump posting was disinformation
and, therefore, untrustworthy. After the election in January 2021,
citing a violent protest at the United States Capitol, both Facebook
and Twitter permanently banned the social media accounts of
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Donald Trump. Mission accomplished. . (Twitter, 2021) (Zuckerberg,
2021)
HOW WILL LAW, POLICY AND MARKETS REACT?
As of January 1, 2021, Joseph Biden has been declared the
2020 US Presidential election winner. Unfortunately, the issues we
have examined in this chapter have led many Trump supporters to
believe that big technology companies, broadcast, print, and social
media placed a hand on the scales of fairness. Trump and his
supporters claim that electronic voting technology, mail-in ballots,
and early voting created a “perfect storm” of election fraud.
They also claim sizeable financial assistance from social media
companies and their executives negatively impacted his campaign
in six “battleground” states where the margins of victory were very
tight. To date, none of these claims have been proven in or accepted
by a Court of Law. (Sheck, 2020)

Many on both sides of the aisle suggest that social media
companies enjoy unwarranted protection from liability for their
actions under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
(Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, 2020) While reform
of this law may bring some relief to those who claim injury caused
by social media company activity, it certainly is under pitched
debate in Congress. Still, it would fail to address social media
companies outside the United States.
Others say there needs to be legislation enacted which affords
individual and companies the same protections afforded them
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(United States Courts, 2020). By analogy, this type of oversight finds
justification under the same theories which allow Public utility
regulation. In 2018 Professor Anjana Susarla of Michigan State
University was quoted as saying:
“It is both an open platform for free expression of diverse
viewpoints and a public utility on which huge numbers of people
— and democracy itself — rely for accurate information……….. It’s
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true that overregulation does run the risk of censorship and limiting
free expression. But the dangers of too little regulation are already
clear, in the toxic hate, fake news and intentionally misleading
propaganda proliferating online and poisoning democracy. In my
view, taking no action is no longer an option.” (Susarla, 2018)
Recently a Justice Minister in Poland introduced legislation that
would impose hefty fines on social media companies who
wrongfully censor legal speech, (PolandIn, 2020) and Senator Mike
Lee of Utah introduced the PROMISE ACT (Promoting Responsibility
Over Moderation In the Social Media Environment Act). (Davidson,
2020) While each of these regulatory adjustments may hold
promise, in reality, in the heat of a campaign or while running a
private business, being censored by social media can be disastrous,
and merely waiting for new legislation or filing lawsuits may not
prevent irreparable harm.
The new reality is that social media censorship, primarily based
upon opaque policies of conduct and arbitrary enforcement
standards, amounts to the equivalent of a Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack.
The internet company Cloudflare defines a DDoS attack as:
“A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is a malicious
attempt to disrupt the normal traffic of a targeted server, service
or network by overwhelming the target or its surrounding
infrastructure with a flood of Internet traffic. DDoS attacks achieve
effectiveness by utilizing multiple compromised computer systems
as sources of attack traffic. Exploited machines can include
computers and other networked resources such as IoT devices.
From a high level, a DDoS attack is like an unexpected traffic jam
clogging up the highway, preventing regular traffic from arriving at
its destination.” (Cloudflare, Inc., 2020)
When it comes to social media and its 4 billion users, simply
censoring information or de-platforming individual posters or users
can have the same effect as a DDoS attack. When conducted
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independently or in coordination with the most significant social
media networks, it creates de facto censorship of dissenting voices.
Internet libertarian and free speech advocate John Gilmore once
wrote, “The Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes
around it.” In 2020 Brian Krebs, a noted cybersecurity expert, found
his website taken offline when a massive DDoS attacked targeted
his domain. His internet service provider informed him that the
attack compromised their systems and customers, and therefore
the website must remove its network. Krebs described the situation
this way:
“Censorship can in fact route around the Internet.” The Internet
can’t route around censorship when the censorship is all-pervasive
and armed with, for all practical purposes, near-infinite reach, and
capacity. I call this rather unwelcome and hostile development the
“The
Democratization of Censorship.”
Figure 9.15 the Democratization of Censorship (Courtesy Brian
Krebs)
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What Krebs described in 2016 was eerily similar to what
occurred to the Trump reelection campaign in 2020. The difference
was that censorship and de-platforming were at the request of an
internet service provider or Content Distribution Network (CDN);
it was being waged actively and passively by social, broadcast, and
print media companies.
As you can see, there are many potential risks to using social
media to conduct a political campaign, run a business, and conduct
government operations. We now turn to countermeasures, risk
mitigation, and related strategies to address this growing challenge
to many people and entities maintaining an online or social media
presence.
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COUNTER-CENSORSHIP-

SOCIAL

MEDIA

RESILIENCY

STRATAGIES AND TECHNOLOGY
P.A.C.E., what is it and why does it matter?
PACE communications planning is a military-inspired concept
designed to ensure a robust ability to effectively communicate
during times when the unexpected happens so that panic, fear,
and confusion do not compromise an organization’s operational
readiness. According to the Puget Sound Healthcare Emergency
Communications Systems;
“Developing comprehensive PACE plans will not ensure perfect
communications in a disaster but helps to clear some of the fog
and friction found in every emergency situation. Developing
comprehensive PACE plans will not ensure perfect communications
in a disaster but helps to clear some of the fog and friction found
in

every

emergency

situation.”

(Puget

Sound

Healthcare

Communications Systems, 2018) citing (Ryan, 2013)
• Primary: The main form of communication.
• Alternate: If the primary fails, this is your secondary form of
communication
• Contingency: Tertiary method of communication
• Emergency: If all else fails, this is the worst-case option. (Fire
Watch Solutions, 2018)
The implications of a loss of communications are widely known,
whether it be a military operation where command and control are
lost, and aircraft are losing radio contact with ground controllers
and other aircraft, or merely finding your internet service down.
The first two are potentially fatal, the third a nuisance, but all three
demonstrate without communication, it is challenging to function
effectively in a data-driven world.
Figure 9.17 PACE Planning (Courtesy Chris Littlestone, Life is a
Special Operation)
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Cyberspace makes the challenge of communication protection
even more difficult. To have a practical strategy, students must
consider some of the lessons learned in primary information
security education, particularly the CIA Triangle. The CIA Triangle,
in its traditional form, has three legs, Integrity, Availability &
Confidentiality.
Figure 9.18 CIA Triangle (Courtesy Infrosecuritybuzz.com)
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Students will undoubtedly face challenges relating to the
successes and failures of the 2020 Presidential election for years
to come. As we have seen in the earlier parts of the chapter, it
is relatively easy to weaponize social media in multiple ways and
different combinations depending upon the objective.
Figure 9.19 Social Media RACC Threat Matrix (Courtesy VFT
Solutions, Inc.)
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Removal from a social media platform can have a devastatingly
significant effect upon a campaign, a business, or an operation that
leverages one platform far over the others. The result can be an
imbalance where the removal from the platform of choice, in 2020
for President Trump it was Twitter can result in multiple hardships
from merely communicating with supporters to redirect them to
alternative media in time to avoid significant disruption and
confusion.
Toxification is a method to make all content posted online by a
source to be suspicious and assumed to be untrue. The tactic can
be more effective and less noticeable to the audience than outright
censorship or removal from a platform because it is very passive and
operates like a subliminal message. As the Nazi Propaganda Minister
Joseph Goebbels is reputed to have said;
“If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will
eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for
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such time as the State can shield the people from the political,
economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes
vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress
dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by
extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.” (Holocaust
Education & Archive Research Team, 2010)
On the other hand, disinformation posted online can have equally
significant value since it can create damaging narratives that are
difficult if not impossible to recover. A perfect example of this would
be the 2017 “Dossier,” which allegedly detailed collusion between
Russia and the 2016 Trump campaign. This narrative persisted
through the entire first four years of the Trump presidency and
though proven demonstrable false, still is used as a useful tool to
fuel false narratives.[5]
Censorship on social media is a complex issue. The platforms
claim to be the sole judges of the content posted on their media
since they are private businesses. Usually, the platform will tailor its
Terms of Service to allow for them to decide what can and what
cannot be posted and to change the rules without notice. As we
discussed earlier, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,
at least in the United States, allows them to do so with impunity.
Collusion, either overtly or de facto, has proven to be a
devastatingly effective tool. When one social media platform uses its
“Fact Checkers” to support content censorship, the adage strength
in numbers applies. While there are many unknowns about Election
2020, for now the following Social Media Information Warfare Cycle
(Figure 9.20) appears accurate.
Figure 9.20 Social Media Information Warfare Lifecycle
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Suffice it to say that the challenges presented by social media are
varied and will likely impact most student’s careers in one way or
another. There are no definitive answers; however, to help address
the challenge, the following steps may serve as Best Practices to
minimize, if not secure online operations from social media risks
mentioned above with impunity
• Rapidly identify trending content that may be relevant to a
particular stakeholder’s interest. Understand that push
notifications can make posts go viral in seconds, and live social
media streams to go from one to over one million viewers in a
minute. As Churchill once said, “There are a terrible lot of lies
going about the world, and the worst of it is that half of them
are true.” (British Broadcasting Company, 2015)
• Develop overlapping, multiple social media accounts on as
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many platforms as possible. When it comes to social media live
streaming, this task has become much simpler with stream
casting technology. A single live or recorded stream can be
simultaneously broadcast on multiple platforms, decentralizing
a portion of RACC risk. Some technologies which can easily
support this function include restream.io, Camera Fi, and
melonapp, to name a few. See Figure 9.21.

Figure 9.21 (Courtesy restream.io)

• Standalone mirror platform. A standalone mirror platform is
simply a proprietary asset owned by the stakeholder, which
has all the features of a traditional social media platform. The
difference is that content is curated, controlled, and owned by
the stakeholder. Inexpensive live streaming and video on
demand technology are now extremely affordable and
straightforward to rapidly integrate into a website. This
standalone should have a URL listed in the description of all
social media accounts operated by the stakeholder as well as
be reachable through SMS “text to” technology (i.e., Text
CENSOR to 555221)
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• Employ live message insertion technology. Live message
insertion technology is a patented process whereby all social
media is scraped in real-time using various search and
recognition technologies to identify relevant content. After
that, an automated or manual message is inserted on multiple
social media streams simultaneously. This process redirects
viewers away from disinformation to legitimate and accurate
content. And they were coupled with a reverse distribution;
this countermeasure can be deployed in a remote, distributed
fashion globally, override and compete with other individuals,
or collective censorship attacks. See Figure 9.22.

Figure 9.22 Live Social Media Message Insertion (Courtesy VFT
Solutions, Inc.)[4]

CONCLUSIONS
Technology changes at a rapid pace; social media
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technology seems to change at the speed of light. This chapter’s
content exposes students to a brief overview of the scope and
breadth of how social media has changed and disrupted our lives.
What may true today may be outdated or incorrect one hour from
now; the key is for students to understand the rapidly shifting
landscape and how such shift can impact personal inconvenience
or benefit to global change or conflict. Technologists, security
specialists, and other professionals would do well to stay abreast of
this emergent technology, currently in individual use by over onehalf of the world population.
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER
1. You are the global marketing president for Tesla Automobiles.
As a popular automobile brand in the age of technology, green
energy, and social awareness you learn the companies
Chairman Elon Musk has made a politically unpopular
statement regarding his fondness for eating foie gras. In
response PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals)
calls for a boycott of all Tesla products as well as a delisting
and censorship of all content and advertisements on social
media. What steps would you take in order to mitigate risk to
your global business, respond to the story, maintain social
media contact with your loyal customer base? What steps
would you take to protect if other nations who were pro-duck
decided to block all social media companies doing business in
their nation which allowed pro foie gras content to be posted?

2. As part of your position as social media director of the local
mayoral campaign, you are told to present a plan to create
social media messaging to make your candidate look as if he
supports gun control while painting the opponent as a
supporter of full concealed carry weapons rights in public
places including schools. How would you address the
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opponent’s ten thousand social media followers? Would you
post on his social media platforms? How would you fact check
the information you intended to post? Would you post content
that could not be 100% verified as accurate? What contingency
plans would you create in case as a result of your postings,
your candidate was de-platformed across social media?
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8PM-11PM/SUN 7PM-11PM, AD-SUPPORTED AND PREMIUM PAY
NETWORKS. NAT GEO MUNDO BASED ON NPM-H. RANKED BY
2020 YEAR-TO-DATE.
Social Media - The Next Battlefield in Information Warfare [Lonstein] | 431

[2] To date the author is unaware of any denial by the Biden family
or campaign that the laptop at issue was in fact owned & dropped
off by Hunter Biden or that any of the reported contents of its hard
drive were not correct.
[3]
7b7d698b9a660997f5e755d92b775d98

https://apnews.com/article/
Robert

Mueller’s

report

debunks Russia dossier
[4] In the interest of full transparency, VFT Solutions is the owner
of patented social media scraping and messaging technologies and
patents. Author Wayne Lonstein is a principal of VFT Solutions
[5]
7b7d698b9a660997f5e755d92b775d98

https://apnews.com/article/
Robert

Mueller’s

report

debunks Russia dossier
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10. Bioterrorism and
Advanced Sensors [Sincavage
& Carter]
“History has shown us repeatedly, in terms of both human suffering
and economic loss, that the costs of preparedness through vigilance
are far lower than those needed to respond to unanticipated public
health crises.” ~ RL Berkelman, RT Bryan, MT Osterholm, JW
LeDuc, JM Hughes
Student Learning Objectives – What Questions Will Be
Answered
1) How have pathogens shaped our history and will determine our
future?
2) What / why are biological weapons (BW) used by terrorists?
3) What general taxonomy of BW is used by LEO / DHS in the
field?
4) What is the current bioterrorism defense for the U.S.
homeland?
5) What could be the long-term implications of compromised
DNA data?
6) How can nanotechnology impact the global BW threat
landscape?
BIOLOGICAL TERRORIST AGENTS (BTA)
Biological terrorist agents (BTA) which are prima facia for
development

of

biological

weapons

(BW)

include

any

microorganism or toxin found in nature or derived from living
organisms to produce death or disease in humans, animals, or
plants. (Burke, 2017) (DrPH & Shiel, 2020). They are odorless,
tasteless, and colorless if released in a biological cloud by terrorists.
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All biological agents ( BA) have an incubation period, which will allow
the terrorist time to escape before onset of symptoms. Anthrax,
plague, and other BA are readily available in biological supply houses
around the world outside the US. (Burke, 2017) There are good and
bad bacteria naturally present in the environment and living
organisms. The bad bacteria are referred to as pathogens because
they

cause

death

to

a

living

organism.

Disease-causing

microorganisms (pathogens) are classified as 6.2 infectious
substances under the U.N,. / DOT hazard class system.[1] Toxins
that are chemical poisons produced by microorganisms or plants
are classified under the U.N. /DOT hazard class system 6.1 poisons.
[See end note & reference (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010)] There are
other systems of classifications for specific audiences, ex LEO. [2]
The biological threat agent can be introduced in the environment
via asymmetric war or terrorist attacks. The threat of advanced
biological warfare agents will continue to present challenges to
developing effective strategies for defense and countermeasures
(vaccines, medicine, etc.) to combat the next level in 21st-century
warfare. For those in the business of BW defense a solid reference
for counterterrorism is by Burke. (Burke, 2017)
Biological Weapons – A Historical Primer
During medieval times, bodies diseased with plague were
catapulted over walls protecting enemy forts and castles. Once
inside, the disease would spread throughout the enclosed walls.
Diseased bodies were also placed upstream from compounds, and
the residents would drink the water full of deadly microorganisms.
In the American Civil War confederate troops placed corpses of
livestock into ponds and lakes, contaminating the water supply,
which delayed the advance of Union troops. (Burke, 2017)
During World War I, Germany used biological weapons on animals
to impact Romania, Spain, Norway, the United States, and Argentina
(Wheelis, 1998). The German biological weapons program produced
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bacterial and pathogen bioweapons of Anthrax, glanders, and
cholera.
France followed Germany with the development of its own
bioweapons program in 1921, weaponizing the potato beetle.
In 1928, The Soviet Union had one of the most powerful
bioweapons programs during the cold war. They created the next
level of weapon using genetically modified agents (Tucker, 1998).
The U.S.S.R. created antibiotic-resistant strains for gland, anthrax,
plague, and tularemia. There are three categories of Soviet
bioweapons strategic, operational, strategic-operational.

The

Soviets decided to develop biological weapons because their
research showed them to be more efficient than toxic weapons.
Biological weapons in massive amounts can create very high
concentrations over a vast area. It is believed between 1988 and 1989;
all Soviet bioweapons were destroyed on Vozrozhdeniye Island by
Colonel Shcherbakov (Tucker, 1998).
Japan was the only country to use biological weapons during
World War II. The Japanese program began in 1933, testing
biological warfare out on women (pregnant or not) and men,
ranging from any age, from their population of prisoners,
handicapped,

and

homeless.

The

Japanese

lab,

Manchuria

Detachment “Unit 731”, tested many agents (ex: plague, anthrax,
gonorrhea, syphilis) on prisoners of war. Prisoners were exposed
aerosolized anthrax and died. Their bodies were dissected to
determine the effects of anthrax. Reports indicate that as many as
3,000 prisoners might have died in BW research. It is also believed
that the Japanese used BTA on Chinese soldiers and civilians in
WWII. Bubonic plague, cholera, anthrax, and other diseases were
released, killing tens of thousands of Chinese. (Burke, 2017) By the
end of WWI, the Japanese had stockpiled 400 kilograms of anthrax
to be used in specifically designed fragmentation bombs. (Burke,
2017)
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From World War I, the United States began research and
development of biological weapons. The official start of the U.S.
biological weapons program was authorized in 1943 by President
Roosevelt. During World War II, the United States had an advanced
bioweapons program that included both offensive and defensive
components. During that time, The United States could massproduce pathogens such as anthrax and test spreading the bacteria
in the form of a cluster bomb or anti-crop agent. Pathogens were
weaponized at Fort Detrick in Maryland, then transported to the
dugway proving grounds in Utah we’re open-air testing of the
biological weapons took place (Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2015).
After World War II, the United States expanded its biological
warfare research based on information learned from Japan’s units
731 (Imperial Japanese Army’s covert biological and chemical
warfare research and development unit). However, the early U.S. BW
program was created because of the anticipated German biological
warfare threat rather than the Japanese. (Burke, 2017) The medical
defensive BTA program in the U.S. continues today as the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).
(Burke, 2017)
During the Korean War, the United States was accused of using
bioweapons, but it was proven to the World Peace Council; the
allegations were Chinese government propaganda. Accusations
followed in 1962 by the Cuban government. It was believed the
United States used bioweapons against poultry and tobacco
industries in Cuba. Cuba could not prove the allegations. In 1969
President Nixon abolished all U.S. offensive biological weapon
capabilities but retained the BTA defensive program. (watchdog
-USAMRIID)
After World War II, Disarmament Discussions began to be
addressed in the United Nations. This included biological and
chemical weapons. In 1968 the nuclear nonproliferation treaty was
put into place. This Treaty’s focus was mainly on chemical weapons
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and did not address the core of the biological weapons race. After
negotiations by the U.S. and USSR,

the biological weapons

convention was written in 1971. It was formally signed in 1972. At
the signing event, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, David Ennals, stated, “The Biological Weapons Convention
is significant as the first measure, reached since the Second World
War, involving the destruction of existing weapons. Biological
warfare was potentially the most frightening method of armed
conflict. Today, over 40 states are parties to this Convention and
have both renounced this entire class of weapons and undertaken to
prevent their future development by appropriate national measures.
All governments for whom this Treaty formally enters into force
today should gain satisfaction from having taken a step which will
reduce the possibility of biological weapons being used in some
future conflict.” (United Nations, 2021).
During the mid-1990’s, the Aum Shinri Kyo Cult terrorist
organization in Japan dispersed aerosols of anthrax and botulism
throughout Tokyo on at least eight occasions. The attacks failed.
John Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense studies found that
given the right weather and wind conditions, about 110 pounds
of anthrax released from an aircraft could spread nearly 12 miles
downwind. The cloud would be colorless, odorless, and invisible.
No warning systems would be activated until patients showed up
in hospitals. (Burke, 2017) [3] During the fall of 2001, Biological
terrorism struck U.S. letters postmarked Trenton, NJ, to various
news organizations and political figures. The most potent of the
letters went to the Senate with a highly refined dry powder
consisting of 1 gram of nearly pure anthrax spores. Twenty-two
people developed anthrax infections. Five Died. [4] (Burke, 2017)
First Bioterrorism Attack in the United States
The 1984, the Rajneeshee bioterror attack that impacted the
Pacific Northwest of the U.S. The Rajneesh cult (Osho followers)
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conducted the first documented bioterror incident in the U.S. (CDC
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2003). The cult had been planned to
influence the county election results by infecting residents with
salmonella on election day. They first started to test their attack by
contaminating salad bars at ten restaurants with S. Typhimurium
(typhoid fever) on different occasions before Election Day (CDC
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2003). It came to light the cult was
to blame when Osho fled the commune and voiced his concern
about the leader Anand Sheela’s fascist beliefs. The FBI found a
bioterrorism lab containing salmonella cultures and documentation
for manufacturing and using explosives and biowarfare.
Dark Winter
On June 22nd and 23rd, 2001, the Johns Hopkins Center for civil
biodefense

strategies

collaborated

with

other

institutional

institutions in a bioterrorism exercise, Dark Winter. The event
simulated

pandemic

smallpox,

focusing

on

the

challenge’s

policymakers would face if confronted with a bioterrorist attack.
Dark winter was intended to bring awareness to the threat posed
by biological weapons among senior national security experts (Tara
O’Toole, April 2002). Dark winner simulated attacks involving
smallpox on shopping malls in three different states resulting in
3000 people becoming infected (Foley, 2017). The exercise resulted
in:
• 16,000 smallpox cases reported in 25 states
• 1000 people had died
• The health care system could not meet the patient load
• Ten countries reported smallpox outbreaks, and Canada and
Mexico had closed their borders (Foley, 2017).
• The vaccine stockpiles for smallpox ran out with a month’s wait
to replenish.
• Food supplies we’re running low
• Countries put travel restrictions in place the economy was
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weak.
What were the lessons learned from Dark Winter? Why was a similar
simulation running again in the U.S.? Remember after September 11,
2001, eyes turned to the United States and the use of biodefense.
Shortly after 9/11, the United States encountered an anthrax attack
against government officials (described supra). Since the tragic
historical event, the FBI create a specialized branch to focus on
chemical, biological radiological, nuclear, and explosives. (Figure
10.1) Later in 2006, it became the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Directorate (WMDD). The branch links intelligence scientific and
operational components to detect and disrupt the acquisition of
WMDD against America.
Between 2014 in 2016, the lessons of dark winter were not applied,
and the nation faced the Ebola crisis. When the outbreak began
in West Africa, the world watched as it spread quickly through
West African countries. 10,000 people were infected with the Ebola
virus, and more than half of that number died. It became a United
States national security top priority, sending troops to assist with
the $400 million humanitarian effort. When the virus reached The
U.S. borders, it was not met with any sort of barrier requirements.
The personal protective equipment could not protect against the
pathogen, causing patients to be isolated. Quick reaction by the
government and the medical community The United States suffered
only 11 cases, which resulted in two deaths and nine survivors.
Following

the

Ebola

crisis,

the

House

of

Representative’s

subcommittees examined pandemic /biological terrorist attack
preparedness. U.S. presidential Directive (PPD)-39 outlined the
responsibilities of five federal agencies regarding WMD exercises
(Foley, 2017). The directive had assigned specific tasks to each of the
five agencies. It did not provide a plan for a coordinated response to
a biological attack
Also, PDD-39 was at the federal funding level and did not account
for the states (Foley, 2017). From 2004 leading up to the Ebola crisis,
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the U.S. government spent over $78.8 billion in biodefense. When
examining the expenditures further, the majority was spent on
multi-hazard programs, and only 17% went towards true biodefense
(Foley, 2017). Biodefense continues to struggle through the budget
from year to year. For example, the 2014 budget was $47.7 million
less than the 2013 budget (Foley, 2017). Since 2017 several of the
programs under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate
(WMDD) were eliminated or reassigned to another division. The
red team who conducted drills and assessments to help federal
and local officials detect threats were eliminated. A part of the
homeland unit that performs its exercises related to Weapons of
Mass Destruction at all levels was reduced. And international
cooperation division that worked with foreign counterparts and the
United Nations nuclear watchdog agency was disbanded. The goal
of this partnership was to stop and track the smuggling of nuclear
materials. There was a cut in funding to mobile units that protected
large public events by detecting biological threats.
Figure 10.1 FBI WMD Investigation (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2021)

The U.S. is one of the largest contributors to the G8 global
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partnership against the spread of weapons and materials and mass
destruction. This partnership with 29 other countries is critical
in preventing the illegal trafficking of weapons mass destruction
materials, dismantle and decommission nuclear submarines, and
improve biosecurity. In 2004, the U.S. was a cosponsor for the
United Nations Security Council resolution 1540. The resolution, “to
prevent states from supporting non-state actors and development
of weapons of mass destruction including biological weapons”
(Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2015). In the United States,
biological weapons programs are created, restructured, expand, and
disbanded at the hands of different government administrations.
In October 2019, a House Homeland

Security Committee

subcommittee held a hearing entitled “Defending the Homeland
from Bioterrorism: Are We Prepared?” The answer was a resounding
no (Rutschman, 2019).
PATHOGENS
There are several types of BTA (pathogens) used for biological
weapons. Biological agents can be divided into several related
groups (See Table 10.1). These include bacteria and rickettsia,
viruses, and toxins. Bacterial and viral agents cause disease and
can multiply and spread beyond the initial attack.[5] Toxins are
poisonous substances produced by living things, some of which are
extremely lethal. Toxins are not contagious. Some of the bacteria
that cause disease include anthrax, plague, cholera, diphtheria,
tuberculosis, typhoid fever, typhus, Legionnaire’s disease, Lyme
disease, and strep infections. Other bacteria produce toxins that
are chemical poisons, such as botulinum. More bacteria exist in a
handful of soils or in a person’s mouth than all the people who have
ever lived on earth. When someone sneezes, over a million bacteria
can be disseminated. Over 90% of all feces is made up of bacteria.
More bacterial cells than human cells exist in your body. From
300,000 to 1,000,000 different types of bacteria exist on Earth. The
majority of common bacteria is not pathogenic nor parasitic. Some
have mutated and learned to invade other cells and cause disease.
Bioterrorism and Advanced Sensors [Sincavage & Carter] | 441

Bacterial organisms have a nucleus, intracellular nonmembrane
bound organelles ( a specialized cellular part that resembles an
organ) , and a cell wall. (Burke, 2017)
Table 10.1 Comparison of Biological Agent Characteristics
(Burke, 2017)

Disease

Likely Method Infectious
of
person to
Dissemination person

Anthrax

Spores in
aerosol

Cholera

Sabotage
Rare
(food & water)

Infectious
dose

8 to
No except
10,000
cutaneous
spores

Incubation Duration
Lethality
Period
of illness
1 to 5 days

>106
12 hours
organisms to 6 days
<100

1 to 3
days`

3-5 days
usually
fatal

High

>1 week

Low when
treated,
high
without

1 to 6
days,
usually
fatal

High if not
treated w/
i 12 – 24
hours

Plague

Aerosol

High

Tularemia

Aerosol

No

1 to 50
1 to 10
organisms days

>2
weeks

Moderate

Q Fever

Aerosol,
sabotage (
food supply)

Rare

10
14 to 26
organisms days

Weeks

Very low

Ebola

Direct
contact,
aerosol

Moderate

1 to 10
plague
units

4 to 16
days

Death
between
7-16
days

High Zaire
strain;
moderate
Sudan

Smallpox

Aerosol

High

Assumed
low

10-12 days

4 weeks

High to
moderate

VEE

Aerosol

Low

Assumed
low

1 to 6 days

Days to
weeks

Low

0.001 g/
kg is
LD50 [6]

Death in
72
Variable
hours;
(hours to
lasts
24 to days) months
if not
fatal

Botulinum
Aerosol
toxin

No

organisms
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High
without
respiratory
support

Bacteria and rickettsia are single-celled microscopic organisms
that can cause disease in plants, animals, and humans.
Rickettsia

are

pleomorphic

(varying

sizes)

parasitic

microorganisms that live in the cells of the intestines of arthropods
(invertebrates and man, such as insects, spiders, and crabs, which
have segmented bodies and jointed limbs. Some are pathogenic to
man, where they are known to cause the typhus group of fevers.
Rickettsia are smaller than bacteria but larger than viruses. Like
viruses, rickettsia are obligate ( they cannot exist on their own or in
any other form); they are considered intra-cellular parasites. (Burke,
2017)
Viruses are very small submicroscopic organisms, smaller than
bacteria and unable to live on their own. They must invade the
host cell and make use of its reproductive mechanism to multiply.
Many of the biological toxins are much more toxic than any of the
chemical agents classified as chemical weapons (CW). See Table
10.2 Lethality of Selected Toxins and Chemical Agents in Laboratory
Mice (Burke, 2017)
Table 10.2 Lethality of Selected Toxins and Chemical Agents in
Laboratory Mice (Burke, 2017)
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Agent

LD50 (g/kg)

Source

Botulinum toxin

0.001

Bacterium

Shiga toxin

0.002

Bacterium

Tetanus toxin

0.002

Bacterium

Abrin

0.04

Plant (Rosa Pea)

Diphtheria toxin

0.10

Bacterium

Maitotoxin

0.10

Marine Dinoflagellate

Palytoxin

0.15

Marine soft coral

Ciguatoxin

0.40

Marine Dinoflagellate

Texilotoxin

0.60

Elapid snake

C.perfringes toxins 0.1 to 5.0

Bacterium

Batrachotoxin

2.0

Arrow-Poison frog

Ricin

3.0

Plant (Castor beans)

Alpha-Conotoxin

5.0

Cone snake

Tiapoxin

5.0

Elapid snake

Tetrodotoxin

8.0

Puffer fish

Alpha-Tityustoxin

9.0

Scorpion

Saxitoxin

10.0

Marine Dinoflagellate

Inhalation 2.0
VX

15.0

Chemical agent

SEB

27.0

Bacterium

Anatoxin-A

50

Blue-green algae

Microcystin

50

Blue-green Algae

Soman (SD)

64

Chemical agent

Sarin

100

Chemical agent

Aconitine

100

Plant (Monkshood)

T-2 Toxin

1200

Fungal Mycotoxin

Bacterial Agents
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Bacteria are single-celled organisms that range in size and shape
from cocci (spherical cells)

with a diameter of 0.5-1.0 m

(micrometer) to long rod-shaped organisms – bacilli – which can
be from 1.5 m in size. Chains of bacilli have been known to exceed
60 m in size. Some bacteria have the ability to change into spores.
In this form, the bacteria are more resistant to cold, heat, drying,
chemicals, and radiation than the bacterial form. When in spore
form, the bacteria are inactive, or dormant, much like seeds of a
plant. When conditions are favorable, the spores germinate just like
seeds. (Burke, 2017)
Bacteria has two methods by which it can cause disease in
humans and animals. The first is by attacking the tissues of the host
living thing. Secondly, all living organisms produce waste. Bacteria
may produce a toxic or poisonous waste material that causes
disease in the host. Some bacteria attack by both methods. When
a terrorist selects a BTA, he wants the organism to survive under
varied conditions and produce certain desired results from
dissemination into the population. Genetic engineering may be used
to create BTA from otherwise harmless bacteria.
Bacteria can be created to be resistant to known antibiotics,
extreme weather conditions, or aerosol dissemination losses.
For a BTA to be effective, it must produce a specific effect: illness,
disability, death, or damage to food chains. It must be produced
in large amounts, and remain stable while manufactured, during
storage, when weaponized, and during transportation. It must be
easy to easy and effective to disperse and remain stable once
disseminated. It should have a short reliable gestation period and
should be persistent. (Burke, 2017)
Bacillus anthracis is the cause of anthrax, used by Robert Koch in
1877 to develop a theory of disease (Bruce Budowle, 2020). DNA is
used to study bacteria’s evolution, giving the scientist the ability to
identify different strands of viruses. As of 2018, 412 strains of anthrax
have been identified, allowing a scientist to understand the bacteria
for cures or weaponization (Bruce Budowle, 2020). The increase in
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DNA study using whole-genome sequencing of data has provided
great insight into pathogens such as the plague. In 2002 two tourists
visiting New York became ill with the first case of bubonic plague.
Scientists were able to determine within a day the couple had been,
in fact, it by bites from fleas in their backyard in New Mexico. The
use of DNA leading to the progression of genotyping and analysis
of a bacterial pathogen increases the chances of determining bio
crimes. As with the good, there is the bad the advances in DNA study
also increase the potential of an effective bioweapon.
Anthrax is a good example of a BTA. Its medical courses is
instructive. There are three ways to die from anthrax. Most
commonly the disease appears on the hands and forearms of people
working with infected animals. Symptoms as a result of cutaneous
exposure include:
• Intense itching, followed by carbuncle formation
• Formation of carbuncles (inflammation of hair follicles and
surrounding tissue)
• Swelling at the location of the infection
• Scabs form over the lesions and turn black as coal[7]

The mortality rate for untreated cutaneous anthrax is 20%.
Inhalation exposure symptoms are flu-like:
• Chills and mild fever
• Malaise
• Nausea and swelling of the lymph nodes
• Fatigue
• Myalgia (muscle pain)
• Dry cough
• Feeling of pressure in chest
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Victims feel better ( known as anthrax eclipse) but in a few days
the victim will get much worse with major pulmonary involvement.
Mortality rate is nearly 100%.
Anthrax can also be ingested. Symptoms resulting from ingestion
exposure to anthrax include:
• Abdominal pain
• Acute inflammation of the intestinal tract
• Nausea
• Loss of appetite
• Vomiting
• Fever
• Abdominal pain
• Vomiting of blood
• Severe diarrhea

Approximately 25-60 % of those victims will die.
All the pathogens in Tables 10.1 & 10.2 are medically described in
detail in (Burke, 2017). Further properties -especially for LEO- are
listed in (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010).
Viruses / Viral Weapons
Viruses are the simplest type of microorganism and the smallest
of living things. They are much smaller than bacteria and range in
size from 0.02 – 1.0 m (1m = 1,000 mm). One drop of blood can
contain over 6 billion viruses! [8] Every living entity is composed
of cells except for viruses. They are inert until they come into
contact with a living host. The infection point created from a virus
occurs at the cellular level. Once the virus invades the cell, it can
kill it. Common examples of viral agents include measles, mumps,
meningitis, influenza, HIV -AIDS, HBV, HBC, and the common
cold. (Burke, 2017)
Most likely virus candidates for terrorist agents would include
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Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), smallpox, and the class called
hemorrhagic fevers. The latter group includes Ebola, Marburg,
arenaviridae, Lassa fever, Argentine and Bolivia, Congo-Crimean, Rift
Valley, yellow fever, and dengue. (Burke, 2017)
Viruses are infectious agents that require a host for propagation,
a trait that has caused them to excel at finding new hosts (Clare
E. Rowland, 2016). Whereas many of the weaponized bacteria are
not as effective in transmission from person to person, viruses are
the pathogens that generate pandemics (Clare E. Rowland, 2016).
The CDC has classified multiple viral agents as potential weapons
of mass destruction or agents for biologic terrorism (Bronze, 2002).
Viruses are significant; they are quickly produced and spread (i.e.,
Ebola, coronaviruses, smallpox). In 2009, the U.S. government
launched USAID PREDICT to search for unknown viruses that can
cross from animals to humans resulting in a pandemic. The
PREDICT program identified nearly 1,000 new viruses, including a
new strain of Ebola; trained roughly 5,000 people worldwide to
identify new diseases; worked with 31 countries, and improved or
developed 60 research laboratories (Global Biodefense Staff, 2020).
In China, PREDICT detected a novel coronavirus clustering with
the SARS-like coronaviruses in Rhinolophus bats from Guangdong.
Further characterization of this Beta Coronavirus is underway,
including sequencing of the spike protein, to determine if it has the
potential to infect other hosts. USAID PREDICT in 2017 and 2018
reported on the cross-contamination of coronaviruses among bats,
camels, and livestock. In 2019, USAID PREDICT had reached the
end of its ten-year funding and was scheduled to be disbanded in
March 2020. On November 21, 2019, Senator Angus S. King wrote
Mark green, the administrator for the United States Agency for
International Development, questioning the closure of PREDICT,
questioning if other agencies would inherit the project’s initiatives,
and asked if Congress would be consulted before decisions were
made regarding the reassignment of PREDICT Initiatives. On
January 30, 2020, Senate representatives, including senator King
wrote mark green again and wrote Homeland Security requesting
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updates on the coronavirus and USAID PREDICT response. April
1, 2020, the USAID PREDICT project was extended by six months.
On May 7, 2020, the United States Agency for International
Development announced USAID PREDICT project replacement,
STOP Spillover. The $100 million replacement project was awarded
to Tufts University to implement STOP Spillover with a consortium
of universities worldwide. STOP Spillover is a critical next step in
the evolution of USAID’s work to understand and address the risks
posed by zoonotic diseases that can “spillover” – or be transmitted
(USAID , 2020). A member of the debunked USAID PREDICT, Kevin
Olival is a disease ecologist at the EcoHealth Alliance, expressed,
“…what is needed is detailed knowledge of local ecology, maps of
species distributions, an understanding of people’s behavioral
interactions with other species and an awareness of the cultural and
economic drivers of the animal trade.”
Galveston National Laboratory
Galveston National Laboratory is one of the most extensive active
biocontainment facilities on a U.S. academic campus. On March 23,
2013, GNL reported a vial of the GUANARITO virus missing from
the secure research lab. Guanarito virus, a rat-borne pathogen that
can infect humans, could potentially be weaponized as an aerosol
spray causing hemorrhagic fever. Similar to Ebola, the virus causes
bleeding under the skin, and internal organs were from body
orifices like math eyes or ears, a 33% chance of death. The virus is
typically contracted in South America, specifically Venezuela. GNL
maintains there was no breach to the facilities and no indication
that wrongdoing was involved. The lab believes the vial had been
accidentally dropped on the floor then destroyed in the incinerator,
but there is no record.
Biological Toxins / Toxic Weapons
Biological toxins are defined as any toxic substance occurring
in nature produced by an animal, plants, or microbe (pathogenic
bacteria) such as bacteria, fungi, flowering plants, insects, fish,
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reptiles, or mammals. They are classified as poisons under
U.N./DOT 6.1. Unlike chemical agents such as sarin, cyanide, or
mustard, toxins are not man-made. (Table 10.3)

Table 10.3 Comparison of Chemical Agents and Toxins (Burke,
2017)
Toxins

Chemical Agents

Natural Origin

Man-made

Difficult small-scale production

Large scale industrial
operations

None volatile

Many volatile

Many are more toxic

Less toxic than many toxins

Not dermally active *

Dermally active

Legitimate medical use

No use other than many toxins
(except murder)

Odorless and tasteless

Noticeable odor and taste

Diverse toxic effects

Fewer types of effects

Many are effective immunogens **

Poor immunogens

Aerosol delivery

Mist/droplet/aerosol delivery

*Exceptions are trichothecene
mycotoxins, lyngbyatoxin, and some
blue-green algae. Cause dermal injury
to swimmers.

**The human body recognizes
them as foreign material and
makes protective antibodies
against them

Toxins are unlike chemical agents in that they vary widely in their
mechanism of action. ( Table 10.4) Length of time from exposure to
onset of symptoms also varies significantly. In battlefield scenarios,
preparations can be made for treatments and preventive measures.
However, in a terrorist threat, preparation is not as easy, because it
is unknown when or where the terrorist will strike, or which agent
would be used. (Burke, 2017)
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Table 10.4 Comparison of Chemical Nerve Agent, Botulinum
Toxin, and Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B Intoxication following
Inhalation Exposure (Burke, 2017)

Chemical
Nerve Agent

Botulinum
Toxin

Staphylococcal
Enterotoxin B

Time to
symptoms

Minutes

Hours
(12-48)

Hours (1-6)

Nervous

Convulsions,
Muscle
twitching

Progressive
paralysis

Headache, muscle aches

Cardiovascular

Slow heart
rate

Normal rate Normal or rapid rate

Respiratory

Difficult
breathing,
airway
constriction

Normal
then
progressive
paralysis

Non-productive cough;
severe cases: chest pain,
difficult breathing

Increased
Gastrointestinal motility, pain,
diarrhea

Decreased
motility

Nausea, vomiting,
diarrhea

Ocular

Small pupils

Droopy
eyelids

Red eyes, conjunctival
injection

Salivary

Profuse
watering
saliva

Normal but
difficult
swallowing

Slight increased
quantities of saliva

Death

Minutes

2-3 days

unlikely

Response to
Atropine /
2PAM-CL

Yes

No

Atropine may reduce
gastrointestinal
symptoms

Toxins, produced by living organisms, are materials that can be
connected

to

several

types

of

industrial

operations

and

bioterrorism. Unlike the other bioweapons, toxic weapons are not
contagious. The toxin ricin is a natural byproduct creating Castor oil
from Castor beans. Castor beans are processed worldwide, resulting
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in millions of tons readily available. In 1978 during the Cold War,
Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov was assassin by a poke of an
Umbrella that contained tiny pellet ricin. It was reported during the
Iran Iraqi war that ricin might have been used. Ricin has also been
detected in the mail received at the U.S. Senate office complex in
2004
In general, governments have found BTA unsatisfactory as
battlefield weapons because they are difficult to deliver efficiently
while protecting their own troops and because of treaties and
conventions signed among participants. However, they may be
more attractive to terrorists because they have a potential to cause
casualties, and to instill fear and panic in a general population.
(Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010) BTA is definitely a global phenomenon.
Table 10.5 Biological agents (BTA) as a function of global
development / use. (Clare E. Rowland, 2016)
.
Table 10.5 Biological Threat Agents as a function of global
development / use (Clare E. Rowland, October 2016)
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INCIDENTS
COUNTRY OR
(aggressor,
ORGANIZATION target, year)
(1)
(2)

AGENT

TRANSMISSION GREATEST
MODE (3)
CONCERN

BACTERIA
Germany;
Allies; WWI;
(4)
US, UK, Canada.
USSR, Iraq,

Bacillus
anthracis
(anthrax)

Yersinia pestis
(plague)

Francisella
tularensis
(tularemia)

Coxiella
burnetti (Q
fever)

Brucella
species
(brucellosis)

Germany, Japan,
Aum Shinrikyo

USSR;
Sverdlovsk;
Inhalation,
1979, Aum
ingestion,
Shinrikyo,
cutaneous
Japan, 1993;
Not
Determined;
US; 2001.

US, USSR, Japan

Japan;
China;
WWII.

Inhalation,
animal vectors

High fatality
rate,
secondary
transmission

US, USSR, Japan

USSR;
German
troops;
WWII (5)

Ingestion,
inhalation,
contact, animal
vectors

Infectivity,
difficult
diagnosis,
antibiotic
resistance

US, USSR

USSR;
German
troops;
WWII (5)

Inhalation,
animal vectors

Infectivity,
stability,
secondary
infection from
animal
vectors

Inhalation,
ingestion,
contact

Aerosol
dispersion

Japan;
China and
Manchuria;
Inhalation,
WWII;
contact
USSR;
Afghanistan;
1982-4 (5)

Infectivity,
high
morbidity

US

Burkholderia
mallei
(glanders)

Germany, Japan,
US, USSR

Germany;
Allies; WWI;
(4)

Aerosol
Dispersion
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Salmonella
typhimurium
(salmonella)

Japan;
China;
WWII
Japan

Rajneeshee
cult;
Oregon;
1984

Ingestion

Incapacitation

Inhalation,
contact

Secondary
transmission;

VIRUSES
Variola major
(smallpox)

USSR, Japan

Viral
hemorrhagic
fevers (Ebola,
Marburg, etc.)

US, USSR, Japan

USSR;
Aralsk; 1971

Inhalation,
contact

high mortality
Secondary
transmission;

TOXINS
Mycotoxins
(including
aflatoxin, T-2
toxins)
Clostridium
botulinum
toxin
(botulism)

Ricin

USSR; Iraq
USSR; Iraq,
USSR, Germany,
Japan,
Aum Shinrikyo

US, UK, USSR,
Iraq, Al Qaeda

USSR; Laos;
1975-81
Aum
Shinrikyo;
1990-95
Soviet
assassin;
Georgi
Markov;
1978

Staphylococcal
enterotoxin B
US
(SEB)

Contact,
inhalation,
ingestion

Incapacitation

inhalation,
ingestion

Extreme
toxicity;
aerosol
dispersion

inhalation,
ingestion,
intramuscular

Widespread
availability

inhalation,
ingestion

incapacitation

(1) Partial list
of

States or groups

Involved in
researching

Or weaponizing
the

The agent

(2) Accidental
releases

Are in plain text.

Attempted
use shown

In italics.
Successful
attacks in

Bold

(3) Common
natural

Transmission
mode

Shown in
italics & Red

Transmission
mode posing
greatest

Threat in bold

(4) Against
livestock

Rather than

Human
targets
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(5) suspected
use

Biological attacks using bacteria or viral agents are likely to
escape detection for a time period corresponding to the incubation
period for the disease they cause, anywhere from hours to weeks.
Toxins typically act much faster. Doctors’ offices and emergency
rooms are considered most likely to be the “first responders” in case
of a bacterial or viral attack. (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010)
Law enforcement officers (LEOs) are most likely to encounter
attacks with toxins. They will be at more risk of exposure to
bacterial or viral agents when investigating suspicious activities or
where terrorists were observed or caught in the process of
disseminating the agent. (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010)

Existing U.S. Biodefense – BioWatch
Post 9/11, the United States created the BioWatch program.
BioWatch is slow and cannot provide comprehensive attribution
information, which leaves the U.S. population vulnerable to deadly
biological agents and contributes to the nation’s overall biological
unpreparedness and vulnerability (Mojidi, 2019). (See Figure 10.2)
This surveillance system uses more than 600 sensors in over 30
major cities across the U.S., including throughout city transport
systems (Mojidi, 2019). The samples are obtained by monitoring
the air quality via a specialized filter (Mojidi, 2019). The filter is
tested for pathogens using the Polymerase Chain Reaction, which
directly identifies pathogenic genes from a list of predetermined
highly infectious diseases (Mercer, 2016).

Bioterrorism and Advanced Sensors [Sincavage & Carter] | 455

Figure 10.2 U.S. Biological Surveillance Process (Mojidi, 2019)

It can take from days to weeks before the U.S. government can
coordinate an effective interagency response to bioterror events
through the unsecured BioWatch portal. BioWatch program
reported between 2003 to 2011 having 56 false alarms. Thus, putting
the credibility of the BioWatch program in question. The U.S. started
development on a Generation-3 system
Figure 10.3 BioWatch Gen 2 Aerosol Collector (Mercer, 2016)
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Figure 10.4 BioWatch Gen 2 Aerosol Collector (Mercer, 2016)
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Biowatch Gen 2 detection capabilities consist of outdoor aerosol
collectors whose filters are manually retrieved for subsequent
analysis in a State or county public health laboratory that is a
member of the CDC Laboratory Response Network. The results
are generally received 8-10 hours after sample delivery to the
laboratory. Biowatch Gen 2 is labor-intensive, and products may not
be available until 12-36 hours after a biological agent’s release has
occurred. (See Figures 10-3 & 10.4)
Biowatch Gen 3 was canceled in 2014 when the Government
Accountability Office reported the program’s upgraded capabilities
from Gen 2 were not worth the investment price. In 2011 the U.S.
Committee on Effectiveness of National Biosurveillance Systems
said, “Generation 3 involves improvements that include replacing
the existing air samplers, which require manual retrieval and
laboratory analysis of filters, with automated detectors capable of
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onsite sample analysis and an anticipated expansion of the
BioWatch system’s coverage. Over the next decade, such upgrades
will more than double the program’s direct cost to $200 million on
an annualized basis. The expansion of coverage mainly drives the
higher cost. As shown by comparing the Generation 2 scenario to
a scenario in which the Generation 3 technology is used without
expanding the number of jurisdictions or deployed detectors, the
cost of acquiring and fielding new technology is largely offset by
the cost savings associated with automated analysis of the detector
samples” (Institute of Medicine (US) and National Research Council
(US) Committee on Effectiveness of National Biosurveillance
Systems, 2011). Biowatch Gen 3 was to operate 24 hours a day yearround, continuously monitoring the air for agents and expanding to
other areas. The BioWatch program is the only U.S. initiative in place
for bio surveillance.
In the private sector, when an audit is conducted internally or if
a third party and critical items are identified, the offender needs
to have an immediate mitigation plan and resolve the issue in a
reasonable amount of time. We can see this across the financial
health care and retail sector with the enforcement of different
federal regulations that must be compliant for the business to
remain in business without incurring a fine or completely shut
down. A security audit completes in 2017 found the BioWatch
website to be critical in high risk of vulnerabilities, including weak
encryption that made the website susceptible to online attacks. The
website was also noted not to have any protective monitoring. The
data on that website included some of the Biowatch air samplers’
locations, which are installed throughout the United States. The
results of the Biowatch air samplers and possible pathogens they
detect in response plans were available on the website. The website
was run by a private company, Logistics Management Institute
(LMI), and was considered a (dot)org versus (dot) gov website. James
McDonnell, assistant secretary of Homeland security counter
countering weapons of mass destruction office, stated the data was
housed outside the secure government firewall and were not
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significant enough to cause a national security threat (Baumgartner,
2019). A security scan found Up to 41 vulnerabilities and attempted
access to the portal by unauthorized users. The website was retired
in May 2019; however, at the time of this writing, with the Wayback
machine, image captures return a positive result except for the final
capture taken in April 2019. (Figure 10.5)
At the House Homeland Security Committee subcommittee
hearing fall of 2019, experts testified that our biodefense system has
been vulnerable and outdated over the past ten years (Rutschman,
2019).
Figure 10.5 BioWatch Portal Snapshots Remain (by Author)

NEXT GENERATION – DNA to GENOME
In 1997, the JASON group (a group of academic scientists who
advise the U.S. government in science and technology), focused
on genetically engineered pathogens and biological weapons. The
group came up with six potential threats: binary biological weapons,
designer genes, weaponized gene therapy, stealth virus-host
swapping diseases, and designer diseases. At the time of their study,
some of the technology existed to produce such threats.
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Science evolved, presenting commercial opportunities to collect
consumers’ DNA to help complete the puzzle of family members’
heritage. The consumer agreed to the fine print ,in the excitement
to find out their origin, but also surrendered their personal (private)
data to be used for research. As a result, DNA is used by several
different industries to profit from the information available from the
DNA data collected. The marketing industry launched large-scale
consumer advertising companies such as Airbnb© and Spotify©.
They use collected DNA datasets to attract customers. The genetic
data

can

give

creative

strategies

to

leverage

customers’

requirements(and company profits) based on their genomes. [9] [10]
DNA collection can occur for medical reasons. DNA data can live
on the physical computer systems of the lab, a medical professional
or their gloves, treatment center/hospital, health care company,
university, and in some cases, a state. It was confirmed in 2017 by
news reports that Asian based firms have obtained U.S. DNA data
and plan to collect additional Americans DNA through commercial
and medical means (Javers, 2017). Since that report, several
healthcare companies, facilities, and organizations have suffered
data breaches. [11]
Genomic data can be digitized. With quantum computing,[12] we
can understand the genetic development of living organisms, how
they are vulnerable to diseases, and how they would respond to
drugs and treatments.

Genomic research has increased the

development of medicines and vaccines dramatically. For example,
a vaccine was created in less than three months for the mutated flu
virus strain H7 N 9. This converging technology also poses a BW
threat when it is used to identify harmful genes or DNA sequences.
There are risks and benefits to dual use DNA collection. The
primary concerns are the amount of data being collected; who
collects and filters /categorizes the data; who owns the data; where
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is it stored; and can it be resold. Another issue is can the collected
databases be hacked. Data collected by Cambridge Analytics
through social media for elections was weaponized and published.
DNA can lead to a designer bioweapon, to affect genocide. Our
DNA data can be used to understand how our mind and body will
react. Synthetic viruses or genes combined with the use of quantum
dots, nanoparticles, and 3D printer materials to create a bioweapon
/ biodefense agent to target a population or protect that same
population. DNA technologies are disturbing and will have a future
impact on the airline, marine and most definitely the defense
industries.
Nanowire
In 2005, research was completed on the concept of using
nanowires, as ultrasensitive electronic sensors to detect biological
and chemical agents (Fernando Patolsky, 2005). Dr. Charles Lieber
and Professor Fernando Patolsky discuss the creation of a sensor
that’s configured with nanowire with the natural oxide coding. The
aforementioned receptor construction is more efficient than the
current modification of glass or a Silicon oxide to create the sensor
(Fernando Patolsky, 2005). When a virus particle binds to an
antibody receptor on a nanowire device, the conductance of that
device will change from the baseline value. When the virus unbinds
again, the conductance will return to the baseline value (Fernando
Patolsky, 2005). When the nanowire encounters influenza the
nanowire reflects accurate characteristics that are consistent with
influenza viruses. The sensor is able to produce optical and
electrical data it receives from the nanowire as the virus diffuses
near the nanowire device (Fernando Patolsky, 2005). The Harvard
team was able to determine the difference in distance of spacing
the nanowires over different size areas when the sensor could
encounter and detect two other viruses. Dr. Charles Lieber and
Professor Fernando Patolsky concluded that nanowire sensors
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could be key for virus sensing devices for the medical community
and used to detect bioterrorism (Fernando Patolsky, 2005).
Advances in nano-biosensor technology offer the ability to alert
LEO / DHS to a biological weapons attack. This early warning
system

permits

enactment

of

countermeasures

such

as

containment. Dr. Jing Wang of the Swiss Federal Laboratories for
Materials Science and Technology (Empa, ETH Zurich) and Zurich
University Hospital was tasked with creating a sensor to detect
SARS-COV-2. In January 2020, the team began testing sensors to
see if they could differentiate bacteria and viruses transmitted in
the air (Global Biodefense Staff, 2020). The goal of the sensor was to
be used in places like train stations or hospitals. It would measure
the virus concentration in the air in real-time (Global Biodefense
Staff, 2020). Doctor Wang and his team developed a sensor that
combines two different methods to detect viruses using optical
and thermal means. The sensor is based on tiny structures of gold
nanoislands on a glass substrate (Global Biodefense Staff, 2020) .
Artificially produced DNA receptors that match specific coronavirus
sequences of SARS CoV-2 are grafted onto the nanoislands (Global
Biodefense Staff, 2020). The coronavirus virus genome does not
consist of the DNA double-strand as in living organisms. The virus
has the DNA of a single strand (Global Biodefense Staff, 2020).
Therefore, the receptors on the sensor can identify the virus. The
optical component, localized surface plasmon resonance (LSPR),
can be used to measure whether the sample contains RNA strands
of SAR-CoV-2 or SARS-COV. The thermal component, plasmonic
photothermal (PPT), can detect whether the DNA strand is single
or double using localized heat produced by a laser of a specific
wavelength (Global Biodefense Staff, 2020). The sensor is in the
early phase of development and not ready for measurement of
COVID-19. When the sensor is completed testing it could be applied
to two other viruses. Dr. Wang’s sensor was featured as part of
the science -Switzerland April – May 2020 report, sponsored by
Swissnex. (Fernando Patolsky, 2005)
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Conclusions
• Pathogens are continuing to grow and disembogue into the
human population
• Biodefense is essential in defending the U.S. from adversaries
and preservation of American lives. It represents a significant
Disturbing Technology for all three theaters: Airline, Marine
and Defense. (Mauroni, 2014)
• Funding for the scientific community is essential for further
discovery, tracking, understanding, and constructing
countermeasures against pathogens.
• Lessons can be learned from past reductions in funding for
bioterrorism.[13]
• Nanotechnologies are the next generation of technology that
can contribute significantly to several different fields,
including medical and bioterrorism defenses.
• Cybersecurity plays a critical role in preventing bioterrorism.
There needs to be an understanding of adversarial use of the
data collected in the public and private sector and stored and
transmitted securely.

Post Analysis from a Terrorist Point of View
Terrorists like Disturbing Technologies because they make their
mission / goals of population disruption manageable. Biological
agents and toxins are the most likely terrorist weapons for the
future. They are inexpensive, do not require a great deal of technical
expertise or equipment to manufacture, and can be produced
without creating a lot of attention. Biological agents have the best
potential as weapons of mass destruction or disruption. They have
the ability to inflict extremely high levels of casualties on a target
population. It has been estimated by WHO that 50 kilograms of
aerosolized anthrax spores dispensed 2 kilometers upwind of a
population center of 500,000 unprotected people in an ideal
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meteorological condition, would travel greater than 20 kilometers
downwind, and kill / incapacitate up to 125,000 humans in the path
of the biological cloud. It is estimated by the Defense Department
that the amount of anthrax equal to a five-pound bag of sugar in
size would be enough to kill half the population of Washington,
DC. (Burke, 2017)
To be effective against large numbers of people, biological agents
must be properly disseminated. Conventional explosives could be
used for this purpose, along with common agricultural and home
garden spraying equipment modified to generate the smaller
particle size of biological materials. Motorized vehicles, boats, and
airplanes could also provide effective dissemination. Spray devices
would need nozzles in the 1- 10-micron range for optimum
dissemination. Weather conditions are critical for the effective
deployment of biological agents as aerosols. The ideal weather
would occur during the early morning or evening hours. (Burke,
2017)
The federal government has clamped down on the sale and use
of biological agents in research facilities. A program has been
developed to control the “Transfer or Receipt of Select agents.”
(Burke, 2017)The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 requires regulation of shipment and receipt of certain
microorganisms and toxins. Regulations are detailed in Appendix E
of (Burke, 2017) This reference also give over 20 pages of resources,
websites, agency contacts, notifications to gain more information or
report an incident. (Burke, 2017)

References
Baumgartner, E. (2019, August 25). It was sensitive data from a U.S.
anti-terror program – and terrorists could have gotten to it for years,
Bioterrorism and Advanced Sensors [Sincavage & Carter] | 465

records show. Retrieved from La Times: https://www.latimes.com/
science/sciencenow/la-sci-biowatch-20190402-story.html
Bronze, M. S. (2002). Viral agents as biological weapons and
agents of bioterrorism. The American journal of the medical sciences,
323(6), 316–325.
Bruce Budowle, S. E. (2020). Microbial Forensics. London:
Academic Press.
Burke, R. (2017). Counterterrorism for Emergency Responders, 3rd
edition. Boca Raton, FL: CRC.
CDC. (2021, January 16). Infection Control Considerations for HighPriority (CDC Category A) Diseases that May Result from Bioterrorist
Attacks or are Considered to be Bioterrorist Threats. Retrieved from
www.cdc.gov/:

https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/

guidelines/isolation/appendix/bioterror-precautions.html
CDC Emerging Infectious Diseases. (2003, January 17). Rajneeshee
Bioterror Attack. Retrieved from Homeland Security Digital Library
(HSDL): https://www.hsdl.org/c/tl/rajneeshee-bioterror-attack/
Clare E. Rowland, C. W. (October 2016). Nanomaterial-based
sensors for the detection of biological threat agents. Materials
Today, V19, No. 8: 464-477.
DrPH, E. H., & Shiel, W. C. (2020, October 16). What Is the Biological
Warfare?

.

Retrieved

from

eMedicineHealth:

https://www.emedicinehealth.com/biological_warfare/
article_em.htm
Evers, D., & T.J. Glover, T. M. (2010). Pocket Partner for Law
Enforcement, 5th edition. Littleton, CO: Sequoia Publishing.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2021, January 12). Weapons of
Mass Destruction. Retrieved from FBI: https://www.f bi.gov/
investigate/wmd
Fernando Patolsky, C. M. (2005, April). Nanowire Nanosensors.
Materials Today, pp. 21-28.
Fish, J., & R.N. Stout, &. E. (2011). Practical Crime Scene
Investigations for Hot Zones. Boca Raton, FL: CRC.
Foley, J. B. (2017). A Nation Unprepared: Bioterrorism and Pandemic

466 | Bioterrorism and Advanced Sensors [Sincavage & Carter]

Response. Fort Leavenworth: Arthur D. Simons Center for
Interagency Cooperation.
Global Biodefense Staff. (2020, April 21). A New Optical Biosensor
for the COVID-19 Virus. Retrieved from Global Biodefense:
https://globalbiodefense.com/2020/04/21/a-new-opticalbiosensor-for-the-covid-19-virus/
Global Biodefense Staff. (2020, February 2020). Shutdown of
PREDICT Infectious Disease Program Challenged by Senators Warren
and

King.

Retrieved

from

Global

Biodefense:

https://globalbiodefense.com/2020/02/04/shutdown-ofpredict-infectious-disease-program-challenged-by-senatorswarren-and-king/
Google. (2021, January 16). Current Global death toll and cases
reported

for

COVID-19

.

Retrieved

from

www.google.com:

www.google.com
Institute of Medicine (US) and National Research Council (US)
Committee on Effectiveness of National Biosurveillance Systems.
(2011). Biowatch and the Public Health System. Biowatch and Public
Health Surveillance: Evaluating Systems for the Early Detection of
Biological Threats: Abbreviated Version. Washington D.C.: National
Academies Press (US).
Javers, E. (2017, March 14). Official: American DNA info at risk
for

theft

by

foreign

powers.

Retrieved

from

CNBC:

https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/14/us-official-american-dnainfo-at-risk-for-theft-by-foreign-powers.html
Mercer, B. (2016, January 28). SFGATE. Retrieved from That
mysterious Homeland Security box plugged into an SF utility pole is
a..: https://www.sfgate.com/superbowl/article/That-mysteriousHomeland-Security-box-plugged-6790510.php
Mojidi, H. (2019). Advancing Bio Detection with Biosensors and
Nanotechnology for Rapid Interagency Response. InterAgency
Journal Vol. 10, No. 2, 44.
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). (2015). Biological. Retrieved from
Nuclear

Threat

Initiative

(NTI):

https://www.nti.org/learn/

countries/united-states/biological/
Bioterrorism and Advanced Sensors [Sincavage & Carter] | 467

Rutschman, A. S. (2019, November 17). Salad bars and water
systems are easy targets for bioterrorists – and America’s monitoring
system is woefully inadequate. Retrieved from The Conversation:
https://theconversation.com/salad-bars-and-water-systems-areeasy-targets-for-bioterrorists-and-americas-monitoring-systemis-woefully-inadequate-126079
Schmidt, C. (2020, April 3). Scienctific America. Retrieved from
Why

the

Coronavirus

Slipped

Past

Disease

Detectives:

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-thecoronavirus-slipped-past-disease-detectives/
Tara O’Toole, M. M. (April 2002). Shining Light on “Dark Winter”.
Clinical Infectious Diseases, Volume 34, Issue 7, 972–983.
Tucker, J. B. (1998, November 6). Biological Weapons in the Former
Soviet Union: Am Interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibel. Retrieved from
nonproliferation.org:

https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-

content/uploads/npr/alibek63.pdf
United Nations. (2021, January 7). History of the Biological Weapons
Convention. Retrieved from United Nations: https://www.un.org/
disarmament/biological-weapons/about/history/
USAID . (2020, September 30). USAID ANNOUNCES NEW $100
MILLION
EMERGING

PROJECT

TO

INFECTIOUS

ANTICIPATE
DISEASES.

THREATS
Retrieved

POSED
from

BY

USAID:

https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/
sep-30-2020-usaid-announces-new-100-million-project-threatsemerging-infectious
USAID. (2021, January ). USAID PERDICT. Retrieved from USAID:
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1864/
predict-global-flyer-508.pdf
Wheelis, M. (1998). First shots fired in biological warfare. Nature,
395.
Zastrow, M. (2019, October 15). Why Japan imported Ebola ahead
of

the

2020

Olympics.

Retrieved

from

Nature.com:

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03103-4

468 | Bioterrorism and Advanced Sensors [Sincavage & Carter]

[1] The HAZARD Classification System divides dangerous goods into
nine

classes

of

materials

for

purposes

of

transportation,

identification, and placarding: Class 1- explosives; Class 2 -gases;
Class 3-Combustable liquids; Class 4-Flamable solids & water
reactive; Class 5- Oxidizing substances; Class 6- Toxic & Infectious
substances; Class 7 – Radioactive materials; Class 8 – Corrosive
substances & Class 9 – Miscellaneous Hazardous materials. The
entire system is further divided into compatibility groups (letters)
and special placarding restrictions on all DOT or vehicles in DOT
jurisdiction must comply. If it moves it falls under these
restrictions. See (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010)
[2] Center for Disease Control (CDC) Taxonomy for LEO of
Biological Weapons – Along with the HAZMAT U.N. DOT
classification system, there are other classification systems. CDC
uses a general system for LEOs (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010) where:
CDC Category A
These organisms pose a risk to national security because they can
be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person. They
result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public
health impact and might cause public and social disruption. They
require special action for public health preparedness.
CDC Category B
These are moderately easy to disseminate and result in moderate
morbidity rates and low mortality rates. They require specific
enhancements of CDC’s diagnostic capability and enhanced disease
surveillance.
CDC Category C
These agents include emerging pathogens that could be
engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of
availability, ease of production and dissemination, potential for high
morbidity
and mortality rates, and major health impact.
Type
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B= Bacteria
V= Virus
T= Toxin
R = Rickettsial
Precautions
Consult with current CDC guidelines. (CDC, 2021) Also, Chapter
4 on BTA from (Burke, 2017) discusses precautions and protective
equipment in detail.
Dissemination
Dissemination is most likely by aerosol; some could also be used
as food or water contaminants; Inhalation is the mist deadly route
of exposure in all cases. (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010)
More official information about biological hazards falls under
DOT HAZMAT Guide 153 available in (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010).
From a LEO, forensics, protective gear perspective, one can consult
Practical Crime Scene Investigations for Hot Zones. (Fish & R.N.
Stout, 2011)
Table 10.2 shows the Biological agents as a function of global
development / use.
[3] The James Bond movie Goldfinger had toxins released from crop
dusters on Fort Knox troops.
[4] There is a detailed discussion of this incident in (Burke, 2017).
[5] It can be argued and there is corroborative Open-Source
evidence to support the theory that COVID-19 was in 2020 a
human-engineered / developed bioweapon (BW) in a Chinese Lab
in Wuhan, China The postulate is that it escaped its containment
apparatus and spread to the world causing unintended grievous
harm and death. Whether this BW theory true, partially true,
negligence or intentionally delivered does not really matter because
as of this writing (1/16/2021) 92,775,578 cases have been reported
with 1,986,842 COVID-19 deaths. About 29% of reported cases are
attributable to North America with 569,333 lost souls. This is a
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solid example of what a BW can do if not contained or breached
countermeasures. (Google, 2021)
[6] LD50 of as toxin, radiation, or pathogen is the dose required to
kill half the members of a tested population after a specified test
duration. LD50 figures are frequently used as a general indicator of
a substance’s acute toxicity. A lower LD50 is indicative of increased
toxicity. (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010)
[7] Anthrax is the Greek word for coal
[8] Virus is Latin for “poisonous slime.”
[9] Think movie Minority Report where Tom Cruise replaces his
eye to bypass biometric security controls and as he passes optical
readers at a mall, the stores pitch him for their goods based on the
wrong profile.
[10] Recognize that the government and LEO all have access to
this data. LEO does use DNA data responsibly to solve outstanding
felony cases. However, it is up for grabs whether we believe that the
government is so attentive and responsible with our private data.
[11] There is little definitive proof that the breaches were related to
the DNA data thefts.
[12] Quantum computing is in its infancy. There is plenty of research
money and a few startups making a run for this technology. There is
lots of hype but not much “commercial beef.”
[13] For example, USAID PREDICT received approximately $200
million over ten years, a fraction of the $2 trillion in emergencyrelief spending authorized by Congress as a response to COVID-19
as of March 2020 (Schmidt, 2020).
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